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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates a major change in U.S. Government research and
development policy away from its traditional mission‐based model, toward a distinctly
commercially‐oriented research approach. The SEMATECH project is offered as an
example of a Government Industry Partnership (GIP) dedicated to the development of
dual‐use programs (DUP) with the stated purpose of regaining technological superiority
and market dominance in the production of a technology that had significant
implications to national economic and military security. The study, builds upon the
previous research of Horrigan, 1996; Porter, 1990; Geisler, 1993, 1997, 2003; Fong,
2000; Harlen 2008, 2010; and Brown, 2010. The study utilizes the process tracing
methodology, and structured interviews to make some level of commentary concerning
the effectiveness of the SEMATECH model and whether or not this model enabled the
government and its primary sponsor, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) to acquire any tangible technological benefits (equities) for the funds invested.
This study also endeavors to ascertain under what conditions DARPA contributed to the
success of this project, and if the government served a distinct and necessary purpose in
advancing competitiveness. The study presents unexpected findings concerning the
government equities that should have emerged from SEMATECH. The unexpected
ii

findings reveal that the government did not receive any tangible return on its
investment in SEMATECH in part because it did, or could not focus its efforts on
repeatedly emphasized government research agendas. This inability to advance its
research interest is a direct result of how SEMATECH was formed, and how it was
funded. In spite of the severe limitations associated with the U.S. government’s
abdication of direction setting prerogatives, DARPA still managed to make contributions
that were necessary to the success of SEMATECH’s commercial and competitive
objectives. Conclusions include indications that policy structured using SEMATECH as a
model may not be the best model upon which to build future GIPs which focus on DUPs.
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TIMELINE
KEY MILESTONES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEMATECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (modified‐‐‐Browning and Shelter 2000)
1979 Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Program is created.
1971 (SEMI) The Semiconductors Equipment and Materials Institute is formed.
1977 (SIA) The Semiconductor Industry Association is formed.
1979 Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Program is created.
1982 (SRC) The Semiconductor Research Corporation is formed.
1983‐94 (MCC) Microelectronics Computer and Technology Corporation
Founded
1984 (NCRA) National Co‐operative Research Act is signed. This Act enables
industries to engage in collaborative research without fear of breaking anti‐trust
laws.
1985, 86, 87 U.S. share of global markets in semiconductors drops to all time
lows.
June 1986 SIA polls members on need for collaborative efforts to stop declines
Nov. 1986 SIA creates SEMATECH (Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology
Consortium) SEMATECH and its steering committee begins to lobby Congress
for government support and for trade sanctions to gain time for a coordinated
response by U.S. industry.
Dec. 1986 (DSB) The Defense Science Board task force reports to Congress on the
link between national security and semiconductors. Report is leaked to media.
The report calls for the establishment of a manufacturing technology which
involves both government and industry.
Mar 3, 1987 SIA Board approves the founding of SEMATECH
Mar 10, 1987 Work on the “Black Book” begins
May 12, 1987 “Black Book” approved by SIA Board
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Mar‐Aug 1987 Interested parties technology plans and operational plans for
SEMATECH. Lobbying for government support begins in earnest. Additional
recruitment of semiconductor firms and semiconductor manufacturing firms
continues. Technology Phase I‐III goals and objectives are established.
Sept 1987 SEMI/SEMATECH formed…Separate organization comprised members
of SEMATECH and SEMI. This organization begins the work of technical advisory
boards.
Sept. 1987 CBO report on Benefits and Risks of Federal Funding for SEMATECH
Report notes that three large federal agencies have a stake in semiconductor
research. They are DOD, DOE and NSF. Report notes two possible ways to
oversee SEMATECH either wholly thru the DOD and or an ad hoc committee with
representatives to the DOD, DOE and the NSF.
Dec. 1987 Legislation authorizing the DOD to participate and fund SEMATECH is
passed.
1988, April Van Atta’s Microelectronics Manufacturing Technology: a Defense
Perspective is published.
Late spring 1988 DARPA who oversees and administers government’s
participation in SEMATECH tells Board to appoint CEO and or loose funding.
May 12, 1988 Memorandum of Understanding between SEMATECH and DARPA
signed
Oct‐Nov 1988 Major reorganization of SEMATECH.
Feb. 1989 Major shift in operational and research objectives switch from focus
on manufacturing to focus on producers of semiconductor manufacturing
equipment.
Mar 1989 Phase I milestone met.
1990 Phase II milestone met.
1990 Defense Cutbacks threaten non‐renewal of government funding. Three of
the original 14 members resign. Reorganization efforts undertaken. New
formulas for determining Return On Investment (ROI) and agenda determination
are established.
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1991 Master list of fifty eight deliverables is developed. This list is more related
to all members’ agenda’s and supplier issues.
Dec 1991 SEMATECH II adopted an implemented
Jan 1992 Government funding renewed. SEMATECH develops ties to (NIST), and
SRC strengthens as defense conversion begins.
Aug. 1992 Competitive position is believed to be restored. Many believe, and do
so to this day, that this is not solely attributable to SEMATECH but is rather the
result of changes in demand conditions, and industry decisions to focus on ASICs,
and design‐foundry relationships.
Jan 1993. Phase III goal achieved.
1994 Then CEO William Spencer asks for no more federal funds. SEMATECH
stands on its own.
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ACRONYMS
ALP

Advanced Lithography Program

ARPA

Advanced Research Policy Agency

ASIC

Application Specific Integrated Circuit

CBO

Congressional Budget Office

COC

Council on Competitiveness
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General Accountability Office
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Government Industry Partnership

GUIP

Government‐University‐Industry Partnerships
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Institute for Defense Analysis

ITAR

International Treaty on Arms Reduction

MCC

Microelectronics Computer and Technology Corporation

MARCO

Microelectronics Advanced Research Corporation
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: WHY STUDY DARPA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH SEMATECH
Study Overview:

SEMATECH is one of the first examples of a change in U.S. Government research
and industrial policy away from mission‐based research to commercially‐oriented
research. Started by the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), SEMATECH received
funding from the U.S. Government and from consortium members to engage in pre‐
competitive technology development with the stated purpose of regaining technological
superiority and market dominance in the production and sale of certain types of
technology driving semiconductors called Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAMs).
SEMATECH is positioned within a similar group of efforts funded by industry to
prevent further erosion of technological expertise to Japan, The Microelectronics and
Computer Technology Corporation (MCC), and a program funded by the U.S.
Government, the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Program (VHSIC). Both of these
programs were created to engage in what Fong describes as “the intentional creation of
technology and industrial policy in explicit support of U.S. economic competitiveness”
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(Fong 2000). Whereas VHSIC and MCC programs are perceived to have not delivered all
that they were expected to (Fong 2000), SEMATECH is perceived to have made lasting
and significant contributions to the resurgence of this particular portion of the U.S.
semiconductor and electronics industry (Wessner 2003).
Even though the project expired in the mid‐90’s, research on SEMATECH
continues (Grimes 2010) and remains relevant to this date. SEMATECH was, and
continues to be, the foundation upon which current Government Industry Partnerships
(GIP) in both the United States and other countries have been modeled (Wessner 2003,
85). In addition, research on SEMATECH remains relevant and important as SEMATECH
was one of the first of what have come to be known as Dual‐Use Programs (DUP)s and is
the model upon which other and current Dual‐Use Programs have been built (Doane
1995). Dual Use Programs are defined by Moteff as:
programs [that] typically involve consortia that include commercially oriented firms. The
research agenda is negotiated with industry and aims to address the common needs of both the
commercial and military sector. Industry cost‐shares the project. The ‘agreements’ are
negotiated outside the Federal regulations for grants or contracts. This is particularly important
because it frees firms from having to provide specified cost‐and‐accounting data and allows more
flexibility in negotiating technical data rights. …The projects also tend to address technologies
and technical issues with relatively near term application [there is less commercial interest in
long‐term exploratory research] (Moteff 1995).

Although SEMATECH may have had substantial positive effects on the U.S.
semiconductor industry including the resurgence of the industry, technology spillovers,
patents filed, technologies transferred and processes adopted‐to name a few:
SEMATECH did not necessarily deliver tangible benefits or “equities”1 to the U.S.
1

Richard Van Atta interview conducted by author Jan 2011. Hereafter, this interview will be referred to
as Van Atta 2011 and will appear parenthetically in the text.
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government. Equities are one of Richard Van Atta’s terms and refer to the accumulation
of tangible benefits and technologies tied to specific thrusts in research. In the case of
SEMATECH these equities would be tied to the development of Application Specific
Integrated Circuits and their concomitant production methodologies and advanced
forms of lithography. Wessner (2003) asserts that some more current programs founded
on the SEMATECH model are not delivering dual use technologies to industry and
government agencies.
Keeping in mind that SEMATECH was successful on these industry issues listed
above, but not necessarily successful in delivering “equities” to the U.S. Government,
this study’s purpose will be to provide commentary on two issues. The first issue is an
assessment of the SEMATECH model. Specifically, is SEMATECH a good model for GIPs
that are tasked with the creation, oversight and general management of DUPs? This
study will show that the SEMATECH model is fundamentally flawed and is not
necessarily a good model. The other issue‐not necessarily a secondary issue‐that will be
considered is: if the model is flawed, can a government agency make any contributions,
other than financial, to ensure the success of industry‐led, inter‐sector R&D consortia?
Introduction:

The SEMATECH project was operational at a unique time in U.S. history. It would
seem prudent to review the macro‐zeitgeist of the United States during SEMATECH’s
formative years. Many Americans no longer recall how threatened the United States
was by the Japanese economy, nor necessarily believe that Japan was ever really as big
a threat as was perceived. Japan’s economy has not performed nearly as well in the
3

1990’s or first decade of 2000 as it had in the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and
consequently this sense of disbelief. However, in the 1980s Japan was a real threat to
the United States. Works such as Rich Nation, Strong Army (Samuels 1994), and the
fictitious book, The Rising Sun (Crichton 1992), present a very compelling portrait of
America’s pre‐occupation with the Japanese industrial juggernaut.
“Back then there was a huge concern [about] the loss of the basic equipment
manufacturing base and silicon wafers and basic semiconductor technology and
manufacturing in the United States going overseas.”2 (Bandy 2011) What William Bandy
notes was not just a concern of the semiconductor industry it was a concern of
American industry at large. By the 1980s the Japanese, in particular, had secured a
significant market presence in the United States in the steel industry, the automobile
industry, and the consumer electronics industry (particularly televisions and personal
electronic devices) in Colorado, they were even expected to take over the ski industry
through their acquisition of three local ski resorts.3 To say that business in the United
States was becoming xenophobic about the Japanese might be a gross understatement.
The methodologies by which the Japanese had secured this market presence will
continue to be debated for quite some time. Brown and Linden (Brown 2010) would say
that Japanese success was a result of Japan’s industrial structure: government and

2

William Bandy interview conducted by author, Jan. 2011. Hereafter, this interview will be referred to as
Bandy 2011 and will appear parenthetically in the text.
3

Comments concerning the Japanese success in the steel, automobile, consumer electronics industry,
were taken from interviews conducted by the author in the early 1990s.
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industry working together under the auspices of the Ministry for International Trade and
Industry (MITI). Japanese success was also the result of Japanese business regulations
and its industry structure: a structure formed around Keiretsus. Each Keiretsu is
overseen by a bank. Each bank has an interlocking network of board members who
control not only the bank but the industries that the bank lends money to. The result of
these interlocking boards is arguably a significant reduction in the cost of capital. In
addition to this industry structure, Brown and Linden hint that the Japanese just “beat
us at our own game.” The Japanese out‐competed the United States using American
methodologies. For instance, Statistical Quality Analysis (SQA) was invented in the
United States by W. Edwards Deming. SQA was used to help the United States produce
products to fight, and eventually win, a war on two fronts. Even though SQA and its
corollary management and production techniques were invented here in the United
States, they were transferred to Japan where they were adopted and massively
improved on by Japanese industry after the Second World War. The legacy of this
improvement remains to this day. The Deming Prize for quality is bestowed in Japan.
Whatever theory is used to explain Japan’s ascendancy to industrial dominance, the fact
remains that Japan had come to represent a bona‐fide threat to the economic interests
of the United States in the 1980s.
The perceived threat of Japanese economic dominance was not the only threat
that concerned the United States in the 1980s. The United States was also in the midst
of the technological challenges associated with President Reagan’s ambition to win the
Cold War. The technology of this era was heavily scrutinized and overseen to ensure
5

that the Soviet Bloc did not catch up with the United States and its NATO allies. Many
government programs and regulations were enacted at the time to ensure that U.S.
technological and military security was kept at the forefront of America’s political and
economic agenda. As an example, the United States created the Committee on Foreign
Direct Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review any potential acquisitions of
U.S. domiciled businesses to prevent said business technologies from falling into the
hands of the “evil empire.” Even though Japan was an ally of the United States, many of
their acquisitions were reviewed by CFIUS. An embarrassing incident revealed that
Toshiba (a major Japanese corporation) had sold propeller milling technology to the
Russians which allowed the Russians to produce propeller blades for Russian
submarines (Chira, 1987). The book, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States,
notes that the CFIUS reviewed hundreds of cases and only denied one (Graham and
Krugman 1995). Although this statistic speaks to a bona‐fide victory for free trade
advocates, it does reveal the extent of real or perceived paranoia and xenophobia of
that time concerning technological security.
During the 1980s the Reagan Administration was beefing up U.S. conventional
military forces, nuclear forces and developing the highly controversial “Star Wars”
program. Star Wars, as its name insinuates, was a space‐based system that was
purported to be able to destroy Russian Inter‐Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in
their trajectory paths. The net result of Reagan era security policy was a substantial
increase in defense costs. In spite of a burgeoning budget associated with Reagan’s
security initiatives, the DOD began to look for ways to reduce costs across programs,
6

especially the costs of technology. One proposed methodology for reducing cost was
the concept of “spinning‐on” technology. If the DOD was going to reduce costs and
bring technologies into defense agencies much quicker than it had, it was going to have
to work with industry in a new manner a manner in which technological development
and technology change were first advanced and successfully commercialized by industry
and then adopted by the government. This new methodology would be opposite of the
basic research, spin‐off process through which the United States emerged as an
economic superpower.
Richard Van Atta thought it important to provide a more micro‐insight on the
zeitgeist of the time.

Van Atta spoke about the sense of urgency felt by the

semiconductor industry and which was more demonstrated by the tireless work of
semiconductor luminaries, Bob Noyce and Jack Kilby. These men, the co‐inventors of
the micro‐circuit, were very concerned about the precipitous state of the industry so
much so that they wanted to find a mechanism for getting the focus of national
attention upon it. Working through the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), and
lobbying personally in Washington D.C., Noyce and Kilby made the round of government
agencies looking for someone to help craft a national response. The DOD was but one
of many potential and appropriate agencies for doing so. Although the DOD, DOE and
DOC were receptive, it seemed to be agreed that the most significant obstacle that may
have been faced by both industry and interested government agencies was how to get
together to craft a plan and do so without attracting the attention of the Department of
Justice. Van Atta recalled how he and Bob Burmeister brought many of the principal
7

players in the semiconductor industry together at the U.S. Naval Academy (story
presented in Appendix A). This proto‐meeting of industry heavy hitters served to break
down some of the barriers between intense corporate rivals. Members of industry were
concerned not only with attracting the interests of the DOJ, but also with not attracting
the intellectual interests of their competitors over such issues as proprietary products
and proprietary processes. This reasonable paranoia was hindering the advancement of
a coordinated response to the loss of competitiveness. The auspicious meeting and the
more cordial relationships that came out of it resulted in further talks conducted
throughout 1987 (Van Atta 2011). Eventually, industry and the government would come
closer together, meeting under the auspices of the Defense Science Board (DSB).
The SEMATECH project was undertaken and pushed further along by the DSB.
The seminal report on the condition of the semiconductor industry in the United States
was the DSB Report. This report indicated that the military security of the United States
was at risk. The report emphasized that:
U.S. defense strategy relies upon technologically superior weapons to overcome the numerical
advantage of our adversaries. Our capability to field technologically superior weapons may soon,
however, be dangerously diminished. The superiority of U.S. defense systems of all types is
directly dependent upon superior electronics, a force multiplier which not only enhances the
performance of the weapons themselves, but also maximizes the efficiency of their application
upon which much of our defense strategy and capabilities are built. The United States has
historically been the technological leader in electronics. However, superiority in the application
of innovation no longer exists and the relative stature of our technology base in this area is
steadily deteriorating. As evidenced by market share and the perception of the technical and
financial communities, the United States' semiconductor device and related upstream industries,
such as those that supply silicon materials or processing equipment, are losing the commercial
and technical leadership they have historically held in important aspects of process technology
and manufacturing, as well as product design and innovation (Report of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on Defense Semiconductor Dependency 1987).

The paragraph only hints at the depth of the content in the report when it
speaks of the technological superiority of U.S. electronics and how this electronic
8

superiority enhances the ability of the U.S. military branches in support of their
missions. This level of electronic superiority was the result of long‐standing investments
in technology, but investments that had lapsed for different reasons such as changes in
U.S. Research and Development (R&D) policies (to be discussed shortly), and the growth
of focus in the electronics industry toward the profitability that was to be made in the
commercial sector.
The parts of the DSB report that spoke to the loss of “stature in technology”
coincided (not accidentally)4 with the efforts of the (SIA) to find a way to address the de‐
facto loss of worldwide market share in DRAMs. While these security and industry
events were occurring, the United States was witnessing a change in federal research
policy. Prior to the mid‐1980s U.S. research policy had been dominated by the
philosophy of Vannevar Bush.5 The Bush Doctrine centered on research and
development conducted under the auspices of mission‐based agencies. These R&D
efforts strengthened and protected the military security of the United States and
occasionally some of this mission‐based technology managed to spin itself off into
commercial markets and assist with overall economic development (Link 2006). How‐
4

Many of the members consulting with the Defense Science Board were also members of the SIA or
consulting with the SRC.
5

Vannevar Bush is considered, by some, to be the father of post war research doctrine in the United
States. Bush is credited with creating the Office of Scientific Research and Development, supervising the
Manhattan Project and with assisting the U.S. in winning the war by demonstrating that technology was
crucial to that effort. (“As we may think.”) psu.edu (10.1.1.128.2127.pdf)
Link (2006) equates the pipeline model of innovation with Bush. The pipeline model is presented as
follows. Basic ResearchApplied ResearchDevelopmentEnhanced ProductionEconomic Growth
(Link 2006, 19)
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ever, during the 1980s, it was becoming apparent that the technological needs of
domestic industry were beginning to surpass the technological needs of the government
in the development of, especially, computing technologies. It was also becoming
apparent that domestic industry was not leading the world in the advancement of these
same critical technologies. Endeavoring to catch up with industry and it superior
technological base, the U.S. Government began to look for ways to spin the technology
onto (called spin‐ons) government agencies and government projects (Alic 1992). While
doing this, the U.S. Government was also looking to ensure that economic and military
security was maintained in the face of international competition.
Initially, the U.S. Government tried to spin‐on and develop IT technology under
the auspices of the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Program (VHSIC). VHSIC was a
program that was started in 1979 as a countermeasure to Japan’s Very Large Scale
Integrated Circuit Program (VLSI). By 1987, it was becoming apparent the VHSIC project
was not going to deliver the technological breakthroughs that had been envisioned.
Fong postulates that one of the main reasons that the VHSIC program did not work was
that the government was too involved in the project and did not give industry the
freedom it needed to move the VHSIC project along (Fong 1991).
While the government and industry were working on the VHSIC project, industry
was working on a different but related computer technology project. Concerned that
the Japanese were beginning to, and would eventually dominate the computer market
for both PCs and supercomputers, the U.S. computer industry created the
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Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC). MCC was started in
1982 as a response to Japan’s “Fifth Generation Project.” The aim of Japan’s project
was to create a wholly new computer by 1991. American industry was exceedingly
concerned about this. Although MCC had a long life (1982‐2000) it was not entirely
successful. Horrigan notes that MCC was not successful for two reasons: 1) “a
membership that was not committed to the ‘basic science’ thrust of the consortium’s
initial research mission…and 2) MCC did not involve the government in its initial
activities. When the consortium eventually turned to the government for support, the
programs it hoped to rely upon for support did not grow at the anticipated rates”
(Horrigan 1996, 280).
The Significance of SEMATECH:

Although SEMATECH is a highly emulated and adopted model, (Wessner 2003)
SEMATECH is significant in respect to MCC and VHSIC because SEMATECH is situated in
the middle of the organizational parameters of VHSIC and MCC. The VHSIC project was
organized and managed by the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government aggressively
sought out the input of participation of industry to ensure that any new mission based
computing technology would not be behind industry. MCC, on the other hand, was
organized and managed by industry, largely ignoring the government. MCC would later
in its life try to involve the government in some of its research thrusts, but by then, it
was too late (Horrigan 1996). SEMATECH is unique in that it was organized by industry,
but industry intentionally sought out and secured government assistance and
consultation from the outset. Although SEMATECH would receive 50% of its funding
11

from the government, SEMATECH was managed by industry. It would seem that this
arrangement solved the problem of either too much government involvement in a
project (VHSIC) or no government participation (MCC). As a result of the novelty of this
structure, SEMATECH was heralded as a wholly new organizational form and a new
methodology under which industrial R&D could take place (Evans 1990).
The second reason SEMATECH should be compared to its contemporaries and
more thoroughly investigated is that SEMATECH has been heralded as being successful.
Both Fong and Horrigan respectively, claim that VHSIC and MCC were not entirely
successful. SEMATECH was successful because of: 1) of its longevity…SEMATECH
continues to endure to this date, even though it is no longer a direct recipient of
government funds 2) the consortium generated “spillovers” 3) the consortium
generated numerous patents 4) the consortium’s research projects generated process
improvements that became manifested in actual usable products 5) the consortium was
able to overcome its formulation difficulties 6) the consortium was able to meet the
technological targets it set in spite of obvious challenges concerning proprietary
intellectual property 7) the consortium was able to survive a dramatic restructuring of
its research agenda 8) the consortium was able to maintain membership in spite of
changes to its research agenda (criteria culled from numerous articles including:
Deininger,1994 Grindley,1994 Spencer, 1993 Irwin, 1996 Caryannis, 2004 and Berman,
1996).
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In spite of this success, and for many reasons, SEMATECH remains enigmatic and
an excellent focus for study. It is true that the government did participate in the
SEMATECH project. However, government participation, at least as evidenced by the
literature, seems to simply have involved financial contributions and occasional reports
to Congress on SEMATECH’s activity. This level of contribution would hardly seem an
adequate methodology for ensuring that the U.S. Government would become the
beneficiary of spin‐ons. Mere financial contributions do not seem an adequate
methodology for ensuring the creation of technology utilizing public funds, nor does it
seem an adequate methodology for managing and or overseeing DUPs. With this
assertion in mind, this study will test the following hypothesis:
SEMATECH is a good model for creating, overseeing and managing Dual Use
Programs ensuring that the government sponsoring agency is able to secure
tangible benefits.
The U.S. Government’s interests in SEMATECH ultimately came under the
purview of, and were expected to be, represented by The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA was given a seat on the Board of Directors at
SEMATECH but no effective voting power. This curious structure in and of itself
warrants investigation. Without a vote how could the government hope to advance its
interests (interests that focused on the development of newer technologies and the
application of the innovations embedded in those technologies) in the SEMATECH
project if it had no control mechanisms other than the power of the purse?
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If this is a reasonable assumption, we may consider and test the following
hypothesis…
A government agency (DARPA) can make real positive contributions to industry
led research consortia other than acting as an overseer of public venture capital.
This is a somewhat novel hypothesis and the investigation therein may prove to be
pregnant with possibility. To date, DARPA’s interaction and management of the
SEMATECH project has been only briefly investigated. This is a substantial void in the
literature on SEMATECH and something that this study hopes to remedy.
The Methodology for Testing the Hypothesis:

Several challenges conspired to direct the methodology by which this research
was conducted. The first challenge was a problem of records. DARPA’s records
associated with the SEMATECH project were purported to have been lost when DARPA
moved into different facilities. SEMATECH’s records concerning its formulative years
and operations conducted with DARPA are simply no longer available to the public. With
these constraints in mind, and in order to create a robust research approach, the
potential research methodologies became quickly limited. As a result of these record
constraints, secondary sources were used to present a history of SEMATECH. That
history was then compared, contrasted and or corroborated with the records of other
government agencies monitoring the SEMATECH project as mandated by Congress. The
result of this research was the cataloging of events that were crucial to the investigation
of the hypothesis under investigation. How DARPA and SEMATECH responded to
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certain events such as appointing a CEO, developing a research agenda, working through
intra‐industry problems, and a host of other issues which will be presented later, set the
SEMATECH project on particular paths. The study of path dependencies can be done
using process tracing and this then is the research methodology employed herein.
Once the historical analysis was conducted and some path dependent incidents
discovered, a series of questions were devised. These questions (Appendix C) were then
discussed with the following: Richard Van Atta Ph.D., William Bandy Ph.D., William
Spencer Ph.D., Craig Fields Ph.D., and a DARPA official who asked to remain anonymous.
Van Atta and Bandy were interviewed in person. Spencer was interviewed via
telephone, and the remaining respondents provided answers to the interview questions
via email. To endeavor to achieve some consistency and validity, all respondents were
asked the same questions.
Each of the respondents had a major role in SEMATECH. The five persons
interviewed were recommended by each other. As this study endeavors to capture the
government’s side of the SEMATECH story, William Spencer was the only industry
representative who was interviewed. However, as the CEO of SEMATECH he would
have been in a position to interact with DARPA and Congress. He would also have had
to read and “sign off” on annual audits of SEMATECH. As such, he was in a unique
position to be aware of the U.S. Government’s research demands. The credentials of
these individuals follow.
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William J. Spencer holds a Ph.D. in physics from Kansas University and is a
fellow at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. (IEEE) Dr. Spencer
was a Director of several programs at Sandia from 1973‐1981. He has held the
following positions at SEMATECH: CEO 1992‐1997 Chairman of the Board
SEMATECH, 1997‐2000 and Chairman Emeritus International SEMATECH, since
2000. Dr. Spencer teaches at the University of Texas, Austin. (Bio courtesy of
Bloomberg Business Week)
William R. Bandy Ph.D. joined the NSA in 1967. He was detailed to
DARPA in 1985 and was the Program Manager for SEMATECH in 1988. In 1989 he
was named the Executive Director of the National Advisory Committee on
Semiconductors. William Bandy returned to NSA in 1990 and retired in 1999 to
found several different companies. (Bio courtesy of Innurvation, Dr. Bandy’s
newest company)
Richard Van Atta Ph.D. is a Senior Research Analyst for the Institute of
Defense Analysis. Dr. Van Atta was with the DOD as a Special Assistant for Dual
Use Technology Policy. Dr. Van Atta teaches at Georgetown in the School of
International Studies. (Bio courtesy of Georgetown)
Craig I. Fields Ph.D. joined DARPA in 1974 and went on to be the Director
of DARPA from 1988‐1990. Dr. Fields was the CEO of MCC from 1990‐1994. Dr.
Fields was the Director of the DSB from 1995‐2001. He received an IEEE award
for Excellence in Public Service in 1992. (Bio courtesy of Sourcewatch.org)
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How This Study Will Proceed:

Chapter Two will present a Literature Review that informed and inspired this
study. The literature on SEMATECH is rather vast and is drawn from the fields of public
policy, economics, technology policy, management, cooperation, political economy, and
others. In spite of the breadth of literature there is very little within this corpus that
specifically discusses and or addresses the hypotheses under consideration for this
study. Chapter Two therefore explores those aspects of the literature that provided
kernels of doubt and or inklings of possibility.
Chapter Three will present the history of SEMATECH in its formative years and
will establish conditions which propelled SEMATECH down a path towards the selection
of a government partner. Ultimately, the history presented about this will leave an
uncomfortable feeling about the future of SEMATECH. Partnered with a government
agency it did not entirely trust SEMATECH seems doomed from the outset, yet it
survives. The literature does not help explain this.
Chapter Four will build on SEMATECH’s history during some of the years in which
it operated with direct government support. It will be established that SEMATECH was
repeatedly made aware of its inability to direct some research efforts towards the
needs, wants and desires of the government. Some aspects of the literature endeavor
to explain this phenomenon, but fall short. In addition, a series of events will be
chronicled under the separate leadership regimes of Noyce and Spencer. These events,
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theory tells us should have resulted in SEMATECH’s demise. The literature has little to
offer in the way of explanation for this either.
Both Chapters Three and Chapter Four combine to form an alternative
perspective of SEMATECH and served to generate a series of interview questions that
were addressed to the principal actors noted above.
Chapter Five will argue that the DOD and subsequently, DARPA became the
agency to oversee the SEMATECH project, as it was the only agency that could attach
SEMATECH’s mission to the issue of national security. Attaching SEMATECH to national
security issues was both a bane and a blessing. Linking SEMATECH to national security
allowed the Reagan Administration to bypass the then raging debates concerning
“picking winners” and maintained the Administration’s stance on America’s laissez‐faire
economic philosophy. Once the Reagan Administration unburdened itself of the
SEMATECH issue, it moved to Congress. The movement to Congress would prove to be
the “bane” of the SEMATECH effort. Congress elected to fund SEMATECH under the
auspices of a grant, effectively removing the ability of the government to provide any
research direction to the SEMATECH effort.
Chapter Five will demonstrate that SEMATECH was able to succeed because
DARPA was able to push SEMATECH in just the direction it was needed at just the right
time. Chapter Five endeavors to capture the wealth of knowledge imparted during the
interviews.
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Chapter Six challenges the success of SEMATECH. This chapter will reveal that
SEMATECH was not all that it might have been for the U.S. Government. In short,
SEMATECH did not deliver any tangible benefits or “equities” to the U.S. Government as
a result of its research endeavors. SEMATECH could not do this because of the manner
in which it was founded and the manner in which it was funded and thus it is not a good
model upon which to build DUPs. In spite of the flaws with this model, Chapter Six
establishes that DARPA did make significant contributions to the SEMATECH effort.
Chapter Summary:

Chapter One established that SEMATECH was created as a response to significant
macro and micro phenomena acting on the semiconductor industry and the U.S.
Government. SEMATECH was but one of three initiatives endeavoring to ensure the
continued competitiveness of the U.S. semiconductor industry. The VHSIC program was
a government led program endeavoring to ensure that the U.S. remained ahead of the
Japanese in the creation of high speed circuits. The MCC program was led and funded
by industry to ensure that the United States stayed at the forefront of computing
technology. SEMATECH was a program led by industry and funded equally by industry
and government.
Fong and Horrigan have claimed that VHSIC and MCC were not entirely
successful. The reasons are in part attributed to a dominance of the research agenda at
VHSIC by government interests. MCC was not entirely successful because it did not
enjoy any financial support or research input from the government. SEMATECH was
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positioned between these two programs as a program funded by both parties but
controlled primarily by industry. Such an organization was considered to be a wholly
new organizational form that appeared to simultaneously solve both the problems of
dominance by government (VHSIC) and a lack of government expertise (MCC).
This study suggests that SEMATECH should continue to be investigated because
it is the foundation model upon which more GIPs have been modeled. To date
however, only a small number of studies have evaluated the success or lack thereof, of
SEMATECH from the government’s perspective. Two hypotheses have presented to add
to the government’s perspective on SEMATECH. The first hypothesis will be tested as a
means of analyzing whether SEMATECH was successful in providing tangible benefits to
the government. A second hypothesis will test whether a government agency has
contributions, other than financial to make to industry led research consortia ensuring
success.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview:

The purpose of this study is to twofold. The first objective is to provide
commentary on the effectiveness of the SEMATECH model in the crafting of public
policy directed towards, and used in the management of, Dual‐Use Programs (DUP)s.
This study will also investigate what specific contributions DARPA made to the
SEMATECH project ensuring its success. The two hypotheses under consideration arose
from a rather broad review of the SEMATECH literature: a literature that draws from the
disciplines of public policy, economics, political science, security, comparative public
policy, organizational development and management to name but a few. The bulk of
this literature recognizes that DARPA was on the Board of Directors at SEMATECH and
that DARPA had no voting power at this level. This fact apparently leads to a blanket
perception that DARPA was a mere financial conduit and financial overseer of the
SEMATECH project. This study will argue that this perception is unfounded. In spite of a
silenced vote, which ensured that the government would not receive‐what Van Atta
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(2011) refers to as “equities,” DARPA played a critical role in the success of SEMATECH
overall.
In order to facilitate a more thorough understanding of the vast literature on
SEMATECH this study will review the literature utilizing the following schema.
1) Material that informs this study and facilitates analysis
2) Material that helps define ‘success’ in the SEMATECH case.
3) Material that helps conceptualize what happened what did not happen, or what
could have happened.
4) Material that produced hypotheses that are misinformed or wrong.
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The Literature:

The literature on SEMATECH has considerable commentary concerning the
obstacles that SEMATECH was able to overcome in relation to the interests and intent of
industry. Although “by industry for industry,” (Van Atta 2011) SEMATECH was a
government‐sponsored‐industry‐led research consortium and thus it would be valuable
to explore how the government was able or not able, to address obstacles that it faced
during its tenure with SEMATECH.
Although “by industry, for industry” SEMATECH did have three initial goals
which endeavored to balance the interests of both industry and the government. Those
goals were:
Goal 1) to develop the technology that would facilitate the creation of ever
smaller line widths on semiconductor substrates
Goal 2) to return the United States to its position of pre‐eminence and
dominance in the semiconductor industry as a whole and finally
Goal 3) establish a robust domestic industry that could meet the needs of the
Department of Defense (goals derived from Browning 2000, Mayer 1989).
There were immediate problems with two of these goals. The first problem
dealt with issues of measures of success. The second problem with these goals was:
whose success was being measured? Goal 1 is easily measurable whether you are
considering success from an industrial or government perspective. Goals 2 and 3 will
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produce different conceptions of success depending on whose perspective the question
is coming from.
Goal1) being able to produce line widths of more discrete tolerances is a physical
process and this can easily be evaluated using scientific methods and by merely pointing
to the physical machinery produced and the products that role off of that machinery. As
a result, this literature review will not discuss this goal. The other two goals however
are not easily observed or assessed and thus the literature review in relation to these
goals will be more extensive.
The second expressed goal of SEMATECH to return the United States to its
position of pre‐eminence and dominance in the semiconductor industry as a whole is
very difficult to measure. Reaching a categorical conclusion about the overall success
of SEMATECH in relation to pre‐eminence and success is problematic for several
reasons. First, industry will have its perceptions of what pre‐eminence and dominance
might mean this might be very different than the government’s indicators of success.
Some ad‐hoc indicators of success (pre‐eminence and dominance) that would be
appropriate to industry would be: percentage of global market held, increase in sales,
higher return on investment than international competitors, a higher return on assets
than international competitors, a greater yield per wafer than international
competitors, or even a better price than international competitors. The list of criteria by
which industry might measure pre‐eminence could actually vary from strategic business
unit, to strategic business unit and thus could be quite extensive.
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Some common indicators of success that could be shared by both industry and
government might typically include things as mundane and observable as patents filed,
reports published, reports referenced in the academic, scientific and technical journals;
presentations given etc. To be fair to all parties participating in SEMATECH, it would
seem logical to ask what the government might have considered, or considers as an
indicator(s) of success? The literature reveals that a simple answer to this question does
not now, nor did not necessarily exist during the U.S. Government’s tenure with
SEMATECH. In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. Government was transitioning from agency
led development as the principal means for performing R&D and maintaining national
competitiveness in technology development to a more broadly based set of models
from which to choose. Given this transition, and the broadness of criteria that might be
have been used and is still used to establish success from three different perspectives ‐
industry, common, government ‐ the literature associated with SEMATECH can easily
appear to be unstructured or even a little schizophrenic. However, the underpinnings
are strong.
The third goal of the SEMATECH project establish a robust domestic industry that
could meet the needs of the Department of Defense is also, not so easy to evaluate.
What does this statement mean? Does this mean an industry that successfully spins‐on
technology to the Department of Defense? Does this mean an industry that has a
wholly domestic value chain? Does this mean an industry that excludes international
relationships? Again, the answer to these questions is somewhat dependent on who
asks the question.
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Considerable effort was put into trying to write simple statements that would
facilitate an evaluation of the rather broad goals established by SEMATECH. Ultimately,
two hypotheses did emerge though. They are:
1) SEMATECH is a good model for creating, overseeing and managing Dual‐use
Programs ensuring that the government sponsoring agency is able to secure tangible
benefits.
2) A government agency (DARPA) can make real positive contributions to industry led
research consortia other than acting as an overseer of public venture capital.

Making sense of the literature that might address these hypotheses is best done using a
four dimensional schema that focuses on:
1) Material that informs this study and facilitates analysis.
2) Material that helps define ‘success’ in the SEMATECH case.
3) Material that helps conceptualize what happened what did not happen, or
what could have happened.
4) Material that produced hypotheses that are misinformed or wrong.
Material That Informs this Study and Facilitates Analysis:

Prior to the formation of SEMATECH, success in government industry research
was rooted in the “spin‐off model” associated with Vannevar Bush (1945). Link
describes the model which emerged from Bush’s work, Science‐The Endless Frontier, as
a linear process that begins with “Basic Research‐which leads to Applied Research‐which
leads to Development‐which leads to Enhanced Production‐which finishes with
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Economic Growth” (Link 2006, 19). This, chain link model is most often associated with
the creation of spin‐offs. Moteff equates the chain link/spin‐off models with what he
calls Dual‐Use Technologies (DUT)s. Unlike decades of federally sponsored research
conducted under the V. Bush model SEMATECH and the U.S. Government’s interests
would intersect in what Moteff labeled Dual‐Use Programs (DUP)s. Dual‐use
technologies and dual‐use programs are somewhat different and emerge as a result of
different philosophies towards technology development. Moteff defines dual‐use
technology as:
[programs in which] the DOD defines the research to be done solely based on the DOD’s needs.
[mission based research]. Data rights, etc. are specifically spelled out in regulations. If DOD pays
for all the research, it gains unlimited rights to the data. [technical data rights can be
commercialized through negotiation between the commercially oriented firm and the mission
based agency] Participants tend to be organizations dedicated to military production or small
start‐up firms, whose first customer is likely to be the DOD, or defense laboratories (Moteff
1995).

This definition embodies portions of the chain link/spin‐off concept. Firms,
under contract, develop technologies for government interests and then provide those
technologies to mission oriented government agencies. Firms may then license those
technologies for their own use or present and leverage them in the civilian market. The
flaw with mission based R&D and a “spin‐offs” is that commercialization of technologies
developed happens rarely. When however, spin‐offs do and have occur(ed) they can,
and have had, substantial economic effects. Both the computer and the internet were
spin‐ offs of defense and are a good example of the economic effects of spin‐offs.
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Moteff describes Dual‐Use Technologies Programs as:
programs [that] typically involve consortia that include commercially oriented firms. The
research agenda is negotiated with industry and aims to address the common needs of both the
commercial and military sector. Industry cost‐shares the project. The ‘agreements’ are
negotiated outside the Federal regulations for grants or contracts. This is particularly important
because it frees firms from having to provide specified cost‐and‐accounting data and allows more
flexibility in negotiating technical data rights. …The projects also tend to address technologies
and technical issues with relatively near term application [there is less commercial interest in
long‐term exploratory research] (Moteff 1995).

The technologies developed in DUPs purportedly result in “spin‐ons” to the Defense
Department. It appears to be assumed that any spin‐ons that might be created in DUPs
will create the same sort of societal benefits as the spin‐offs that have emerged from
DUTs.
Moteff’s work was selected for two reasons: 1) it uses rather generic definitions
and prevents a rush towards the definitional quagmire that distracts from the research
emphasis. 2) Wessner and Doane (op cit, respectively) note that SEMATECH was the
foundation for many other GIPs focusing on DUPs. If this study comes to some specific
conclusions on a generic model, these conclusions might then be applied to a broader N
sample of GIPs.
Moteff’s characterization of DUTs and DUPs was used to create a simple four
quadrant table that demonstrates a fundamental flaw with Dual‐Use Programs. In
Column One, the organization that initiates the R&D accrues benefits. However, in the
upper left quadrant, the spin‐off model, not only does the originator of the technology
thrust accrue benefits, but the possibility exists that someone else (industry primarily)
will benefit as well. The same does not necessarily apply in the lower left quadrant,
Column One‐Row Two. In this quadrant, there is no secondary party(s) (government
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agencies) privy to the research and thus no entity to share the benefits with other than
the industrial members who sponsor it. Column Two demonstrates as does Column
One, that the principal beneficiary of research thrust is the organization that initiates it.
However, consider that in Column Two‐Row One, there is a possibility for industry to
accrue some level of economic benefit out of a government led consortia. Whereas in
Column Two‐Row Two, it is suggested that there are questions concerning what is
supposed to accrue to the organization that does not initiate the research thrust. In
short, the government disadvantages itself in at least two of four quadrants, whereas
industry is not necessarily so disadvantaged. Industry has the opportunity to reap some
benefits from technology developed in all four quadrants. From the perspective of
government then, the spin‐on model (lower right) would seem to be characterized by a
rather large flaw. This flaw can be expressed in these questions: 1) “What should the
government get for its investment in industry led research consortia?” 2) “If the
government expects to get nothing, or in fact, does get nothing, why does it participate
at all? These are significant questions and answers to these will emerge by the end of
this study.

29

Table One
Column One

Column Two
Government Funded Inter‐Sector Co‐
operative Research

Dual‐use Technology “Spin‐Off Model”

‐
‐
‐
‐

‐

Government Agency Led
Government Agency owns
technologies produced.
Government Agency own patents
produced as a result of R&D.
Industry may license technology for
commercialization.

‐
‐

‐

Government agency invites industry
to participate in development of
technologies that have use in both
industry and DOD. Primary thrust is
rapid adoption by the DOD.
Patents are shared.
Industry accrues profitability from
providing product for DOD and from
commercialization of technologies
that are not hindered by national
security concerns.
Very High Speed Integrated Circuit
(VHSIC) Project is good example.

Inter‐Sector‐Co‐operative Research

Industry Funded Co‐operative Research

“Dual‐use Program/Spin‐On Model”
‐
‐

‐

‐

‐
‐

Industry led and wholly funded.
R&D is targeted at maintaining
industry competitiveness in face of
international competitive threat.
Results of R&D, although legally
confined to pre‐competitive
technologies, are owned by industrial
consortia but accessible to members
for commercial exploitation.
Microelectronics Computer
Technology Corporation MCC is good
example of this.

‐

‐
‐

Industry led R&D consortia
Cost shared between industry and
government.
Legally required to focus on pre‐
competitive technology development
only.
Industry or Government owns R&D,
patents, processes, machinery etc.
The government receives ????? for
money invested.

Moteff’s work and Table One combine to help define the unit of study: Dual‐Use
Programs. However, defining the unit of study does not answer the question(s)
concerning what the government, or sponsoring government agency, receive from its
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participation in industry led inter‐sector‐ R&D consortia. To address this shortcoming, it
might be helpful to define criteria for success. The following works helped define the
conditions of success for GIPs involved in DUPs.
Material That Helps Define ‘Success’ in the SEMATECH Case:

Evans and Olk have claimed that R&D consortia are a new organizational form.
Industry led inter‐sector consortia differ from joint ventures in that R&D consortia have
multiple members and that the members are all direct competitors. Evans and Olk note
that it is difficult to get inter‐sector members to agree on 1) specific goals and 2)
addressing and overcoming seven generic operational problems. These operational
problems are:
1) recruiting personnel; 2) obtaining resources; 3) recruiting new members; 4) decision making; 5)
legal issues; 6) membership turnover; 7) evaluating and producing outputs (Evans and Olk 1990).

A consequence of elusive goals and operational challenges is that managers of
consortia must deal with conflicting demands and political issues that cross member
firms. A component of success must therefore be sensitivity to every member’s needs
and objectives. Decision‐making procedures must permit input by members while
arriving at consensus quickly. If a member company is unsatisfied with the consortia
there is a high likelihood that they will quit the effort (Evans 1990).
SEMATECH, especially if analyzed from an industry perspective, appears to have
found approaches to deal with decision making procedures and a select few of the
seven generic operational issues. Analyzed however, from a government perspective,
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this study reveals that the U.S. Government had a great deal of influence in assisting
SEMATECH with items
1) Recruiting personnel: DARPA demanded that SEMATECH find a CEO.
2) Obtaining Resources: the government split the cost of the SEMATECH project.
5) Legal Issues: a number of laws were crafted or changed to facilitate the
development of pre‐competitive R&D consortia.
7) Evaluating and Producing Output: DARPA introduced the technique of
technology road‐mapping to SEMATECH to help it evaluate its various projects
and operational trajectories. However, DARPA‐because of its silenced position
on the Board of Directors‐had little ability to effect SEMATECH’s real output.
DARPA’s inability to affect SEMATECH’s output, had a dramatic affect on what
the government should, and or would, be able to claim and or measure as successes
that emerged from the public funds invested in SEMATECH. In addition to criteria 7
DARPA had a mixed ability to influence criteria 4) decision making. DARPA did not have
a vote on the Board of Directors, but did have a vote on the Technical Advisory Boards.
DARPA also had some influence on decision making at very specific times in
SEMATECH’s history. These specific times will be outlined more fully in Chapter 3 and 4.
By the conclusion of this study, it will be shown that SEMATECH did not always meet all
of the criteria for success proposed by Evans and Olk. In some cases, it did, in other
cases it did not.
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Even if government and industry are able to craft an agreement with specific
goals and overcome some, if not all of Evans’ criteria, Kelley warns that activities which
focus on commercial‐led policy are not without peril. During the 1990s the federal
government developed a new post‐Cold War commercial orientation in some of its
technology policies. These initiatives indicate a change in policy from the strictly
military‐led or mission‐driven approach. The shared goal (government and industry)
was to assist industry in achieving technical advances that provided private returns to
the innovating or technology‐using firms. Accomplishment of these goals should yield
broad social and economic benefits to the nation as a whole. However, government
agencies need to define and manage new roles and relationships with industry in order
to carry out these policies. Because of the uncertainties involved in any effort (public or
private) to advance new technologies, there will inevitably be some failures.
Government agencies defining and managing new roles are likely to meet with
obstacles. As such, the manner in which government agencies address these obstacles
will have a measure on the success of the program (Kelley 1997).
Kelley’s sentiments are taken up by Geisler. Geisler notes that government‐
university‐industry partnerships (GUIPs) have received a great deal of attention. What is
known about these relationships is largely a function of “hard myths and soft facts”
(Geisler 1997, abstract). Some of the myths are positive, others negative. A reason for
the divergent positions is a lack of congruence in methods and frameworks of study.
Geisler notes that each sector has its own criteria for measuring success where
technology cooperation is concerned. This does not mean that inter‐sector cooperation
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is not workable. Rather inter‐sector cooperation is feasible and produces results that
are of benefits to all parties. But inter‐sector cooperation is a complex phenomenon
that does not lend itself to direct measurements (Geisler 1997).
Grindley parrots Geisler admitting that it is difficult to analyze the success of
SEMATECH: “The broad goals of such undertakings, such as ‘achievement of world
leadership’ generally are affected by so many influences that they are unrealistic
yardsticks for evaluation” (Grindley 1994, 724). Yet, some measure of success must be
utilized. Grindley proposes that “evaluation focus on the specific tactics adopted to
achieve goals; provided of course that these are agreed upon at the inception of a
program” (Grindley 1994, 752).
Two Advanced Technology Program (ATP) studies contribute further to the
interests of this endeavor. The first, Dyer (2006) postulates that successful R&D
alliances hinge on three issues: 1) the composition and structure of the alliance; 2) the
governance procedures of the alliance, including contractual agreements and; 3) a
structure and management style that ensures frequent communication between
partners (Dyer 2006). The second ATP study, Petrick (2006) claims that1) the ability to
recognize and respond to changing needs over time is what characterizes a successful
R&D consortium; 2) the structure and memberships of the consortium must match the
needs of each stage of the R&D process, from discovery through reduction to practice
and into commercialization and deployment, and 3) successful R&D consortia recognize
the importance of individual member capabilities, interests, and expertise—and then
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match these member characteristics with the phase of the consortium’s R&D activities
(Petrick 2006).
Stiglitz explains that no matter what the form of a partnership, there is always
some level of responsibilities borne by each partner and a set of incentives and
directives in place to help fulfill those responsibilities. Successful partnerships have
common objectives, but even when interests among partners are “disparate” success
can be achieved. Therefore, public partnerships must focus on designing terms of the
partnerships such that public objectives can be met (Stiglitz 1999).
Larry Browning and Judy Shelter (2000) created a thorough analysis of
SEMATECH. This particular work serves two purposes in this study. First, it is the source
used to develop the history of SEMATECH which then is juxtaposed against government
documents from other government agencies. Second, Browning and Shelter’s criteria
for success will be analyzed, particular criteria two. Browning’s criteria for success are:
1) the internal matter of organizing the consortia: the issues of structuring, developing,
and managing of organized cooperation among competitors. 2) the nature of the
consortium’s business‐government relations within the shifting context of national and
international economic and political pressures and 3) the overriding need to achieve
timely and substantive manufacturing technology goals (Browning 2000, ix). This lengthy
book is particularly insightful as far as topic one is concerned. However, there is much
more to be said about SEMATECH’s government business relations. This study will
greatly expand on area two, the nature of the consortium’s business government
relationships and how these pushed SEMATECH down differing paths.
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It is not possible for any organization, no matter how big, or influential, to meet
all of the criteria for success that are listed in this section. However, these particular
authors and their works were chosen as the criteria that they set as conditions for
success should apply equally to any organization whether that organization is embodied
as a business‐business partnership or a business‐government partnership. This moves
this discussion of the literature to the next schema.
Material that helps conceptualize what happened, what did not happen, or what could have
happened:
A Novel Technology Environment:

Alic asserts that the SEMATECH project was, in part, undertaken to facilitate the
creation and rapid introduction of technology developed under R&D consortia into
civilian and defense markets. This was a substantial change in U.S. policy as for many
years after World War II, the existing model of technological innovation was based on
the development of technology for military and or other missions‐based agencies of
government and then the technology was routed into the civilian and private sector
(spin‐offs). By the 1980s this paradigm had run its course and the trend was reversed.
Great technological leaps were being accelerated by the needs of civilians and industry,
while the military was woefully and even strategically behind this technological
progress. This stark realization engendered a change of focus in the DOD in particular,
to attempt to create “spin‐ ons” of technology from the civilian world into the defense
world (Alic 1992).
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In addition, to Alic, Branscomb (2003) stated that SEMATECH and other research
consortia like it, demonstrated a switch in US research/innovation policy to one driven
by the demand side of technology rather than the traditional supply side of technology
where government labs performed research and which was then supplied to industry
for development. Branscomb posits that the federal government can no longer rely on
spin‐offs from DOD, DOE, CDC‐ to name a few‐ to create competitiveness. Instead the
federal government needs to intentionally assist, not only with basic research, but also
with supplying venture capital to help entrepreneurial firms bridge ‘the valley of death’
(Branscomb 2003, 18). This valley of death is defined as the lag time between basic and
applied research and the gap between management and the investment community.
Fong’s (2000) research can be juxtaposed against Branscomb. Fong explains that
many doubt that the federal government can craft intentional programs that support
economic competitiveness using newer paradigms. This doubt is a result of both the
laissez‐faire philosophy of government towards economic development and the
traditional mission focus of government agencies (Fong 2000). Fong demonstrates ‐
through the use of nine mini‐case studies‐that the federal government “is increasingly
capable of crafting technology and industrial policy measures in explicit support of U.S.
economic competitiveness” (Fong 2000, 155). Fong marks this increasing capability as
progress and thus asserts that the U.S. Government is capable of crafting intentional
technology policy.
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Fong’s research concerning SEMATECH and VHSIC forms the historical basis for
some portions of this study. At the same time however, portions of Fong’s research
should be modified by the conclusions that emerge from this effort. Because Fong’s
work(s) is utilized heavily in this particular study, some effort will be made to present his
arguments with a modest degree of thoroughness.
The research published by Fong in 2000, Breaking New Ground or Breaking the
Rules, is methodical in development. Fong first explains that many academics and policy
practitioners believe that the federal government is not capable of shaping the
country’s information technology future because: 1) the government has an array of
policy instruments at its disposal 2) policy is broadly disseminated across agencies and
States 3) policy is designed and disseminated across both the public and private sector
4) policy has a short‐term political life and finally, 5) there is a distinct lack of coherent,
targeted strategic policies to enhance economic competitiveness (Fong 2000, 156‐157).
Furthermore, the reason America is “not capable of explicit coherent strategy that
enhances economic competitiveness”(Fong 2000, 154) is that policy success is often
measured using, and rationalized by, traditional market failure issues such as job
creation, domestic coalition building, global alliance building, and social welfare. In
addition, direct government support of R&D has traditionally focused on basic research
and agency (mission‐focused) R&D including defense‐related R&D (Fong 2000, 158).
To demonstrate that the federal government is capable of explicit policy design
under new paradigms, Fong develops five technology typologies: 1) By‐Product Model 2)
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Intentional Spin‐Off Model 3) Explicit Dual‐use Model 4) Industrial Base Model and
finally, 5) the Economic Competitiveness Model (Fong 2000, 159‐160). (More explicit
definitions may be found in appendix B) Fong then endeavors to establish that such
efforts as SEMATECH, amongst others, show the government moving away from its
previous reliance on the By‐Product Model to any of the other four models (Fong 2000,
161‐182).
Fong explains that any movement off of typology one or two should be
considered as either “breaking new ground” or “breaking the rules” (Fong 2000, 184‐
185) depending on what side of the industrial policy fence you sit. In Fong’s view,
breaking new ground is progress and evidence of the ability of the U.S. Government to
craft industrial policy. Breaking the rules is merely, maintaining the status quo.
Ultimately, Fong declares that the nine cases reviewed provide more than ample
evidence that the U.S. Government is capable of explicit development of programs and
policies that support economic competitiveness. Although he makes no specific claims
that the government needs to participate in any models, it seems reasonable to assume,
that since the government chooses to participate, that it must have some sense of
conviction that its participation is indeed necessary.
Block, like Fong, claims that the government has dramatically expanded its
capacity to finance and support the efforts of the private sector to commercialize new
technologies as it is not hindered by the market fundamentalist perspectives of the
Reagan Era. The partisan logic of US politics however has worked “to make these efforts
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invisible” to mainstream public debate. The consequence is that while this “hidden
development state” has had a major impact on the structure of the U.S. national
innovation system, its ability to be effective in the future is very much in doubt. This
hidden change needs to be opened as the importance of these developmental initiatives
to the U.S. economy could present a significant opening for new progressive initiatives
(Block, 2008).
Harlen, in contradistinction to Block and Fong, claims that the U.S. Government
has lost the ability to impose direction on technology development. The reasons for this
decline go back as far as the 1970s but are really most evident when studying spin‐ons
and the dual‐use‐technology programs of the 1980s and 1990s. Harlen catalogues the
change in research from the pipeline perspective and the spin‐offs associated with that
model of technology development to the change in spin‐on technologies associated
with industry’s ability to supersede and surpass the technological needs of the
government and its mission based projects. As the government became less of a driver
of technological innovation, funding for technological development declined. The net
result of this decline in funding is: “the erosion of the government’s relative importance
in technology markets creating a decline in the ability of the government to impose
requirements on firms receiving money from it and which has led it to adopt a more
hands‐off, market‐oriented approach to the development of technologies” (Harlen
2008, 3).
Wessner on the other hand, has observed that GIPs work. GIPs contribute to
national mission based organizations and help a nation to capitalize on R&D investment.
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Wessner asserts that GIPs when properly constructed accelerate technology from the
lab to the market. Successful partnerships are characterized by industry initiation and
leadership, public commitments that are limited and defined, clear objectives, cost
sharing, and learning through sustained evaluations of measurable outcomes (Wessner
2003, Government Industry Partnerships).
Wessner’s second study, Securing the Future: Regional and National Programs
to Support the Semiconductor Industry, claims that there is a perception that SEMATECH
contributed to the resurgence of the semiconductor industry in America. This
perception has led to the emulation of SEMATECH in many semiconductor producing
countries. The focus of Wessner’s study is “the extent to which the SEMATECH
model….has been emulated abroad. It notes the degree to which the principle of
cooperative‐government industry research activity has been adopted and accelerated in
other semiconductor producing countries and regions” (Wessner 2003, xvi‐xvii). This
report explains that significant changes in the semiconductor industry warrant
continued policy engagement and public investment.
As far back as 1990 Porter spoke about what the scope of government
involvement should be in competitive policy. Porter points out that there are some
government activities that are necessary to economic development, industry success
and national competitiveness. He notes amongst many, a few things the government
should do. Governments should promote:
1)

indirect cooperation, where joint efforts involving competitors take place through independent
entities, can be beneficial in some circumstances….Cooperation through trade associations for
the purpose of factor creation is also desirable…
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2) Vertical cooperation (buyer‐supplier) is beneficial to national advantage, as long as no one or two
firms form relationships that preclude all others.
3) Government’s proper [role is to act] as a pusher and challenger. There is a vital role for pressure
and even adversity in the process of creating national competitive advantage. These are drives
that government, by providing too much assistance, undermines. Government’s role should be
to transmit and amplify the forces of the “diamond” as well as to help upgrade the determinants
themselves. Sound government policy seeks to provide the tools necessary to compete, through
active efforts to bolster factor creation, while ensuring a certain discomfort and strong
competitive pressure (Porter 1990).

In some ways Porter’s work, especially the role of pusher and challenger, helps
establish whether DARPAs interaction with SEMATECH contributed to its success. There
are instances where DARPA inserted itself into the SEMATECH project to encourage or
even pushed SEMATECH to raise its aspirations and move to a higher level of
competitive prowess even though it may have been an unsettling and even unpleasant
experience. DARPA, given a seat on the Board of Directors, had no voting rights and was
thus a “silent partner” at SEMATECH. Not given any direct influence in the management
of the whole SEMATECH project how was it that DARPA was able to push and prod
SEMATECH in directions that industry may neither have liked, nor necessarily have
considered? Although this particular area of investigation appears as a secondary
hypothesis, answers to this question are significant. Later in this study, it will be
revealed that DARPA was able to push and prod SEMATECH in some respects. This so
called “pushing” may have been exactly what was needed, at just the right moment, for
SEMATECH to meet its industry objectives and thus be considered a success from that
perspective. This study will simultaneously reveal that DARPA was not able to push and
prod SEMATECH in directions that would help the government meet its’ objectives.
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Finally, Porter recognizes what both government and industry need to realize:
6

[ g]overnment policy toward industry must recognize that the “diamond” [for a description of
Porter’s diamond theory, please see footnote] is a system, which makes policies in many areas
interdependent. The weakest link constrains the development of an economy (Porter 1990).

According to Porter, the government is part of a system, an inter‐related diamond
system. To give and get the most out of R&D consortia, the government must know
what it brings to the table, and be able to elucidate what it wants and expects to get out
of the project. DARPA in a silent partner position may not have necessarily been able to
perform the latter.
Hypotheses That Are Misinformed:

Several of the works presented thus far will be subject to scrutiny throughout
this study. The most important will be Geisler, Evan and Olk and Horrigan; others will be
the subject of less substantial assessment. Horrigan’s work however, is the most
specific and will bear the brunt of critical scrutiny.

6

Porter postulates that successful economies or industries develop as a result of five forces that interact
in a favorable manner. Those forces are: 1) basic factor endowments (geography, geographic position,
natural resources) 2) advanced factor endowments (infrastructure, education) 3) related and supporting
industries 4) industry strategy and structure and 5) government policy. Forces one through four are often
portrayed in the shape of a baseball diamond, and individual national economies find themselves
developing various corners of the diamond along their growth trajectory. Porter postulates that
government policy can 1) facilitate movement along the diamond, or that even more importantly for fully
mature economies such as the U.S. Japan and Germany, be a significant contributor to economic
competitiveness. In short, the government, in mature economies, is the pitcher’s mound from which the
whole thing is run and overseen.
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John Horrigan crafted a theory about SEMATECH’s success. Horrigan postulates
that successful consortia must meet the conditions outlined in the following equation.
Conditions for successful cooperation arise when:
(R‐E)+G>T
(Where)
R is the discounted rate of return for participation in the consortia, (more fully):
R reflects the fact that firms in a consortium benefit to the full extent of the
consortium’s activities, but pay only a pro‐rata share of the direct costs….R also captures
the choice of rules for sharing research.

E is the cost of enforcing cooperation, (more fully):
(E is) how costly it is for consortium member to express displeasure to other members
and management. It is the price of ensuring that members do not defect.

G is the amount of government subsidy and
T is the cost of going it alone/trying to survive without joint R&D.
(Although T) is not observable, (it stands to reason) that is the present discounted value
of direct returns R minus enforcement costs E, plus a discounted flow of government
subsidy G exceed the value of going it alone T, (then) cooperation is sustainable
(Horrigan 1996, 18‐20).

Horrigan’s work compares how well MCC and SEMATECH met these criteria.
Horrigan asserts that SEMATECH was more successful than MCC because it was better
able to meet the conditions outlined in the equation: SEMATECH was able to 1) keep the
costs of enforcement low and 2) sought government subsidies from the outset rather
than later in its life cycle (Horrigan 1996). By the conclusion of this study, it will be
revealed that SEMATECH may not have required a government subsidy (G), however, at
least as far as one CEO was concerned. This begs the question ‘what useful purpose did
DARPA/ the U.S. Government serve in SEMATECH effort?’ Furthermore, this study will
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find that Horrigan’s conception of enforcement is narrow and does not consider
whether or not DARPA/the U.S. Government had the same rights as industrial members
in the expression of dissatisfaction and redress of that dissatisfaction. DARPA, in fact
did not have equal treatment. Why then did it continue to fund SEMATECH? Did it have
a bigger role to play in the success of the SEMATECH project?
Summary and Conclusions:

Although SEMATECH, crafted broad goals that attempted to balance the
interests of government and industry, measurement of these goals is problematic. The
literature on SEMATECH does not make measurement an easy task. The literature is
drawn from a variety of disciplines.
A four part schema was employed to help make sense of the literature. Moteff
was the first work considered. Moteff was used to define the unit of study, specifically,
inter‐sector dual‐use programs. An effort was then made to present theories that
establish criteria for measuring success. The authors presented were selected because
the criteria for success that they present could be equally applied to business to
business partnerships, or business to government partnerships. Several works were
explored. However, the works of Evans and Olk and Grindley will be considered in more
detail in later chapters.
The chapter moved on to consider those theories that might explain what
happened, why it happened, and what might have happened. SEMATECH arose out of a
novel environment. Many as discussed in Chapter One, doubted that such an effort
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could succeed in enhancing national competitiveness as the proposed changes were too
much to manage from either the government or industries perspective. Fong’s works in
particular challenge this assumption. Fong claims that any movement of U.S. Research
Policy away from the chain link/spin‐off model is evidence of a de‐facto commitment to
a new research paradigm. Block supports this view claiming that such a switch presents
a significant opening for progress. Harlen however disagrees and argues that the U.S.
Government has considerably diminished its capacity for influencing industry.
Porter’s work hints at what a government could and should do to enhance
national competitiveness. Porter’s work in particular inspires the second hypothesis
under consideration. Before SEMATECH was formed, the U.S. Government had taken
positive steps to increase competitiveness. However, the conclusion of this study will
demonstrate that the manner in which SEMATECH was founded ultimately reduced the
government’s ability to continue to enhance competitiveness.
Finally, this chapter presented the work of Horrigan. Horrigan’s conception
regarding the necessity of government subsidization of GIPs and the crafting of
enforcement mechanisms as criteria that determine success may require some
modification.
There is little that has been said in the relevant literature about whether
SEMATECH was a success or not from the standpoint of the government. This may be
because much of the work previously published assumed that the success of the
SEMATECH project could be evaluated using the standard measures of the time, i.e.,
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patents filed, papers presented, spillovers, market failures addressed etc. These criteria
are in many ways unfair, as they evolved using a R&D paradigm (V. Bush) that may no
longer have existed as SEMATECH was formed and ran its course with public funds.
Under the DUT paradigm, public funds invested at least left the government with
patents and technologies that it could license back or lend to industry in the hopes that
such activity would result in new markets or entirely new industries such as the IT
industries and the Internet. The DUP paradigm however does not provide the
government with even an opportunity to recover resources expended. The conception
of DUPs under which SEMATECH was created merely assumed that what was true on
one side of a spectrum would be true on the opposite side. This research effort will
demonstrate that this is a very poor assumption.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EVOLUTION OF SEMATECH
Overview:

Chapter 3 will present a historical picture of electronics consortia, the Very High
Speed Integrated Circuit Project (VHSIC) and the Microelectronics and Computer
Corporation (MCC) and the evolution of SEMATECH. Drawing heavily on the works of
Fong (1991), Horrigan (1996) and Browning (2000) respectively, this chapter will present
the history of VHSIC, MCC, and how industry’s experience with these programs
informed the formation of SEMATECH. As SEMATECH was formed it had to come to
grips with the sour relationship the semiconductor industry had with the U.S.
Government at large and with the Department of Defense in particular. Where it is
possible, the perspectives of these works will be juxtaposed against U.S. Government
documents as a means of discovering key issues or events that pushed SEMATECH down
particular paths.
What emerges by the end of the chapter is a picture of SEMATECH as a
conglomeration of industry players who already possessed a great deal of cooperative
experience. This study argues that SEMATECH’s challenges associated with the creation
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of an inter‐industry cooperative environment are somewhat exaggerated. The real
challenge in SEMATECH’s formation years was not necessarily in establishing a
cooperative environment between and among industry competitors the real challenge
was in the establishment of a more productive inter‐sector working relationship with
the U.S. government. As SEMATECH was formed, its industry members repeatedly balk
at the prospect of working with the DOD in another research consortia. The
government’s own studies concerning the formation of SEMATECH advised that this
inter‐sector effort should be closely monitored, as the DOD may not have been the best
agency for SEMATECH to work with. In spite of all these warning flags, the DOD was
able to insert itself into a position of influence as SEMATECH developed its operational
plans, and in spite of SEMATECH’s concerns the DOD became the organization that was
selected to oversee the SEMATECH project. The literature which informs this study is
hard pressed to explain this curious development.
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The Formative Years and the Semiconductor Industry Association:

SEMATECH was the culmination of several serendipitous efforts by industry and
government. SEMATECH emerged as a United States’ response to declining market
share in Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) chips in the 1980s. A VLSI7 Research
Report showed that in 1981, U.S. firms enjoyed the lion’s share (approximately 50 per
cent compared to Japan’s 38 per cent) of worldwide markets in the production and sale
of DRAMs and other micro‐electronics. By the mid‐1986‐87 this market dominance had
essentially reversed itself: Japan held approximately 50 per cent of the market and the
U.S. hovered around 38 per cent. (VLSI, 1987; DSB, 1987; Horrigan, 1996) This dramatic
shift was believed to be the result of Japanese industrial policy and alleged Japanese
predatory practices.
SEMATECH did not emerge by accident, but rather as the result of dedicated and
focused analysis conducted by the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) in response
to Japan’s assault on the U.S. semiconductor industry. Founded by Wilfred Connigan8 of
Fairchild Semiconductors in 1977, the SIA collected and communicated industry data to
members concerning issues such as sales, market share, start up activities and other
7

VLSI is: VLSI Research Inc is the leading provider of market research and economic analysis on the
technical, business, and economic aspects within semiconductor, nanotechnology and related industries.
The company is known for its unparalleled accuracy, innovation in market research, and its sharply
focused insight into the rapidly changing landscapes of the industries covered. VLSI Research’s primary
databases and reports cover the semiconductor, flat panel display, PV cell and module manufacturing,
and associated high technology industries. https://www.vlsiresearch.com retrieved 10‐9‐2011.
8

Other key members of the SIA include: Bob Noyce of Intel, Jerry Sanders of Advanced Micro
Devices(AMD), Charlie Sporck of National Semiconductor (NSC), and John Welty of Motorola. Noyce and
Sporck will go on have large roles in the development of SEMATECH. All these organizations will become
founding members of SEMATECH.
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quantifiable data. As a result of the research performed in these areas, the SIA was
cognizant of Japanese semiconductor activity and had begun to warn Congress in the
early 1980s about the potential ramifications of Japan’s increasingly predatory industrial
policies. Congress apparently ignored the warnings and reports of the SIA because
industry powerhouses Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) and Hewlett Packard (HP)
were content with the Japanese semiconductor industry and its ability to provide high
quality products at reasonable prices (Browning 2000, 7). Congress would remain
apathetic about SIA’s concerns until IBM, then the world’s largest producer of
semiconductors, joined SIA and took up the message (Browning 2000, 7‐10).
Between 1979 and 1984 the SIA developed an increasingly unified political voice
that successfully lobbied U.S. Congress for the passage of the Cooperative Research Act
of 1984. (herein after referred to as the Act) The Act allowed industrial cooperation and
facilitated the founding of industrial R&D consortium as long as the consortium was
engaged in pre‐competitive efforts such as basic research and or the establishment of
manufacturing and industry standards. Passage of the Act facilitated the founding of
MCC and would eventually form some of the legal conditions under which SEMATECH
would operate.
VHSIC:

Another semiconductor research effort had already been underway before the
ACT was passed. That project, VHSIC, was initiated by the DOD in the mid 1970s when
the DOD realized that the semiconductor industry had long since shifted its research
focus away the defense sector to focus on developing sophisticated, cutting edge
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technology that would satisfy the burgeoning needs of the industrial and consumer
markets. The intention of VHSIC was to bring the entire semiconductor industry,
including merchant firms, captive firms, commercial firms and systems firms9 back into
the DOD’s sphere of influence to assist the DOD in catching up to the then, current
levels of technology. Fong (1990) 10 explains that during the months between June and
October of 1979, the DOD consulted with industry to produce the organizational form of
the VHSIC project and its intended research focus.
The VHSIC project came into existence in 1980 and was to be a program based
on three phases. Fong explains that Phase 0 (Zero) was to study and set out the plan by
which technical objectives of the program were to be met. Nine contracts of $10.3
million were awarded. Five future members of SEMATECH (IBM, Rockwell, TI, Motorola
and National Semiconductor) were recipients of these contracts. Another future
member of SEMATECH, Harris Semiconductor, did not receive any awards for Phase 0.
Phase I (One) which lasted from 1981‐1984 was intended to focus on the development
of 1.25 micron circuitry. $167 million dollars was awarded to achieve this objective.
Five future members of SEMATECH ‐ IBM, TI Motorola, Harris, and National
Semiconductor ‐ were the primary contract winners for Phase I. Rockwell which had
received awards during Phase 0 did not receive any funds during Phase I. Phase II was
to operate from 1984‐1988. Phase II was to build upon the 1.25 micron technology and
9

Merchant and Commercial firms sell semiconductors in the open market. Captive firms are firms that
produce and consume their own semiconductors in house. Systems firms are firms that design, build and
use semiconductors in weapons and other military systems.
10

Much of the history of VHSIC will come as a summary of Glenn Fong’s 1990 work.
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continue efforts to further reduce micron size (sub‐micron) as well as to push these
new technologies towards military applications as quickly as possible. Only two of the
future members of SEMATECH were recipients of Phase II awards, Motorola and IBM.
Three future members of SEMATECH, Harris, TI and National Semiconductor, were not
recipients of Phase II awards. Phase Three awards amounted to $35.8 million and were
allocated across twenty five companies and universities (Fong 1990, 3).
VHSIC was a somewhat novel program involving the DOD and industry. As an
example of this, industry was sought out from the beginning to provide input to the
technological goals and technological planning process. Industry was consulted, as was
academia, critics of the Pentagon, regular DOD semiconductor contractors, and
commercial firms. In addition, to this broad consultative base, the Pentagon worked
diligently to ensure that the technological goals that were set were built around the
agenda of the commercial industry participants, rather than defined by mission
requirements or systems firms. This was a significant departure from how the DOD had
traditionally interfaced with the semiconductor industry. The VHSIC program was not to
be a mission driven program; rather it was a joint program between government and
industry to advance research in common areas or interest such as signal processing, sub‐
micron circuit technology, and lithography, to name a few.
The merchant and commercial firms who joined the VHSIC program had very
high hopes for it. Fong explains that Motorola, TI and National Semiconductor
transferred oversight and management of the relationship and activities associated with
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the VHSIC project out of the government focused divisions of the firm and into the
executive offices to ensure that they would capture the strategic technology spillovers
that were envisioned. These organizations were expecting commercial payoffs from the
program, particularly in the areas of process technology such as lithography, circuit
technology, design approaches, and computer aided design [CAD] (Fong 1990, 12).
Sadly however, the high hopes, initial infatuation and enthusiasm that the commercial
semiconductor firms had for VHSIC were to disappear.
Fong explains that the Pentagon’s bureaucracy had an adverse affect on the
VHSIC program. Distinct offices within the Pentagon had very different opinions
concerning any potentially commercializable technologies that would come out of the
VHSIC program. The semiconductor industry exported a good deal of product. The
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) of 1979 prohibited the exportation of
weapons related technology. The more liberal Office of the Under Secretary for
Research and Engineering had a relatively relaxed view about the technology that would
come out of the VHSIC project: while the Office of the Under Secretary of Policy in the
Pentagon took a very dim view of the exportation of any technologies that were, or
might be, associated with the VHSIC project. In addition, the VHSIC program was
originally envisioned to have a longer term R&D focus. However, the individual services
were far more interested in short‐term advances that could be fielded in near term
weapons systems. This focus on “inserting” developed technology into weapons system
shifted the focus of VHSIC away from long‐term research associated with sub‐micron
technology (Fong 1990, 12‐17).
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The shift in emphasis was disheartening to the merchant and commercial firms
as VHSIC went from a program that had real promise for the development of sub‐micron
and lithography technologies to a program that now revolved around the traditional
system firms of GE, TRW and the weapons systems they provided. In spite of this
change, the government still welcomed the merchant producers to participate, albeit as
sub‐contractors. This was hardly appealing to the merchant firms. To make matters
worse, even if some potentially profitable technologies were to emerge from VHSIC the
export requirements of the time made it highly unlikely that profits could be realized in
any areas other than the United States. The net result of this change to the VHSIC
program was that the government succeeded in alienating the very firms that it was
endeavoring to bring back into the fold, the merchant and commercial firms. This is one
of the foremost reasons why Fong claims that VHSIC was a failed effort and one of the
foremost reasons why the industry members of SEMATECH were adamant about 1) no
military influence in the project and 2) that SEMATECH be led by the needs and desires
of industry.
Microelectronics Computer Technology Corporation:

MCC was founded in 1983 by William Norris, the then Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) of Control Data Corporation (CDC). MCC was formed as a response to Japan’s
intention to create a “Fifth Generation Computer.” The Fifth Generation Computer was
to be a computer with a more human interface, meaning a computer that had both
(conversational) language and reasoning capabilities. In order to develop this computer,
Japanese industry in conjunction with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
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(MITI) formed a collaborative effort under the Institute for New Generation Computer
Technology (ICOT). The projected funding for this effort was a stunning $1.35 billion
(Horrigan 1996, 67). 11
Norris was convinced that the only company capable of dealing with such a
threat was IBM. No other member of the United States’ computing industry had the
resources to deal with this massive Japanese initiative. Consequently, Norris called for a
meeting of computer executives in 1982. Fourteen12 companies attended this meeting.
The resolutions that came out of that meeting had some small recommendation
concerning the need for industry collaboration and more to do with concerns that the
Justice Department would see such a venture, even the very meeting, as collusive, and
initiate anti‐trust proceedings against those who wished to cooperate.
The SIA was able to address the anti‐trust concerns with the passage of the
aforementioned Cooperative Research Act of 1984. While MCC waited for the passage
of the Act, it developed a proposed research agenda that would focus on three areas.
Betting that SIA would be effective in having the law changed, MCC determined that it
would focus its efforts on pre‐competitive, high‐risk, long range research that was
outside of the financial means of any individual firm. MCC would also help members

11

Much of the history and explanation of MCC will be derived from the dissertation work of John
Horrigan, most particularly chapter three of this document.
12

The companies in attendance were, AMD, NCR, National Semiconductor, Mostek Corporation, Sperry,
DEC, Motorola, Honeywell, TI, Harris, North American Philips, United Technologies, Rockwell and
Signetics. IBM, GE, Intel and HP were invited but elected not to attend.
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avoid wasteful duplicate research efforts. Each of these research areas was to be
managed by a single firm, but could be sponsored by any interested firms.
MCC’s research agenda was somewhat non‐traditional, as it was considered a
“cafeteria style” of research. Individual members could pay their funds and contribute
other resources towards any one of the three research thrust areas being pursued by
MCC. Horrigan noted that: “MCC founders used such membership rules because it
ensured a larger initial membership some companies were not interested in all four
research areas, so were not willing to expend resources to support them” (Horrigan
1996, 72).
Starting small, MCC’s research program had grown from 14 to 34 members by
1984. This growth of membership was considered to be an accomplishment. However,
the 34 members were only able to create a relatively small operational budget of $40
million. Austere budgets were to plague MCC for the operational years between 1984
and 1995. In fact, the largest budget MCC acquired during these years was $73 million.
By 1987 membership in the organization had declined from 34 to 28. In 1992, MCC
membership surged to 77 members. However, in spite of more than doubling
membership in a little less than ten years, the budget for that year was again a meager
$45 million (Horrigan 1996).
Given these wild swings in resources and support, it is safe to say that
membership and budget issues dominated the interests of MCC leaders. Horrigan
states: “In its early years, MCC devoted more effort structuring rules to attract members
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rather than structuring rules to ensure wide‐spread research sharing and thus large
future returns” (Horrigan 1996, 76). Each of MCC’s successive CEOs changed the
research agenda of the organization and the membership dues as a means of attracting
and maintaining members. There were three CEOs at MCC during the years that
coincide with the SEMATECH project. Those CEOs were Robert Inman (1983‐86), Grant
Dove (1987‐1990) and Craig Fields from (1990‐1994). During these same years the
research time frame for MCC projects devolved from the 5‐10 year research horizons
under Inman to under 3 years during Fields tenure. MCC thus had moved from high‐risk
long‐term research to short–term research projects developed under contractual R&D
relationships.
Summary Comments‐VHSIC and MCC Programs:

The tables below summarize the firms that joined and participated in the MCC
and VHSIC projects. By the time SEMATECH came into existence, well over half of its
members had some years of experience with the at least one of the other major
microelectronics consortia. Just less than 25 per cent of the SEMATECH members had
experience with both of the other microelectronics consortia. Given the experience that
individual firms had with these projects it is not difficult to imagine why there was such
an aura of suspicion amongst the government and the members of industry about yet
another microelectronics consortium.
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Table Two
SEMATECH Firms in Bold Participated in All Three Microelectronics Consortia
SEMATECH Firms that are Italicized Participated in at least one other Microelectronics Consortia
VHSIC

MCC

SEMATECH

Members 1980‐88
3M

Microelectronics Computer Technology
Corporation members by 1984
Control Data

Analog Devices

3M

Founding Members
1988
ADVANCED MICRO
DEVICES
AT&T

Burroughs

ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES

DIGITAL EQUIP.CORP.

Control Data

Allied Corporation

HARRIS

Fairchild
GCA

Bell Communications Research
BMC Industries

Hewlett‐Packard
IBM

General Dynamics

Boeing

Intel

General Electric
HARRIS

DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION
Eastman Kodak

LSI Logic
Micron Technology Inc.

Honeywell

Gould

MOTOROLA

Hughes

HARRIS

IBM

Honeywell

Intersil

Lockheed

NATIONAL CASH
REGISTER (NCR)
NATIONAL
SEMICONDUCTOR
ROCKWELL

MOTOROLA

Martin Marietta

TEXAS INSTRUMENTS

NATIONAL
SEMICONDUCTOR
Perkin‐Elmer

MOTOROLA

Raytheon

NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR

RCA

RCA

ROCKWELL

Sperry

Sanders

Westinghouse

NATIONAL CASH REGISTER (NCR)

Signetics
Sperry
Tektronix
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
TRW
Union Carbide
Varian
Westinghouse
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Analysis:

The review of the history of VHSIC and MCC demonstrates an almost bi‐polar
mood in the semiconductor industry. One the one hand, it is apparent that the
semiconductor industry had the will to cooperate. On the other hand, industry was
justified in being highly suspect of cooperating with the government. Even though the
DOD had been very proactive in working with the entire industry to advance the VHSIC
project, this up‐front work was quickly overtaken by the back‐office realities of the DOD.
These operational necessities were probably not altogether unfamiliar to the big
systems contractors. However, to a commercial sector who had long since moved away
from the DOD they were highly disconcerting.
In spite of this bi‐polar mood, as 1986 dawned the stage had more or less been
set for SEMATECH move beyond concept to formal incorporation. In order to
incorporate, SEMATECH had to accomplish two goals: 1) recruit members from across
industry and create a research agenda and operational parameters that were
achievable; and 2) legitimize its existence with the government and find a government
agency amenable to its mission (Browning 2000).The potential list of agencies was
narrowed to the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Commerce (DOC) and
curiously, the DOD.
The Defense Science Board:

The DOD was not inactive while SEMATECH was in its formative stages. By 1986
the DOD had become increasingly worried about its ability to source semiconductors
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from domestic producers. This, in no small part, was a reaction to a pamphlet entitled
“The Japan That Can Say No.” Some sanitized versions of this document have been
published in the United States, long after these events occurred. However, the original
version and comments by Shintaro Ishahara, made it very apparent to the Pentagon,
that if Japan decided to stop trading with the United States, the U.S. military industrial
complex, and consequently, U.S. national security would be at extreme risk. Without
semiconductors, U.S. weapons systems were relatively ineffectual. This pamphlet
characterized the state of U.S. and Japanese national and industrial relations. From one
perspective there was cooperation: from another perspective suspicion, loathing,
distrust and fierce competitiveness (Morito 1989).
In order to address these growing concerns the DOD asked the Defense Science
Board (DSB)13 to convene two study groups in 1986. One group, chaired by William
Perry was to study the cost savings that would accrue to the military through purchase
of commercial components rather than the mission based components usually secured
by the military. The other committee, chaired by Norman Augustine of Martin Marietta,
13

The Defense Science Board was established in 1956 in response to recommendations of the Hoover
Commission:

"The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development) will appoint a standing committee, reporting directly to
him, of outstanding basic and applied scientists. This committee will canvass periodically the needs and opportunities
presented by new scientific knowledge for radically new weapons systems."
The Board operates by forming Task Forces consisting of Board members and other consultants/experts to address those
tasks referred to it by formal direction. The products of each Task Force typically consist of a set of formal briefings to the
Board and appropriate DOD officials, and a written report containing findings, recommendations and a suggested
implementation plan. The Board reports directly to the Secretary of Defense through the USD (AT&L) while, at the same
time, working in close coordination with the DDR&E to develop and strengthen the Department's research and
development strategies for the 21st Century.
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/history.htm
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focused on the issue of semiconductor dependency. (Browning 2000, 19) The DSB
issued a report in February of 1987 (although leaked in Dec of 1986) which stated:
The following suggests that a direct threat to the technological superiority deemed essential to
U.S. defense systems exists:
♦ U.S. military forces depend heavily on technological superiority to win.
♦ Electronics is the technology that can be leveraged most highly.
♦ Semiconductors are the key to leadership in electronics.
♦ Competitive, high‐volume production is the key to leadership in semiconductors.
♦ High‐volume production is supported by the commercial market.
♦ Leadership in commercial volume production is being lost by the U.S. semiconductor
industry.
♦ Semiconductor technology leadership, which in this field is closely coupled to
manufacturing leadership, will soon reside abroad.
♦ U.S. Defense will soon depend on foreign sources for state‐of‐the‐art technology in
semiconductors. The Task Force Views this as an unacceptable situation.

The DSB made several recommendations as a means of rectifying this situation. Only the
following really informs this chapter:
Support the establishment of a Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Institute which would
develop, demonstrate, and advance the technology base for efficient, high‐yield manufacture of
advanced semiconductor devices, and to provide facilities for production of selected devices for DOD
needs. (italics added by author) (Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DEFENSE
SEMICONDUCTOR DEPENDENCY February 1987)

However, what is most interesting about this paragraph and the DSB report is how
closely it resembled the recommendations that were being forwarded by the SIA to the
proto‐SEMATECH organization. It could be argued that this was no coincidence. The DSB
Task Force had 31 members. Some of those members were the principals and
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luminaries of the semiconductor industry. Men such as J.S. Kilby, the Co‐Inventor of the
Integrated Circuit, Texas Instruments 1958‐1970; Mr. Larry Sumney, President of the
Semiconductor Research Corporation; Admiral Robert R. Inman (retired) President and
CEO of MCC; Robert Noyce, Co‐Inventor of Integrated Circuit, Vice Chairman of Intel and
founding member of SIA; and finally, Mr. Michael Thompson, Executive Director of
Integrated Circuits, AT&T Bell Laboratories worked to ensure that the industry would
survive.
Other Government Assessments of SEMATECH:

In spite of the serendipity demonstrated between the DSB and SIA reports, Congress
and the Executive Office were in no hurry to act conclusively. Two other government
assessments of the state of the semiconductor industry were conducted during 1987.
One study conducted by the National Security Council was “unable to produce a
consensus on recommendations” (Browning 2000, 25). Browning explains that this was
a result of the study group being too diverse. This group consisted of members of the
Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of State, the
U.S. Trade Representative, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and a smattering
of White House staff and advisers. Van Atta (Van Atta 2011) states that these particular
reports were never intentioned for public consumption.
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Late in 1987, Congress also commissioned a study on SEMATECH (Gramlich
September 1987). Early in the report Edward M. Gramlich14 mentions SEMATECH’s
proposed three phase development effort. This development effort was the result of 1)
the formal incorporation of SEMATECH on March 3, 1987 and 2) the creation of an initial
operating plan that was penned under the name of the “Black Book.” Gramlich’s report
discusses the traditional benefits that the government might expect for investing its
resources: technological spillovers, technology transfer, and social benefits in terms of
lower prices throughout the industry. The report does indicate that there are potential
conflict issues that need to be addressed by the government and its future sponsoring
agency. The report notes the following:
The five year program calls for three concurrent phases corresponding to three different levels of
density of integrated circuits. The near‐term focus is on improving current commercial
manufacturing practices rather than bringing entirely new materials or technology to the
industry. Thus SEMATECH will concentrate on silicon rather than exotic materials, and on optical
lithography rather than X‐ray lithography (Gramlich 1987, 41).

This mention of optical lithography rather than X‐ray lithography demonstrates that
SEMATECH was already at odds with its potential DOD sponsor. Furthermore:
Improving semiconductor manufacturing technology may not reduce U.S. military dependence
on foreign suppliers for specific devices. Nor can SEMATECH guarantee that U.S. producers of
semiconductors will find filling U.S. military needs a profitable activity, especially given the
bureaucratic and technological requirements that accompany defense contracts. SEMATECH
may, however, increase the domestic availability of any given technology…..Nonetheless, while
any direct military benefits from SEMATECH would appear to be long‐term and incidental, the
lower costs resulting from improved manufacturing technology would benefit the DOD as well as
all other consumers of semiconductors (Gramlich 1987, 45‐46).

These comments are rather significant statements about three issues in particular. 1)
The use of the word “incidental” implies that spin‐ons are unlikely to occur or that they

14

Edward M. Gramlich was the Acting Director of the Congressional Budget Office in 1986, 1987.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2007/09/05/AR2007090502503.html
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will be a long time in the coming. 2) Not only is industry concerned about defense
bureaucracy, but Congress should be as well. 3) This report alludes to the inability of
SEMATECH to make the U.S. self‐sufficient in the production of ICs. This contradicts
some of the recommendations of the DSB.
Finally, Gramlich’s reports notes:
Another issue concerns the role of the federal government, which has had little experience with
this type of cooperative arrangement. Although it funds applied research with commercial value
through such agencies as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National
Institutes of Health, and the National Science Foundation’s Engineering Research Centers, the
government itself is the director of the research agenda in these situations (with industry in a
consultative role), rather than a “silent partner” as it would be in SEMATECH. …To succeed,
SEMATECH will require an agenda that meets the industry’s needs. The government’s role in
creating such an agenda in this case is a consultative one. SEMATECH’s prospects will depend to
a great extent on the willingness of the government to take a cooperative and, in many respects,
passive role in the consortium, once SEMATECH’s basic policies have been set (Gramlich 1987,
52).

This was a very difficult recommendation for the U.S. government to adopt. This
advisory role is perhaps one of the pivotal reasons why the DOD may have ultimately
settled on DARPA as the agency to oversee SEMATECH: the literature is more than
vague in this area. Given this void in the literature, I must speculate that DARPA may
have been selected because it had a history of success as an advisory organization and
operational parameters that supported advisory activities. A little referenced Van Atta
(1991) publication, DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume III, hints that this
speculation may be correct.
Gramlich’s report concludes with a discussion about which government agency
might be best considered to oversee the SEMATECH effort. Gramlich notes that the
DOD has the most experience and technological expertise on efforts of this scale. In
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fact, the DOD had two successful organizations‐DARPA and Manufacturing Technology
Program (Man Tech)‐that were working on computer and advanced technology efforts.
In addition, the DOD had the active VHSIC program. In spite of these successful and
ongoing programs however, the DOD had:
consistently managed these programs to achieve technological performance at the expense of
cost….The purpose of Sematech is to develop cost‐effective commercial technologies, not to
pursue technologically demanding but commercially irrelevant directions (Gramlich 1987, 56).

This small comment on the ability to manage cost is a very compelling argument for the
consortium to be led by industry.
Gramlich continued to make a recommendation that SEMATECH should be
overseen by an interagency coordinating committee chaired by the DOD. This
committee would include the DOC, DOE, and NSF and would be “advised” by an
Advisory Council on Federal Participation in Sematech made up of representatives from
industry, science and defense. Such a wide consultative base would encourage a focus
on, “broader, long‐term interests.” Within the same paragraph, Gramlich explained that
such a committee could not form very quickly, that DOC does not have the personnel to
participate, that NST has most of its work conducted by outsiders, so they would be
inappropriate, and that the DOE would most likely send experts in its defense related
activities (Gramlich1987, 56).
Analysis:

This committee recommendation can be seen as ill‐conceived. By this time, it
was already well known that interagency cooperation on the semiconductor issue was
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highly unlikely. Almost a year earlier, Nov. 28, 1986, Inside U.S. Trade ran a story
entitled “Administration Policy Group Split on Need for Aid to High Tech industry.” This
article explained that the National Security Council was unable to come to consensus on
the issue of SEMATECH. It stands to reason therefore, that if an interagency panel could
not even reach consensus on the state of the semiconductor industry, it certainly would
have little ability to actually manage or oversee a project that would reconstruct it.
Even as Gramlich’s skeptical report was circulating, Browning noted that the
funding amounts and debates about who should oversee SEMATECH raged inside the
Beltway. The House favored DOC sponsorship, the Senate favored the DOD. Members
of SIA and SEMATECH remained very concerned about DOD oversight; given their
experience with VHSIC, this is not unwarranted. In addition, the industry members of
SEMATECH were justified in their concern considering for example, that the
government’s own studies revealed concerns about DOD oversight. Given this level of
hesitancy and skepticism it seems wise to ask why oversight was not given to a different
government agency.
Malcolm Baldridge, then acting Secretary of Commerce was a strong proponent
of SEMATECH. The DOE was another strong candidate for oversight. The DOE was the
government agency with the second largest budget dedicated to semiconductors. The
DOE had $77 million in funds for semiconductors in 1987. This is relatively small
compared to the approximately $340 million or so that the DOD had allocated across its
operations for semiconductor research (Gramlich 1987, 60). In spite of the disparities
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in budgets, the DOE had an established track record of working with industry,
particularly at the Brookhaven Labs.
Brookhaven was home to the National Synchrotron Light Source (NLSL). In fact,
10 per cent of its budget came from the use of its technologies by semiconductor firms,
including IBM and AT&T to examine wafer and circuit surfaces in very great detail. The
technologies that were housed with NLSL included x‐ray and ultraviolet beam
lithography prototypes, which were at that time already being considered for use in the
future (Gramlich 1987, 68‐69). Gramlich demonstrated that the DOE’s labs all had
integral and ongoing involvement with the semiconductor industry. Nowhere in
Gramlich’s discussion of the activities between the DOE’s labs and the semiconductor
industry, is there an example of the type of hesitant recommendations that he
expressed about DOD oversight. After reading this report, it would seem logical to ask:
1) why does SEMATECH ultimately end up under the DOD and DARPA? 2) how was the
relationship between SEMATECH and the government affected by oversight of an
agency that so many had such distrust in and 3) is this of any significance to the success
or failure of SEMATECH? The literature reviewed for answers to these questions is
vague.
Developing the Program:

While Gramlich was researching and disseminating his study, SEMATECH was
pushing forward on its proposed research agenda. This agenda was outlined in “Black
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Book.” The “Black Book” set three sub‐micron goals which SEMATECH hoped to achieve
during its five year funding period. Those goals were:
Phase 1: Develop and master technologies associated with .80 micron width
features for silicon chips.
Phase 2: Develop and master technologies associated with .50 micron width
features for silicon chips.
Phase 3: Develop and master technologies associated with .35 micron width
features for silicon chips.
All three phases were to be completed by 1992.
Three key issues arose during the planning meetings associated with the “Black
Book.” The first issue was the technology platform or Manufacturing Demonstration
Vehicle (MDV) that would be used to develop the forthcoming sub‐micron technology.
The initial impetus of the SEMATECH effort was to recapture U.S. pre‐eminence in the
production of Random Access Memory chips (RAM)15 chips. RAM chips are essential for
computing purposes. In addition to the microprocessor, RAM chips are what enable
15

RAM ‐ Random Access Memory: A memory device whose individual memory cells can be read from or
written to at random (that is not serially).
SRAM ‐ Static Random Access Memory: A type of RAM that has self‐contained memory circuitry.
DRAM ‐ Dynamic Random Access Memory: A type of RAM that requires some external support circuitry.
ASIC ‐ Application Specific Integrated Circuit(s):An integrated circuit for one narrow purpose. Often
custom or semi‐custom.
(Definitions from Gramlich 1987).
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electronic equipment to perform. RAM chips are necessary in both commercial and
defense related applications. RAM chips, particularly Dynamic Random Access Memory
(DRAM) chips, are commodity items. They are ubiquitous in electronic products and are
produced in huge volumes.
Even though commodity products, semiconductors are not easy to produce.
Fabrication facilities (FABS) cost billions of dollars. Consequently, semiconductor firms
wish to produce as many semiconductors as possible from each wafer that runs through
the production process. Since DRAM and RAM chips are commodities, many firms in the
semiconductor industry learned how to increase yields across all of their product lines
by producing RAM and DRAM chips. Finding a better way to produce RAM chips
seemed a logical vehicle upon which SEMATECH could focus its research objectives.
Browning notes:
Since it was agreed that SEMATECH was being established to improve manufacturing ability
industry wide, it had originally been taken for granted that the technology driving memory chips
would be the demonstration vehicle of choice (Browning 2000, 56).

Even though this assumption was at odds with the DOD’s wishes to conduct R&D
on ASICs, it appears that even the DOD was satisfied with the initial decision to use RAM
production as the manufacturing research vehicle. The DOD uses RAM chips in its
electronic systems. The DOD also uses Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs).
These ASICs are in some cases similar to the microprocessor in a typical home computer,
and in other cases, they are specific micro‐circuits with a single dedicated purpose.
Naturally, the DOD was concerned about having access to domestically produced RAM,
but equally concerned about the ability of U.S. firms to be able to produce ASICs.
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Luckily for the DOD, ASIC production is related to SRAM production. The DOD was
therefore supportive of SEMATECH’s initial focus on regaining world‐ class dominance
by focusing on sub‐micron technology that could be applied to RAM.
Industry powerhouses, AT&T and IBM both volunteered technologies to be used
as the manufacturing demonstration vehicle. AT&T volunteered its SRAM product, IBM
its DRAM product. Browning explains some small problems with this.
The type of chip a company makes largely determines the way its production is organized, the
firm’s potential for innovation, the kind of FAB and equipment it has, and the nature of the
technological process (Browning 2000, 55).

The donation of these technologies, although seemingly generous, sparked a great deal
of controversy. If SEMATECH chose one over the other, its FAB facility would be locked
on a technology trajectory that would not be easy to diverge from. SEMATECH would
have to have more flexible manufacturing capabilities. This would be exceedingly
expensive, more expensive perhaps than the funds that were likely to be made
available. In January of 1988, Charlie Sporck settled this debate. He announced that
SEMATECH would use both platforms instead of either. This decision, although
expensive would have long‐term ramifications for both industry and the DOD.
As a flexible factory was more expensive, the DOD naturally became somewhat
worried. This in turn caused a call for more direct military oversight of the SEMATECH
project. No one, in particular the U.S. government, wanted SEMATECH to end up on a
wild spending spree (Browning 2000). The solution at the time was strict oversight. This
call for more oversight in‐ turn raised concerns among the members of SEMATECH that
the project would come to be dominated by the military. Simultaneously, however, the
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flexible manufacturing decision was appreciated by SEMATECH members who had
military sales. Eight of the ten largest military semiconductor suppliers were SEMATECH
members. The flexible manufacturing decision provided the possibility of focusing on
process improvements that could eventually be leveraged to improve ASICs. This more
flexible manufacturing capability was not necessarily what IBM had envisioned when it
offered to donate its DRAM technology. IBM, Intel, Motorola and TI were most
concerned with improving manufacturing equipment not necessarily the specific
production processes and or the end products that could be produced by other firms.
The second issue that arose out of early 1987 planning sessions was the even
more controversial issue of protecting members’ proprietary intellectual property and
processes. Individual members were concerned not only about disclosing their
proprietary property and processes to domestic competitors, but were additionally
concerned that these would leak into Japanese firms because of the strategic
relationships that each American firm had with Japanese partners. The defense system
producers‐TI and small portions of Motorola‐were concerned that sharing some of their
processes would violate the security requirements imposed by the DOD for programs
under contract. It should however be noted that SEMATECH had very wisely established
an operations plan outlined in the “Black Book,” and a separate participation agreement
which had to be agreed to and signed by all members. The participation agreement did
not allow issues to move forward until a unanimous vote had been taken from all
fourteen members and the DOD. Explaining the participation of the DOD in the
development of the “Black Book” and participation of the DOD in the development of
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participation agreement is complicated. This participation was already exercising a
degree of influence and control over SEMATECH even before a final decision had been
made about what agency would oversee the SEMATECH. Again, the literature does not
have an explanation for this.
The third issue which arose in the planning meetings was funding. What would
each individual firm be expected to contribute? The DSB report had recommended $250
million a year from industry and $250 million per year from the government. This
recommendation was not only unpalatable, but unrealistic by all accounts. The 14
members of SEMATECH could not possibly support that level of investment. Efforts
were made to expand the membership base. The automotive industry at the time had
considerable investment in semiconductors. Ford had a microelectronics division and
GM had its Delco division. The auto industry, already injured by Japanese penetration
of U.S. markets, did not participate in the SEMATECH project. Ultimately, SEMATECH’s
yearly budget settled at $100 million per year from industry and $100 million per year
from federal and individual state interests in SEMATECH. Industry members’ dues were
to be based on the following: $1 million minimum or 1 per cent of sales, or no firm
would have to pay more dues than 15 per cent of sales.
Analysis and Conclusions:

Late in 1987 SEMATECH was complete and becoming formally incorporated by
industry and the government. The biggest impediment to SEMATECH was not industry
and its purported inability to cooperate, at least cooperate within the semiconductor
producers ranks: rather the opposite now appeared to be true. In the early 1980s
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semiconductor producers already had a track record of working together on several
different projects, SIA and MCC. In addition to these domestic projects many of the
firms who made up SEMATECH had been cooperating with their Japanese competitors
for years. Much of industries’ concern about sharing and or ultimately losing their
proprietary intellectual and process property would thus seem to be theatrical rather
than substantive.
What is most curious about the SEMATECH project is how the U.S. Government
responded. Both the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush Administrations were strong proponents
of smaller government. As such, government participation in the rescue of an industry
seems somewhat anathema. However, this anti‐government involvement sentiment
was heavily tempered by the Reagan and subsequent Bush Administrations’ desire to
end the Cold War. As such, those policies that would speed that along, military security
in particular, seemed to have been given substantial support. This is a rather bold
assertion. However, the following example demonstrates its validity. The Reagan
Administration did not necessarily bail Chrysler out to save jobs. At the time, Chrysler
had a substantial stake in the development of both the M1A1 Abrams tank, and the
vaunted Humvee. These two vehicles have become the mainstay of the U.S. military’s
mobile units. Had Chrysler failed, the military would not have the superior technology
embedded in these vehicles. This same sort of rationale was obviously brought to bear
on the whole issue of semiconductors as well. Later in this study, Van Atta will reveal a
previously undocumented relationship between national security and SEMATECH. This
revelation will facilitate the development of a different perspective of SEMATECH and
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hopefully lead to a deeper understanding of why such conceivably ill‐matched partners
came together.
Even more curious than the government’s participation in SEMATECH, is the fact
that industry, in spite of its well documented reservations about DOD participation,
consults very closely with the DOD. The semiconductor industry lobbied the DOD very
heavily, more so than either the DOE or the DOC. The merchant and commercial
members of SEMATECH were concerned about forming a relationship with the DOD
because their participation in the VHSIC project had not been entirely satisfactory. In
addition, the U.S. government’s own advisory panels were somewhat suspect of
allowing SEMATECH to be overseen by the DOD with its cumbersome administrative
practices, and technological security concerns. The literature is hard pressed to explain
why these two groups ultimately came together and what came out of that partnering.
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CHAPTER 4
SEMATECH REALIZED
Overview:

Chapter 4 will present a historical picture of SEMATECH under the leadership of
Robert Noyce and William Spencer. The historical portions of this chapter will rely
heavily on Horrigan’s (1996) and Browning and Shelter’s (2000) history of SEMATECH.
This history will be juxtaposed against the documents produced by various government
agencies evaluating the performance of the SEMATECH consortium. This comparative
process traces the evolution of SEMATECH’s working relationship with the U.S.
government, including not only DARPA, but various government agencies charged with
reporting on SEMATECH’s progress and results in a different picture of SEMATECH.
SEMATECH’s operational relationship with the government begins on a surprise
note when operational oversight for SEMATECH moves from the Office of the Under
Secretary for Defense to DARPA. Ultimately this switch will prove to be fortuitous, but
this does not mean that the relationship between DARPA and SEMATECH would always
be amicable.
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DARPA’s first interaction with SEMATECH was confrontational. One of the first
things Craig Fields, Director of DARPA did upon assuming oversight of the SEMATECH
project was to confront SEMATECH on the lack of progress in areas specifically outlined
in its legal charter. Resolution to these issues was found and a professional relationship
developed between the two organizations. However, a perceived spending spree
occasioned a Government Accounting Office (GAO) audit which noted SEMATECH’s
narrow (read industry based) research focus. The observation that SEMATECH was not
acting on the needs, wants and desires, of the government would be repeated by a
series of different agencies over several years. In spite of this well documented
shortcoming, the government was never able to get SEMATECH to focus on a more
balanced research agenda. This inability calls the efficacy of the SEMATECH model into
question.
Interspersed in the analysis is a thickened history of SEMATECH chronicling a
series of events, under the separate leadership of Robert Noyce and Bill Spencer, which
theory tells us, should have resulted in SEMATECH’s demise. Yet, we know that
somehow SEMATECH succeeded. The theory in the existing literature does little to
explain these phenomena.
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SEMATECH’s First Two Years:

Work to get SEMATECH operational had been well underway before Congress
passed the Defense Authorization Bill in December of 1987. Portions of the industrial
members’ dues of $100 million had to be made available to SEMATECH during the
fourth quarter of 1987 and those funds had been put to use. Horrigan notes that
SEMATECH’s initial research thrust was on “materials, equipment, and process”
(Horrigan 1996, 106): towards that end a fabrication (FAB) location was ultimately
settled on in Austin, Texas. In a short thirty‐two weeks, one half the industry norm,
SEMATECH had outfitted its facility in Austin: a remarkable accomplishment even
considering that the building already existed.
Semiconductor FABS are some of the most sophisticated manufacturing plants in
the world. The manufacturing and air handling machinery is incredibly complex, must
be positioned, calibrated and tested so that production on a beyond microscopic scale
can take place. Semiconductors are produced in clean rooms, producing a product on a
sub‐microscopic level. Any particulates in the room can contaminate an entire
production run. There are approximately 250 process steps using twenty or so generic
technologies in the production of a semiconductor. Each of the twenty generic
technologies requires a specific piece of equipment (Browning 2000, 64): not all
SEMATECH’s members used equipment provided by the same manufacturers. Teams of
engineers from SEMI, SEMATECH and a host of other parties pooled their talents to
adroitly accomplish the outfitting of the FAB. SEMATECH’s first technology transfer then
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was the lessons learned in the rapid build of a FAB. From this perspective then the
consortium seemed to be starting out well (Browning 2000, 86).
In spite of the huge progress being made in the outfitting of the production
facility, SEMATECH soon clashed with the DOD. By the end of the first quarter of March
1988, SEMATECH had failed to: 1) craft and sign a MOU between itself and the
government, and 2) appoint a CEO. As a result of these deficiencies, the DOD
immediately threatened to hold up the disbursement of government funds. In order to
forestall this, the SEMATECH Board created a three person CEO team “the Troika” to
assuage the DOD. Shortly after the appointment of the Troika, the DOD turned its
involvement in SEMATECH over to DARPA.
Browning does not provided details concerning the DODs decision to turn
SEMATECH over to DARPA. He notes only that there was a major reorganization in the
DOD and that SEMATECH project was turned over to DARPA (Browning 2000, 77).
[DARPA’s records in this area have not been found, they were apparently lost during its
move to new facilities] This is a curious change as prior to March of 1988 DARPA had
had no direct contact with SEMATECH. DARPA‐an organization that had a long and
distinguished history of working with industry and in the field of semiconductors‐took a
hard look at SEMATECH. Fields took immediate steps to ensure that the MOU that was
supposed to have been developed between SEMATECH and the U.S. government was in
fact completed and would be implemented in full. Jack Robertson, writing for Electronic
News reported on the negotiations between SEMATECH and DARPA. Robertson noted
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that Ed Maynard, the DOD representative who had been working with SEMATECH for
some years, had expressed some reservations that the consortium’s plans were too
vague and undetailed. This was a real concern. Although SEMATECH had set goals of
reaching .80 microns in its initial research there were several problems with this. 1) This
level of circuit was already in production, so some parties were asking why the
consortium was wasting resources on it. 2) Although the consortium had set technical
goals, specifics about how those goals were to be reached were lacking. This lack of
detail was confirmed by William Bandy who noted that in early meetings with DARPA
and SEMATECH officials SEMATECH officials claimed that “they did not want to lay out a
very detailed strategic plan as this might limit creativity” (Bandy 2011).
The transition from working with the DOD to DARPA was not as smooth as one
might be led to believe. Electronic News (April‐May 1988) reported on three weeks of
what seem to be intense discussions concerning perceptions of the role of DARPA in the
consortium. Electronic News notes that SEMATECH had three serious reservations
about DARPA. Those reservations were: 1) that DARPA wanted to focus on lithography
techniques other than optical lithography; 2) that DARPA has a long history of working
on a project by project basis and thus might only fund limited and or piecemeal projects
at SEMATECH; and 3) that DARPA might micro‐manage the consortium. These
perceptions and issues seem to have been resolved in May. Electronic News reported
that an undisclosed DARPA official announced that Sematech would set up a six‐
member strategic planning panel to direct future development projects, with DOD
having three representatives and that fully 20 per cent of funds provided by DARPA
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would be directed to advanced lithography. Although these agreements may have been
reported, sadly they never seem to have been actualized.
Electronic News further reported that the DOD was displeased with SEMATECH
on several dimensions.
DARPA reportedly is questioning Sematech's plan to rely initially only on optical lithography
techniques. Sources said DARPA is pressing Sematech to come up with a revised plan that would
include X‐ray lithography and other processing technologies in developing the next‐generation
memories. (Electronic News May 1988).

In addition Electronic News noted that the DOD was”irked” that a CEO had not yet been
found and that issues had arisen around technology transfer and commercialization of
SEMATECH developed technologies.
What is most disconcerting about Electronic News’ reporting is that SEMATECH
and the government had been working together for some two years. In spite of the
time and effort invested by both industry and the DOD, especially by those persons and
groups reporting to Edward Maynard, no real concrete plan seems to have emerged as
to how, in a step‐by‐step fashion, SEMATECH was supposed to get where it wanted to
go.
In July of 1988 Bob Noyce accepted the position of CEO of SEMATECH and a
more cordial relationship with DARPA was institutionalized. Prior to his acceptance,
Noyce had been chairing the committee charged with finding a CEO. Noyce’s
acceptance was a welcome event for both industry and DARPA. Noyce had been a
champion of the SEMATECH effort all the way back to its early conception by the SIA.
Noyce had also served on the DSB. In addition, he was exceedingly talented, he was the
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co‐inventor of the micro‐circuit, and his egalitarian management style was legendary.16
Noyce also had a very favorable reputation in Washington. Within weeks of his move to
Austin, Noyce began working on SEMATECH’s 1989 operational plan. To facilitate the
development of SEMATECH’s 1989 plan and to provide a better management structure
for projects already underway, Noyce created the Office of the Chief Executive, a new
troika of sorts, comprised of himself‐ CEO Paul Castrucci from IBM as COO and Turner
Hasty as Chief Administrative Officer (CAO).17 Between August and December of 1988
the new OCE hammered out a strategic and operational plan. DARPA participated in the
development of the 1989 operational plan and gave the plan its endorsement on Dec. 1,
1988. In less than a year, DARPA had created a very favorable relationship with
SEMATECH. This was in part due to the work of Craig Fields, DARPA’s Deputy Director,
and William Bandy, the DARPA project manager for the SEMATECH project.
Analysis:

Evans and Olk claim that successful R&D consortia are characterized by how well
they meet seven criteria. Among those criteria is selection of personnel. Had DARPA
not pushed SEMATECH, it is entirely possible that Robert “Bob” Noyce would not have
accepted the CEO position. Had SEMATECH continued to try to run itself under the
auspices of the troika, it is highly likely that funds would have been withheld, and as a
16

One might conclude that these strong statements about Noyce’s management style and reputation
could be attributed to one particular author. These exact words might be the case. However, Robert
Noyce was a remarkable man, and I have been hard pressed to find anyone say he was nothing other than
one of the best of the best in everything he did.
17

Turner Hasty was in fact the second CAO. Peter Mills was the first person in that position under Noyce’s
leadership.
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result, the SEMATECH project would have died before it had truly ever gotten started. In
addition, DARPA and SEMATECH appear to have established a working relationship that
could be built upon. In this instance then, DARPA per hypothesis two may have
significantly contributed to the success of SEMATECH.
Noyce Takes the Reins:

Noyce made some important philosophical and operational changes to
SEMATECH. Noyce was very fond of high‐risk projects. As SEMATECH had a very
confined budget this was going to be difficult to do. To conserve fiscal resources, Noyce
mandated that SEMATECH would contract for technology R&D. This would expand the
pool of talent and the costs of this technology contracting would be shared with
suppliers, federal labs, and universities. This change began to meet the mandates
established by the Defense Appropriations Act of 1987 concerning federal labs and
university participation. In addition, SEMATECH was already behind in its technology
trajectory so Noyce and the OCE mandated accelerated learning. SEMATECH was to
give priority to identify the most promising technology paths in lithography, etch and
deposition and manufacturing systems. Two other important changes emerged out of
the 1989 operational plan. Human capital was to be reduced from 750 people to 650
and only one half of the TAPF (Tool Applications Process Facility) was to be built. TAPF
was a portion of the Austin facility where SEMATECH and tool company engineers were
to jointly develop, prototype and test new equipment. What work SEMATECH could not
do as a result of this cut in infrastructure was to be done in off‐site projects. These
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sizable budgetary cuts ($104 million) were to be reapplied and balanced between off‐
site research and to longer‐term R&D expected by the DOD (Browning 2000, 75‐88).
Analysis:

These operational and philosophical changes provide some level of evidence that
Bob Noyce, in particular, may have been more in tune with government expectations for
SEMATECH. Although Browning does not specifically identify what is meant by
promising technologies, he does note that Noyce was a proponent of high‐risk, long‐
term research. This might very well mean that he would have been amenable to
DARPA’s requests for research into other forms of lithography. Unfortunately such
speculation cannot be verified as Robert Noyce passed away on June 3, 1990.
Audits Begin:

Internal strategic operations at SEMATECH were not altogether smooth in the
early years. Noyce and Castrucci had considerably different management styles, and
considerably different ways of implementing plans. In 1988, Castrucci began
authorizing the purchase of very expensive equipment which was not necessarily in the
budget. This triggered an audit and investigation by the General Accountability Office
(GAO) as some Congressional opponents of SEMATECH thought that it had gone on a
spending spree. The Defense Appropriations Act required that the GAO conduct
periodic audits of SEMATECH. In addition to the GAO, the Defense Authorization Act
also specified that an Advisory Council on Federal Participation in SEMATECH be
created. The Advisory Council as it came to be known was to: “develop operating plans
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in consultation with the DOD and SEMATECH. Additionally; the Advisory Council was to
provide the Secretary of Defense and SEMATECH with advice concerning SEMATECH’s
objectives and plans” (Federal Research: The SEMATECH Consortium's Start Up Activities
1989, 16‐19). To facilitate this, the Advisory Council was to be made up of seven
members of industry and five federal officials. “The five federal officials were to be:
DOD’s Under Secretary for Acquisition, who is the Council’s Chairman: DOE’s Director of
Energy Research; the Director of the National Science Foundation; DOC’s Under
Secretary for Economic Affairs, and finally, the Chairman of the Federal Laboratory
Consortium for Technology Transfer” (GAO/RCED‐90‐37). The members of industry “are
to be approved by the President of the U.S. and will include four members representing
the semiconductor and related industries, two persons who are eminent in the fields of
technology and defense, and one person who represents small business” (GAO/RCED‐
90‐37).
The GAO report noted that the composition of the panel: “while ensuring the
government an important voice in SEMATECH, established a business‐like arrangement
that would allow SEMATECH a reasonable degree of freedom in its operations and
management” (Federal Research 1989‐GAO/RCED‐90‐37, 2). By November of 1989, the
Advisory Council had never met because the DOD had not forwarded the names of
seven of members of industry to the President for approval (ibid).
The net result of Castrucci’s forced but inevitable audit was the publication of
the first GAO report on SEMATECH which was presented to the House of
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Representatives. Two positives emerged from the audit and presentation of the
findings. Internally, the consortium created the Investment Council. The Investment
Council was created to help the GAO evaluate SEMATECH’s contractual arrangements.
Browning explains:
SEMATECH needed a consistent system for submitting the requests for proposal (RFP), grading
the proposals, and choosing who would receive contracts (a political and legal minefield). Not
only were there strict legal requirements for an organization operating with government funds,
but the contracting process brought it closest yet to the role of “picking winner and losers.”
Something SEMATECH’s critics had often prophesied….In addition, the council’s chief function
was not to determine where money would go but to legitimize and integrate the mechanisms for
the consortium’s contract allocation and spending….Not all the skilled engineers who came to
SEMATECH with projects dreams were practiced in forecasting costs, managing allotted funds
legitimately, and effectively, or integrating projects with an overall strategic plan…..The
Investment Council quickly became a key element in the new organization structure (Browning
2000, 91‐92).

Externally, and perhaps more importantly, The General Accounting Office
recommended that SEMATECH have access to continued funding, and that funding
disbursement and oversight remain under DARPA.
The Advisory Council submitted a report in late 1989 on SEMATECH’s
performance to that time (Mayer 1989). Mayer’s report noted: “SEMATECH’s most
important accomplishments in 1988, however, probably had less to do with meeting
operational goals than with the difficult and occasionally contentious work of self‐
definition” (Mayer 1989, ES‐4). Since SEMATECH was an organization that was founded
with an already existing history of cooperation within industry: the problems of
definition seem to have arisen out of an incomplete operational plan. This operational
plan had previously only established goals, but under DARPA tutelage had blossomed to
include specific processes and milestones that would facilitate reaching stated goals.
Such was DARPA’s tutelage that the report goes on to note that:
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Experience in 1988 should help to allay concern that DOD funding may lead to the subordination
of SEMATECH’s commercial objectives to specific defense production needs. Early tensions
between DARPA and SEMATECH on the issues of production flexibility, planning and discipline,
and project leadership/industry commitment were largely resolved by late summer. At year end,
DARPA officials were pleased with SEMATECH’s overall progress (Mayer 1989, ES‐5).

Mayer’s statements reflect similar conclusions reached by the GAO on
SEMATECH’s performance in 1988. Both reports recommended that SEMATECH
continue to be overseen by DARPA even though both the Defense Appropriations Act
and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act required that alternative oversight
agencies be considered.
In spite of the positive tone of this report, both the Advisory Council and GAO
had recommendations concerning SEMATECH’s research direction. The Advisory
Council made five advisory comments on SEMATECH. Those that inform this study are
outlined below.
Expanding the Consortium’s Strategic Focus. Some early proposals for SEMATECH focused on the
manufacture of standard design memory chips, using present‐generation process technology.
During 1988, however, consortium planners expanded this strategic vision to include increased
emphasis on flexible manufacturing of special application chips (ASICS), and accelerated
development of commercially feasible X‐ray technology. (Italics added)
Improving Supplier Relations. Spokesmen for SEMATECH and SEMI/SEMATECH seem to agree
that by creating a framework and incentives for communication, SEMATECH has succeeded in
founding a more open and cooperative relationship with suppliers (Mayer 1989, ES‐4).

The GAO report established the following:
1) A greater percentage of research and development should be conducted outside of SEMATECH.
2) SEMATECH has been satisfied with it interactions with DARPA, stating that DARPA has helped
improve SEMATECH’s strategic planning efforts without micro‐managing SEMATECH’s activities
of influencing it into performing more defense‐related research.
3) While not a formal member, DOD shares access to SEMATECH’s technology. Each member
company, DOD, and SEMI/SEMATECH, which represents U.S. semiconductor equipment and
materials suppliers, are represented on SEMATECH’s Board of Directors and Executive
Technology Advisory Board (ETAB).
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4) The National Defense Authorization Act required DOD to enter into a memorandum of
understanding with SEMATECH before it could provide funds. Before DARPA signed the
memorandum of understanding in May of 1988, SEMATECH agreed to address DARPA’s concerns
that (1) SEMATECH’s operating plans should include more complete and consistent goals and
milestones and (2) 20 percent of SEMATECH’s annual budget should be dedicated to advanced
development projects that involved member companies, equipment manufacturers, universities
and federal laboratories. DARPA’s program manager also is responsible for coordinating
SEMATECH’s R&D program with DARPA’s other semiconductor‐related R&D programs. Project
managers from DARPA and SEMATECH met on June 29, 1989, to exchange information about
advanced manufacturing technology projects that each is funding. This includes discussions
about DARPA’s research on (1) X‐ray lithography…….
5) The former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition stated that many government/industry
collaborations failed in the past because the government took the lead in defining objectives and
operating plans (GAO/RCED‐90‐27 Federal Research).

These reports highlight the significant accomplishments of SEMATECH in the
1988, 1989 timeframe. In a manner of months, SEMATECH, via its interactions with
DARPA had seemingly managed to eradicate, although not completely, its suspicion of
the government and its’ potential for dominance of agenda. Noyce wrote a response to
the GAO report noting that there was a potential for duplication of effort by both the
Advisory Council and the NACS. He was perhaps correct to be concerned. The GAO
writers responded in support of Noyce, stating that “each new group overseeing
SEMATECH requires SEMATECH managers to take time away from its mission to explain
its operations to the group" (GAO/RCED‐90‐27 Federal Research, 22).
Analysis:

There are four significant issues that emerge from these two reports and
SEMATECH’s early operational years. The first was that SEMATECH was doing well.
SEMATECH was moving forward: it had overcome some substantial internal hurdles,
and had managed to address some rather large and surprising external hurdles including
the change from one Office of the DOD (Office of the Under Secretary Defense for
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Acquisition and Technology) to DARPA oversight. SEMATECH had established a good
working relationship with a government agency, DARPA, with which they had no
previous interaction. Although this may have occasioned some worry, every other
government agency who had audited SEMATECH agreed that DARPA was the best
agency for the consortium to work with. SEMATECH did not need to be burdened with
more government agencies and organizations poking around its operations and agenda.
In addition, the industrial members of SEMATECH were able to put their issues
concerning working with the DOD over the horizon. A positive relationship had evolved
between SEMATECH and DARPA in particular.
The third issue which emerged from a review of SEMATECH’s operations is the
acknowledgement of the importance of X‐ray lithography and ASICS to national
competitiveness. Not only was there a reminder about this, but specific references to
contracts and other legal activities were made. In spite of this recognition, no action
seems to have been under taken by Members of the U.S. House of Representatives to
address this flaw in the SEMATECH model.
The fourth message that emerged from these reports was that semiconductor
manufacturers and the firms that produced manufacturing tools needed to address the
splintered nature of their relationship. Addressing this fourth issue would radically alter
the nature of SEMATECH’s mission and objectives and be a critical instance wherein
DARPA helped contribute to SEMATECH’s success.
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Creating a Co‐opetitive Environment:

The GAO report that proclaimed SEMATECH’s early successes reported on
developments that had evolved from SEMATECH’s early work in retro‐fitting the FAB in
Austin. By November of 1988 the FAB had been outfitted with enough machinery to
begin some limited production. In the process, SEMATECH learned a great deal about
the problems that semiconductor equipment manufacturers had with producers. These
relationship problems had been known for some time at an individual vendor to
customer level. The retro‐fitting of the FAB really brought‐home the industry‐wide
nature of vendor customer relationships. The formation of SEMI/SEMATECH was the
early effort to address this relationship gap. Talks conducted under the auspices of this
organization had been fruitful, but inconclusive.
Obi Oberai of IBM was charged with discovering why SEMATECH member firms
had such problems with the tool industry. Oberai discovered‐through extensive
interviews‐ that each firm, vendor or customer, had a very different experience
between what he/she believed to be the other’s practices, and what the reality was.
For instance, Oberai explained that production managers were desirous of high quality
and reliability. However, when it came time to purchase machinery, purchasing
managers, the people who actually control the purse strings, were cost conscious and
desirous of a low price. This causes very real problems. In the world of business, it is
exceedingly difficult to produce and or purchase a product that simultaneously
optimizes the variables of quality, reliability and price. Tensions arise in the production
process and between management units with different responsibilities. These tensions
90

invariably result in workarounds, short‐cuts, and compromises. As these variables sneak
into the specifications and production of the capital machinery, a customer ultimately
ends up with an unsatisfactory experience. If this cycle is repeated, eventually the exact
situation which was witnessed by the semiconductor industry in the U.S. is experienced.
Poor business relationships inevitably lead to poor equipment (Browning 2000).
The correlation between poor quality and low reliability on the one hand and poor relationships
between chip makers and suppliers was a significant finding. But for a time, this nexus remained
overshadowed by the consortium’s need to develop its own technological capability and help the
infrastructure by improving equipment technology. During the technology‐focused processes of
equipping the SEMATECH FAB and initiating equipment‐focused projects, the management
implications of interrelated problems of quality and customer supplier relations continued to
grow clearer. This better understanding eventually led to one of SEMATECH’s most successful
programs (Browning 2000, 101).

Caryannis has postulated that SEMATECH would not have succeeded without
this change to “co‐opetition”18 (Caryannis 2006).
Bob Noyce kept Congress informed of the SEMATECH effort and the conditions
which were emerging that would warrant a change in SEMATECH’s mission, objectives
and membership composition. He explained to Congress in 1989:
“I think that the job we have to do has become somewhat more difficult in the two years that
have passed since the original plan was put out. As a result of that, we have been moving our
emphasis to the semiconductor equipment and material suppliers because we see that as more
critical now than the job that we were going to do‐more in the manufacturing technology,
manufacturing methods, quality methods, the techniques, if you will, of high‐volume
production.” (Congressional Testimony)

At first glance a focus on the tool industry may seem counter‐intuitive. The
semiconductor industry had been flourishing in the United States for several decades
18

Co‐opetition is cooperation between members of an industry’s upstream and downstream value chain.
In this particular case, it means cooperation upstream from the FAB.

91

and all the manufacturing processes for semiconductors had been relatively static for
some time. In fact the proven semiconductor production process had been transferred
around the globe several times by 1988. Admittedly, there may have been inefficiencies
created in the tool industry because of tensions between customers strategic business
units. However, the fact that the industry had become a successful global industry
demonstrated that these inefficiencies could not have been that inefficient. DARPA and
SEMATECH were to discover the flaw in this reasoning.
The entire semiconductor industry is driven by what is known as Moore’s Law.
Moore’s Law is named after Intel founder Gordon Moore and predicts that transistor
density on integrated circuits doubles every two years (Intel.com no date). Historically,
Moore’s law has held true with the industry introducing better, faster, denser, chips
every 20‐26 months or so. This is a function of several factors, the ability to cram more
circuits onto a substrate, a reconfiguring of manufacturing process, or incremental
improvement(s) of manufacturing process. Because of this rate of change, and because
some of these noted changes are proprietary discoveries, each individual maker of
semiconductors works in relative secrecy with its vendors to get its product out to
markets as quickly as possible so as to recoup its substantial capital investment. Most
of America’s tool vendors are small to medium sized businesses. Their small size gives
them a great deal of operational alacrity. One tool firm might be producing the same
sort of machine for several different semiconductor manufacturers. However, non‐
disclosure clauses signed between the tool maker and the customer do not make it
possible for the vendor to create economies of scale in the production of the machine.
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One customer wants the machine with X features and benefits, another wants the
machine with 1/2X and two other features, a third wants the machine with X and Y
features and benefits.
The engineering challenges associated with such custom requests are
monumental. The production challenges of producing the specified machines are even
more so. Each machine for each individual customer needs to be produced as rapidly as
possible to keep pace with Moore’s Law. Prior to SEMATECH, the industry norm was to
get production machinery as quickly as possible and then work out its flaws on the
actual semiconductor production line. This is inefficient. There is no Chilton’s manual
that comes with these machines. If they need to be fixed, altered, or modified, they
cannot easily be serviced by in‐house staff or easily picked up off the FAB floor and
hauled to the neighborhood mechanic. A team of engineers will have come to the
actual semiconductor production site to diagnose the problem, develop a solution, have
the solution manufactured, the original machine taken apart in situ so that the new
part, process, or technology can be inserted. Once the modification has been made,
several production runs must be completed and evaluated to analyze the effect of the
changes. With luck, the fix works. If not, the whole process begins again.
As SEMATECH was building and outfitting its own FAB, these typical industry
problems were manifested and became very apparent to not only the SEMI/SEMATECH
but to DARPA as well. The U.S. government owns and operates some small FABS. Like
industrial producers however, the government’s production problems were not openly
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discussed. The outfitting of the SEMATECH FAB demonstrated in ways that could not be
captured from individual firm, from the government’s perspective, tool maker
experience, or focused interviews just how critical this problem was. Even though IBM
and AT&T had donated proven production processes, they did not donate the
machinery that went with it. SEMATECH needed to secure that on its own. In the
process, the industry norms, tension between SBUs and customization of tooling,
became the operational reality at SEMATECH. SEMATECH members were trying to
address the problem; however, 14 members were offering 14 “veiled” solutions to the
problem. Individual tool makers were doing the same. Solutions were ‘veiled:’
…because no one wanted to reveal how exactly they would, or were currently producing
solutions, nor were they willing to present finished machines and the finished products
associated with that machinery. It turns out however, that what everybody believed to be a
proprietary process or a proprietary modification was in fact quite common solution across the
bulk of SEMATECH’s members” (Bandy Interview 2011).

This was a truly significant discovery as fixing this problem would really help
move the entire industry to a higher level of expertise and competitive capability.
Analysis:

Even as SEMATECH found common ground between itself, the government and
the tool makers, it positioned itself on the brink of collapse. SEMATECH’s first round of
funding was chartered for five years. In that time it was expected to make significant
advances in the reduction of circuit size. Barely a year and a half into its existence it was
suddenly talking about, and actively lobbying for, a change in its research focus.
Changes in research focus are expected in long‐term research (Confidential Interview B
2010). Changes to a research agenda already one fifth of the way through its funding
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horizon however are not. Theory tells us that: “the success of a program is tied to
specific tactics that are adopted to achieve goals, provided that these goals are agreed
upon at the inception of a program” (Grindley 1994, 752). This is a rather double edged
statement. In the former clause it claims that specific tactics must be adopted.
Focusing on the rectification of the problems between tool makers and semiconductor
manufactures was a specific tactic that was supported by the industrial members of
SEMATECH, by the members of SEMI and also by DARPA. In this sense then, this change
in the research agenda was a good thing. The latter clause though hints at a possible
avenue for failure. SEMATECH and DARPA had hardly agreed upon this tactic at the
inception of the program and thus theory hints that this effort should have failed.
Research Reminders:

The switch towards the tool industry and its output as the focus of SEMATECH’s
research although well received ultimately did not silence the perennial discussions
concerning other forms of lithography and ASICS. The reasons for this are varied, but
going back in history will help explain this in more detail. Japan as always, was one of
the principle reasons X‐ray lithography in particular, continued to be associated with
SEMATECH. According to the DSB, in the early 1980s, the U.S. had parity with Japan in
research towards the development of X‐ray and other forms of lithography. However,
the U.S. was on the cusp of falling behind. If progress in semiconductors was to be
made the next generation of semiconductors would have to rely on new lithography
technology as optical lithography was nearing its physical limits. These concerns were
noted by the DSB in its 1986 report, in subsequent reports issued by the Advisory
95

Council, the National Committee on Semiconductors and by industry itself. Browning
notes that since SEMATECH was being established to improve manufacturing technology
industry wide, that SEMATECH would focus its efforts on the technology drivers of the
time DRAMs and SRAMs. However, even as SEMATECH was forming, the entire industry
noted that markets were changing and that ASICs were becoming increasingly important
to both commercial and defense interests. Browning emphasizes that during
SEMATECH’s planning stages that the government19 and industry substantially
underestimated the future market for specialized chips and how ASICs would eventually
become the technology drivers of the future and the technology that would be
associated with much more flexible manufacturing systems (Browning 2000, 56). Given
this seemingly unanimous concern, why was there no consensus then on ASICS and X‐
ray lithography? If the industry and government were both recognizing this as a
technology of the future, why did it continually get superceded?
Analysis:

A portion of the answer to this question lies in the differing commercial
objectives of SEMATECH’s participants. The large firms, IBM, Motorola, Intel and TI,
were very much concerned with the huge costs they each incurred as they developed
new semiconductors and the tools needed to produce them. These large firms usually
bore the brunt of technological leaps not only in the semiconductor product itself, but in
the development of the machinery needed to produce it. Smaller firms such as Micron,

19

Browning did not have access to Van Atta’s 1988 work which will be presented and discussed in Chapter
Five.
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LSI, and NCR usually needed to adapt the production machinery that had a large portion
of its flaws worked out by the firms noted above, and endeavor to form a competitive
advantage through process technology.
There was a group of relatively smaller semiconductor producers that
participated in SEMATECH. The semiconductor firms of Harris and Rockwell are
examples of this type of firm. Harris and Rockwell produced commodity
semiconductors, but their branded products were considered to be discrete and highly
specialized. In order for these firms to produce these highly specialized products, at a
palatable price, these firms leverage the investment of the firms who have spent large
funds on manufacturing and process technology. Firms that leverage work done by
others are considered late adopters of technology. Because they are late adopters they
can focus their efforts on the design and production of specialized purpose chips,
(ASICS). Late adopters might produce commodity chips or higher volume chips to
produce revenue, but their real expertise is in these specialized semiconductors.
SEMATECH’s small producers were under‐represented, not only in terms of numbers,
but in terms of agenda setting. Because of their small size, and small voice, these firms
may not have necessarily been able to advance a research agenda which was more to
their needs, and more in line with long‐term thinking. The size and interest of the
smaller firms partially explains why ASICs were ignored by SEMATECH. DARPA and the
government interests however were not small. How have others explained why ASICs
were not a substantial part of the SEMATECH research agenda?
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A partial answer to this question is found in the 1990 report prepared for
Congress by the Congressional Budget Office. (Using R&D Consortia for Commercial
Innovation: SEMATECH, X‐ray Lithography, and High Resolution Systems. 1990). This
document noted the tension that might exist between government and industry where
cost sharing is incorporated into the consortia and why research agendas of industry
and government might not match. The report states:
The 50/50 cost sharing for federal involvement in SEMATECH created a precedent for R&D
consortia and established that industry was seriously interested. ..Industry is not likely to create
an irrelevant research agenda if its own money were at stake….Discriminating among interesting
technologies requires detailed knowledge, which is usually located in private industry. If the
private sector has its own funds and experts involved, the research is more likely to be relevant.
Program operations in R&D consortia will have to rely fundamentally on private sector partners
for success. To a large extent, the government will be delegating its authority to private
initiative, both during and after the formation of any R&D consortium….Failure is a common
result in the development phases of new technology. The “right level of failure” will be hard to
determine for any federal agency supporting commercial innovation through R&D consortia. To
continue support in the face of failure will also be hard for the Congress. One way of ensuring
the right level of failure is to separate the reputation of federal support efforts from that of any
single major project. Rather, by supporting many smaller technology developments, the federal
government could pursue a broad portfolio of technologies, some of which would have
commercial potential, and therefore, would not discourage additional funding (Using R&D
Consortia for Commercial Innovation, xv and xvi).

A review of this statement reveals considerable information about why Harris, Rockwell,
and the government in particular had such difficulty in directing at least some portion of
SEMATECH’s R&D agenda towards different forms of lithography and ASICs. Industry is
not likely to create an irrelevant research agenda if its own money were at stake (op cit,
xv). Bandy and Van Atta will challenge this assertion.
Browning (2000) and Mayer (1989) note the following. IBM and the captive
producers had some interest in ASICs, but this type of chip was mainly the concern of
the smaller SEMATECH members, and of the firms with defense sales. DARPA and the
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National Security Agency (NSA) in particular, already had some research projects
underway concerning X‐ray lithography, as did IBM in partnership with Motorola.
However, both organizations were not necessarily convinced that X‐ray lithography
would be the next best way to put circuit lines to a substrate. Two other technologies,
Deep Ultraviolet Light, (DUV) and Electron Beams (E‐beams) were viable contenders in
this area. Since there seemed to be no real industry consensus on the next technology
that would become the lithography process, industry as a whole did not seem interested
in investing a huge amount of money in this area. Apparently the other firms that
comprised SEMATECH were more than satisfied with the R&D efforts which were
already being undertaken by IBM and Motorola. It appears that these firms were
expecting the development of these different technologies to come to them in the same
way that they had previously acquired them, late adoption. If this philosophy was not
prevalent, then perhaps the other members of SEMATECH were looking back to
Vannever Bush (1950‐1970) thinking that speculative research of this type was
considered to be basic research and was therefore the purview of the government and
its research institutions. Research in X‐ray lithography was already underway in the
DOE, NSA and DARPA. If you couple this knowledge with the risk mitigation noted
above, then the stance of SEMATECH to avoid such speculative research appears logical,
at least to some of SEMATECH’s industrial members.
Another interesting statement from the CBO 1990 report is: “discriminating
among interesting technologies requires detailed knowledge, which is usually located in
private industry. If the private sector has its own funds and experts involved, the
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research is more likely to be relevant. Program operations in R&D consortia will have to
rely fundamentally on private sector partners for success (op cit, XVI). On the surface, it
appears as though the government made a similar mistake as industry. In the 1970s and
1980s, innovations to semiconductors and their manufacture were coming out of
industry at a much faster rate than out of government labs and programs. Had the
government come to believe that its own experts were out of touch, and that it would
be better for industry to direct which technology paths industry would pursue? The
answer to this question is both yes and no. The government recognized that its cost of
acquisition for semiconductors had grown exceedingly high. During the 1980s the
government therefore engaged in efforts to spin technology on from industry to the
DOD. The government continued to employee some of the best and brightest people
from industry and academia. These people however focused on long‐term highly
speculative leading technology research.
The last important comment from the 1990 CBO report is:
Failure is a common result in the development phases of new technology. The “right level of
failure” will be hard to determine for any federal agency supporting commercial innovation
through R&D consortia. To continue support in the face of failure will also be hard for the
Congress. One way of ensuring the right level of failure is to separate the reputation of federal
support efforts from that of any single major project. Rather, by supporting many smaller
technology developments, the federal government could pursue a broad portfolio of
technologies, some of which would have commercial potential, and therefore, would not
discourage additional funding (op cit, XVI‐XVII).

These statements speak to the perception of government spending of the time.
SEMATECH was already a dangerous gamble on behalf of both industry and the
government. Why would anyone want to increase its chances of failure by increasing
expectations for it to deliver on technologies that might have been beyond its purview
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or raison d’être? It would seem apparent that some parts of the government were
exceedingly aware of high levels of failure and were hedging their funding bets by
distributing lithography research throughout the system. Any failure would amount to
smaller budgets and be attributed to standard conceptions of failure at the time.
Tying a wholly new research endeavor to an untried, unproven industrial policy
concept was perhaps just too daunting for the time. In a short two years, SEMATECH
had proven that substantial gains could be accrued simply by focusing on issues that
needed repair, and incremental improvements to already existing technology platforms.
If success was occurring under these conditions, why risk it by shooting for the
development, testing and proving of whole new technologies? Subsequent discussion
with Van Atta and Bandy will expand on this question.
The important issues that came out of the CBO in 1990 might have been
addressed with SEMATECH in 1991 and subsequent years. Bob Noyce was a huge
champion of high‐risk, long‐term technology development. In his short tenure as CEO,
he had created an amicable, professional working relationship with DARPA. He had
identified huge holes in the industry and in SEMATECH’s operations and had created
ideas, institutions and processes for dealing with them. Noyce had freed up hundreds of
millions of dollars to be spent on projects other than demonstrating best of class
manufacturing (Browning 2000). It is highly likely that had Noyce lived longer that
SEMATECH may have been able to undertake a more serious focus on alternative forms
of lithography and production of other types of semiconductors. The next chapter of
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this effort will reveal that this entire interpretation is partially wrong. Bandy will in
some ways agree with this assessment. Van Atta however will claim that one of the
reasons why ASICs and other forms of technology were never addressed under the
SEMATECH project was because of how it was funded.
The Spencer Years:

William “Bill” Spencer was appointed CEO by SEMATECH’s Board of Directors in
fall of 1990. Spencer was an interesting choice as he came from outside the
semiconductor industry. Spencer came from Xerox. Spencer proved to be a very good
choice as he saw SEMATECH through obstacles that were every bit as trying as
SEMATECH’s start up activities.
By 1990 it was becoming apparent that SEMATECH had some quality issues that
needed to be dealt with. Although Noyce had created an environment where tool and
product manufacturers could interact and create quality machines that were reliable,
SEMATECH was suffering from poor internal quality practices and an increasing
dissatisfaction by some members and DARPA regarding the value they were receiving
from their investment and participation in SEMATECH. Browning relates a story told to
him by Bill George that captures the core of SEMATECH’s internal problems.
Bill George noted that when he joined the consortium in early 1991 that if you asked SEMATECH
what its output was, they’d tell you how many reports they’d published, how many meetings
they’d held, and how many documents they had sent to member companies. The product was
viewed as the report (Browning 2000, 147).
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This is not what was expected for millions in capital invested. In fact, reports were a far
cry from the substantial lessons that had been learned and transferred a mere two years
ago when the SEMATECH FAB was being built.
Browning notes that some member’ concerns were tied to the market which had
recovered by the end of 1990 and the entire industry seemed well on the road to
recovery. Still others felt that they were not getting much out of SEMATECH because
there was substantial difficulty in transferring technology out of the organization.
SEMATECH was on the verge of achieving the Phase II milestone of producing .5 micron
line width and was also on its way to producing the .35 line width goal it had set to meet
by 1992. These were substantial achievements. But with the industry no longer on the
brink of demise, and with the U.S. set to achieve technical parity with Japan using
American made equipment by 1992, some of SEMATECH’s members were justifiably
questioning whether or not the funds that already had and would be, committed to
SEMATECH would produce results any faster than in house development. Not only had
SEMATECH learned how to deal with the tool makers, but individual member companies
had also learned how to interact with their suppliers in a much more professional,
proactive, and quality focused manner (Browning 2000).
There is some speculation that DARPA/DOD was also becoming increasingly
disenchanted with SEMATECH. DARPA’s primary concern for more technology that
could easily be spun on to the military (ASICS and lithography processes other than
optical lithography) continued to secure only short shrift from SEMATECH. Glowing
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reviews, from Congressional audits aside, part of the reason why the DOD had originally
sponsored SEMATECH was a means to ensure a reliable domestic semiconductor
industry that would be able to provide the DOD with the products that it needed. To
this end, SEMATECH had begun to work very heavily with Graphics Corporation of
America (GCA), the company that had invented the photolithography process, and was
by 1988 owned by General Signal Corporation. GCA, a maker of a tool called a stepper,
had more or less lost its competitive position to the Japanese by 1989. SEMATECH felt
that it could:
Make GCA competitive again, and the consortium worked hard to do so. In fact, in 1989, to help
prime the pump for acceptance of the improved GCA stepper, SEMATECH offered attractive
leases, or even free use, to member firms. Only four of the member firms, Motorola, NSC, Harris
and Micron accepted the offer (Browning 2000, 124).

While SEMATECH was working with GCA it was also heavily involved with the
Optical Lithography Division of Perkin‐Elmer Corporation. In 1990 Nikon, a Japanese
company, made a bid to purchase Perkin‐Elmer. This was a huge concern to SEMATECH
and to the DOD. It was felt that Perkin–Elmer was the only realistic contender left in the
U.S. in the area of optical lithography. All other firms had either gone out of business or
just did not have enough credibility with SEMATECH members. SEMATECH bought 60
per cent of Perkin–Elmer to prevent the sale of the firm to Nikon. This purchase
resulted in Craig Fields dismissal from DARPA, the Administration feeling that he had
moved too aggressively, was picking winners, and had used SEMATECH as a tool for
industrial policy (Browning 2000, 136). The net result of SEMATECH’s interaction with
U.S. optical lithography companies did not yield the results expected by DARPA or the
members of SEMATECH.
104

Bill Spencer had a daunting task ahead of him. By the day he had arrived, several
issues needed to be addressed: DARPA was unhappy‐one of its SEMATECH champions
was ousted. This was untimely because the government was talking about major
funding cutbacks for the 1992 budget year and more importantly the 1993 budget
year.20 Two, small members, LSI Logic and Micron Technology had already made it
known that they would be leaving SEMATECH in 1992: the first available opportunity to
do so, under SEMATECH’s founding charter. Harris, it was rumored, might also be
leaving. This was a problem. If member firms were leaving, they would be taking their
membership dues with them. The resignation of industry members would in theory
require the Federal government to reduce its financial commitment to SEMATECH as
well. Spencer had a significant job to do, if he was to keep SEMATECH fully funded and
keep what members who wished to remain satisfied with their investment.
Even as SEMATECH was falling under increasing scrutiny by the government, it
managed to catch a break of sorts from the Japanese. In 1991, the GAO, working on
request of Sen. Lloyd Benson and SEMATECH, responded to allegations that U.S. firms
were being denied access to Japan’s state of the art machinery, packaging materials and
computer components. This incident revived some of the national furor associated with
20

SEMATECH’s original charter under the Defense Appropriations Act of 1987 called for five years of
government funding. It would not bode well for SEMATECH’s future beyond those five years of funding if
it should lose 20 percent of its funding in its final year. Although SEMATECH had set a goal of achieving
the .35 micron line width by 1992, it was not altogether certain that this goal would be met. As early as
1989, it was becoming apparent that it might take SEMATECH slightly longer than five years to reach this
goal. As such, it was crucial that full funding be achieved every year, not only for fiscal purposes, but for
political and psychological purposes as well. Decreases in funding in 1992 would almost certainly mean
that either smaller, or no funds would be forthcoming in 1993. SEMATECH would thus have to meet the
.35 micron goal with only internally generated funds, or fold altogether.
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SEMATECH, potentially contributing to future full funding. This incident simultaneously
served to revive the debate about what benefits non‐members of SEMATECH should be
receiving for the tax dollars that were being invested.
Critics of SEMATECH called the organization hypocritical. Any firm who
manufactured semiconductors in the United States did not have immediate access to
the technology that was being developed by SEMATECH. In fact, non‐member firms
had to wait for up to a year to receive technology that was being, in part, sponsored by
their tax dollars. Under Noyce, some small headway had been made in this area; any
tool maker could sell new tools developed by SEMATECH after it had fulfilled orders for
SEMATECH members. This more or less meant that tools makers could immediately sell
any excess tools that they had contracted for, but did not deliver. The flaws with this
scheme should be immediately apparent. These tools are expensive to produce, highly
dedicated to specific manufacturers and specific manufacturing tasks. The chances of a
tool such as this being produced and then not delivered are pretty slim. Access to new
and or exceedingly improved tools had to change if SEMATECH was to maintain a good
public image: and change it did. SEMATECH’s new policy for the sale of tools developed
by SEMI/SEMATECH became as follows: “To diminish any discriminatory effects and to
give suppliers as much opportunity as possible, SEMATECH sponsored equipment
developments were abolished, with no preferred customer treatment for
semiconductor firms that were customers” (Browning 2000, 156). This change in access
to SEMATECH developed tools was a sea change for the organization. Such a change
would leave SEMATECH with a host of industry free riders. This is a very confusing
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decision in the face of what was going on at SEMATECH in 1991. Some members were
already expressing dissatisfaction with SEMATECH. Now, in addition to concerns about
return on investment, one of the key benefits of membership, an early lead with new
technology, had been given away.
To offset these drawbacks, Spencer who had been instrumental in Xerox’s
winning of a Malcolm Baldridge Award for Quality in 1989, applied his experience to
every aspect of SEMATECH’s operations. He set a new motto for the organization: “On
Target, On Time, Together” (Browning 2000, 151). Much of 1991 was spent developing
the organizational structures and operational procedures that would allow the living of
this motto and would become known as SEMATECH II. Each of the three Ts was fleshed
out further in the SEMATECH II operational plans. In short, each meant as follows.
On target, addressed matters of focusing on and selecting technological deliverables relevant to
the needs of each stakeholder. On time, referred to the meeting promised project schedules so
that technology generation and fab equipping cycles were in line with each member firm’s
needs. Together, meant structuring consensus to give each member company a voice in setting
deliverable priorities rather than the majority rules process that had been used before (Browning
2000, 152).

In addition to the three Ts, a new planning process was instituted with DARPA.
This plan began to focus on SEMATECH’s objectives beyond 1992. The plan was a two
stage process that alternated a strategic planning cycle with an annual planning cycle.
The strategic plan was a five year horizon based on customer input, and endeavored to
look into the future to see what technology might be forthcoming and what support
would be needed for these up and coming technologies. The strategic plan was
developed on a year to year schedule and was to be done during the first and second
quarters. Once completed, it was presented to DARPA as the long‐range plan. The
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annual plan was developed begin in the third quarter of the year and was designed to
select the programs and funding that would be put into place for the following year. This
dual planning process took SEMATECH’s planning to new levels of development and
greatly enhanced internal customer (member) satisfaction (Browning 2000). This new
planning process would not only incorporate internal customers (members) but the
technological trajectories that would come out of a new initiative called Road
Mapping.21
Both Micron and LSI Logic left SEMATECH in 1992 as expected. Both
organizations cited divergence between technology agendas as the reason for leaving.
Micron and LSI Logic were the smallest firms in the SEMATECH project. Though their
annual $1 million dollar subscription sounds small compared to the $15 million expected
of the larger firms, this contribution was incrementally much more difficult to bear.
These two firms’ small size in sales was also evidenced by their smaller technological
needs. SEMATECH’s bylaws had established that each firm had a vote, and that
consensus must be achieved on all major initiatives. Browning wisely notes however
that consensus does not mean that every member’s voice would be heard (Browning
2000, 157). SEMATECH had driven its research agenda in the early years by polling all
members and asking for a list of their top ten priorities. The common ones that

21

In April of 1991, a conference called Microtech 2000 was convened in North Carolina. The SRC, NACS
and 90 or so semiconductor experts were charged with identifying and mapping the technology that
would be needed to develop a one‐gigabyte SRAM with a .12 micron line width by the year 2000. Such an
accomplishment would not merely ensure that the United States maintained parity with the rest of the
world’s semiconductor companies and activities, but that the U.S. would make a quantum leap forward
and maintain that leap by continuing these mapping activities.
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emerged out of the fourteen top ten lists became SEMATECH’s top priorities. There was
a fundamental flaw with this system. Although it shared commonality of purpose, it did
not ensure that every firm had its top priorities addressed. Hypothetically, a firm (we
will call it firm A) might have eight items on its technology agenda that were rank
ordered 1‐8. Suppose firm A also had items 9 and 10 on its agenda. However, if only
items 9‐10 appeared on every other firm’s (B‐X) agenda, then firm A would only receive
assistance on those technologies that it considered a lower priority. This system,
although logical really lent itself to advancing the interests of those firms that were
similar in operations and technical capability: the big merchant firms and the big
captives. Browning does not note if DARPA had the same top ten agenda privileges as
the other 14 SEMATECH members.
Bill Spencer would radically change this ranking process. In order to increase
member satisfaction, two things had to occur. First, members had to have concrete
evidence that they were receiving value for the resources invested. In short, they had to
have a measurable return on their investment, not just reports generated. Second, that
value not only had to be measurable, it had to be implementable. $15 million reports
are worth little if the contents of the reports cannot be implemented by the firms that
paid for those contents. SEMATECH’s efforts to date had simply assumed that all
technological breakthroughs would be implemented by members as the member
assignees returned home. This was an unfounded assumption. Spencer would not
consider a SEMATECH technology transfer successful until SEMATECH technology had
been inserted into, calibrated, and tested in a member company’s fabrication facility.
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In order to measure a member’s return on investment, the firm had to admit
what projects it wanted. Under the previous system, the fourteen members submitted
sanitized lists of their research agendas. In committee, it became difficult to figure out
who had necessarily put what on the research agenda. None were willing to admit what
it had put on their agenda as this might reveal competitive initiatives. Under Spencer,
this last vestige of industry mistrust was to end. As part of the return on investment
initiative, each member firm at SEMATECH became obligated to do three things.
One: Members were obliged to clearly define what projects they had voted for.
Two: Members were to define what they expected from SEMATECH.
Three: Members were to define what they intended to do to help the consortium achieve the
goal specified including the resources it would require from each member from planning to
execution (Browning 2000, 160).

This process gave a new meaning to cooperation and consensus. The previous process
had been consensus by acquiescence, muteness and procedure. This new process was
consensus based on transparency and dialogue. This was a substantial change,
especially for the remaining smaller members of SEMATECH. Everyone discussed
(except DARPA), in frank detail, their research agendas. Most importantly this
process created a communication vehicle for members to say what they wanted. The changes
also helped members vote in a disciplined way for things which they could realistically benefit,
rather than for things they could not afford but wanted SEMATECH to do (Browning 2000, 161).

DARPA was a silent participant in previous agenda and Spencer’s changes ensured that
DARPA would remain so under the newer agenda development process.
Changes to SEMATECH’s operational philosophy and organizational structure
were summarized in the new aims and objectives for SEMATECH II, an operational plan
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concluded in December 1991. SEMATECH had a new mission that read in part: to create
fundamental change in manufacturing technology and domestic infrastructure to
provide U.S. semiconductor companies with the capability to be world‐class suppliers.
The wording of this statement has been linked to DARPA: at least that is what Browning
claims that Miller Bonner meant when he alluded to the close alignment of the two
organizations (Browning 2000, 163). This is a very dubious claim. In January 1992, the
Bush administration’s proposed FY 1993 budget recommended that the government
reduce SEMATECH’s funding by 20 per cent or $20 million. A subsequent GAO report
noted that DARPA planned on phasing out its investment in SEMATECH and was thus
recommending that SEMATECH’s funds also be reduced to $80 million for fiscal 1993.
These recommendations to reduce funding seem illogical if DARPA and SEMATECH were
in such close alignment. Why on the eve of debates which would determine
SEMATECH’s funding future were DARPA and the Bush Administration suggesting
budget cuts? SEMATECH had after all, in five short years been responsible for
considerable and measurable technological improvements. It may not have been solely
responsible for stopping the industries slide, but it certainly had generated quite a bit of
positive change and technological gain.
Analysis:

Horrigan’s theory predicts that SEMATECH should have failed at this point.
Horrigan’s study claims that the success of an R&D consortium is in part due to the
enforcement mechanisms the consortia creates. Enforcement mechanisms are: “the
cost for consortium member(s) to express displeasure to other members and
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management….It is the price of ensuring that members do not defect” (Horrigan 1996,
18‐20). Members of SEMATECH were leaving because of an inability to advance their
own research interests. In addition, one of the primary benefits of membership, access
to cutting edge technology before the rest of the industry, had been taken away as a
privilege of membership in SEMATECH.
Spencer did an admirable job of crafting new enforcement mechanisms keeping
the remainder of the SEMATECH consortium intact. Like it or not however, DARPA and
the U.S. government were members of SEMATECH and perceived to be a crucial part of
SEMATECH’s value chain. A financier is part of any company’s or industry’s value chain.
Spencer’s SEMATECH II changes did very little if anything to facilitate DARPA’s research
agenda. This being the case, DARPA could have, or should have withdrawn from
SEMATECH.
Evans and Olk also speak of criteria that contribute to a successful research
consortia. Two of the seven criteria they utilize are: membership turnover, and
evaluating and producing outputs (Evans and Olk 1990). If a member is unsatisfied with
the consortia, there is a high likelihood that they will quit the effort. In addition, the
inability to evaluate and produce output should also increase the likelihood that
members will quit the organization. DARPA may have had the ability to evaluate
SEMATECH’s research agenda at the level of the Technical Advisory Board but it had no
real decision making authority in what SEMATECH would purchase, fund, and or
produce in terms of demonstration product.
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Finally, Petrick claims that “successful R&D consortia recognize the importance
of individual members’ capabilities, interests and expertise:” although Noyce and
Spencer may have been able to leverage the government’s (cum) DARPA’s capabilities
and expertise, SEMATECH did not really recognize the government’s interest (Petrick
2006). Van Atta and Bandy will tell us why in the next chapter.
Conclusion:

This chapter has presented the operational history of SEMATECH. It has been
noted throughout the chapter that SEMATECH received repeated notice that it was not
addressing the needs and wants of government in relation to ASICs and other forms of
lithography. One government report, Using R&D Consortia for Commercial Innovation,
endeavors to explain that this is because industry does not invest in irrelevant research.
I can only wonder what Bob Noyce might have had to say about that comment,
especially since industry freely admitted that ASICs were up and comers and that optical
lithography was approaching its limits.
Noyce was fond of high risk, long‐term research, a philosophy he had in common
with the government. Craig Fields had managed to extract a commitment from
SEMATECH to direct 20 percent of its resources towards government research interests.
This chapter revealed that early opportunities to create a more synergistic research
agenda were superceded by the real problems SEMATECH was forced to address as it
outfitted its FAB.
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Addressing and overcoming the issues between tool manufacturers and
semiconductor producers would do two things for SEMATECH, one positive, the other
not. First, solving this issue would cause a coalescence of interest and purpose amongst
the industry members of SEMI and SEMATECH. The U.S. government who owns its own
FABs had to deal with the same problems as industry in this regard undoubtedly also
benefited from this effort.
Addressing the relationship between tool producers and semiconductor
manufacturers radically redirected the overall thrust of SEMATECH’s research efforts.
Theory hints that this change should have caused SEMATECH to fail. SEMATECH had
funding approved for a five year window and was already more than a year into its
funding cycle. Shifts in R&D are the norm for long‐term research but unexpected for
short‐term projects such as this. Congress should have been concerned by this.
Congress’ concern seems to have been overridden by audit reports noting the
significant progress SEMATECH had already made. These reports not only mentioned
the physical progress SEMATECH was making, but the progress that was being made
between SEMATECH and DARPA and resolution of trust issues. Apparently since neither
Fields nor Bandy (DARPA’s principals for the SEMATECH project) were worried about
such a change, why then should Congress.
SEMATECH was surprised when Bob Noyce died. His successor, Bill Spencer was
forced to deal with issues associated with Horrigan’s enforcement concepts. When
Spencer arrived, three firms announced their intention to leave SEMATECH. LSI, Micron
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Technology and Harris Semiconductor were smaller firms at SEMATECH and because of
SEMATECH’s decision making structure were unable to advance their research interests.
Their impending exit from the consortium warranted a restructuring of SEMATECH’s
decision making processes. This restructuring did not include DARPA. The theories of
that Petrick and Evans and Olk indicate SEMATECH should have failed at this point. Yet
it did not. The reasons why SEMATECH did not fail will be revealed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
SEMATECH REINTERPRETED: DARPA’S UNTOLD STORY REVEALED
Overview:

The preceding chapters developed a characterization of SEMATECH as it was
being formed and as it crafted its operations. Chapter Three argued that SEMATECH’s
challenges associated with the creation of an inter‐industry cooperative environment
were perhaps somewhat exaggerated. The real challenge in SEMATECH’s formative
years was not necessarily in establishing a cooperative environment between and
among industry competitors; the real challenge was in the establishment of a more
productive inter‐sector working relationship with the U.S. Government. As SEMATECH
was formed, its industry members repeatedly balked at the prospect of working with
the DOD in another research consortia. The government’s own studies concerning the
formation of SEMATECH advised that this inter‐sector effort should be closely
monitored, as the DOD may not have been the best agency for SEMATECH to work with.
In spite of all these warning flags, the DOD was able to insert itself into a position of
influence as SEMATECH developed its operational plans: and in spite of SEMATECH’s
concerns the DOD became the organization that was selected to oversee the SEMATECH
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project. The literature which informs this study is hard pressed to explain this curious
development.
Chapter Five will argue that the DOD and subsequently, DARPA became the
agency to oversee the SEMATECH project, as it was the only agency that could attach
SEMATECH’s mission to the issue of national security. Attaching SEMATECH to national
security issues was both a bane and a blessing. Linking SEMATECH to national security
allowed the Reagan Administration to bypass the then raging debates concerning
“picking winners” and maintained the Administration’s stance on America’s laissez‐faire
economic philosophy. Once the Reagan Administration unburdened itself of the
SEMATECH issue, it moved to Congress. The movement to Congress would prove to be
the “bane” of the SEMATECH effort. Congress elected to fund SEMATECH under the
auspices of a grant, effectively removing the ability of the government to provide any
research direction to the SEMATECH effort. This finding helps to deepen the
explanation, raised in Chapter Four, of how and why SEMATECH was able to repeatedly
deflect reports about its deficiencies in responding to the needs wants and desires of
the government.
Chapter Four also cataloged a series of events that occurred under the regimes
of Noyce and Kilby that could have caused SEMATECH to fail. Again, theory does little to
explain SEMATECH’s duration in the face of these events. Chapter Five will demonstrate
that SEMATECH was able to succeed because DARPA was able to push SEMATECH in just
the direction it was needed at just the right time.
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Introduction:

Chapter One had established the research methodology that was utilized to
conduct this effort. A problem with records dictated that process tracing would be a
robust research model to employ. To that end, secondary sources were utilized to
develop a history of SEMATECH. This history was then juxtaposed against government
documents that are still accessible. This comparative process led to a characterization
of the SEMATECH project that is somewhat different and raised new questions and
issues that needed to be addressed.
These new questions were addressed to several individuals who were close to
the SEMATECH project: Richard Van Atta, William Bandy, William Spencer, Craig Fields
and a DARPA official who asked to remain confidential.
In order to maintain the validity of the research, all interviewees were asked the
same questions. Some of those with whom the author spoke have not previously had
some of their thoughts and insights published. Others, Van Atta and Spencer, in
particular, have extensive publications concerning DARPA and or SEMATECH. Van Atta
and Bandy thought it prudent to review select aspects of SEMATECH’s formative years.
Both Bandy and Van Atta were very careful to present micro‐interpretations of the
zeitgeist of the time. Bandy endeavored to recapture the mood of the semiconductor
industry. “Back then there was a huge concern [about] the loss of the basic equipment
manufacturing base and silicon wafers and basic semiconductor technology and
manufacturing in the United States going overseas.” (Bandy 2011) What Bandy notes
was not just a concern of the semiconductor industry it was a concern of American
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industry at large. Van Atta contributed to the characterization about the sense of
urgency by talking about Bob Noyce and Jack Kilby. These men, the co‐inventors of the
micro‐circuit were very concerned about the precipitous state of the industry so much
so that they traveled throughout the country and to Washington, D.C. to find a
mechanism for getting the focus of attention on it. The DOD was one of many potential
and appropriate agencies for doing so. All interested parties needed to get together and
discuss the state of the industry, and what to do about it. Van Atta noted that the
Justice Department was preventing this. Van Atta recalled how he and Bob Burmeister
were able to facilitate a protected conversation, while simultaneously breaking the
barriers between intense corporate rivals that were hindering advancement of the
cause by hosting a summit of interested parties at The U.S. Naval Academy (Van Atta
2011).
This U.S. Naval Academy meeting resulted in continued talks and discoveries,
some of which would appear in the DSB report. Among those items were: “the DOD
should continue and strongly increase R&D in the areas of future kinds of chips and chip
technologies in particularly production technologies and lithography. Furthermore,
industry needed to find a way to get together to focus on manufacturing, and that such
an effort should be supported by the U.S. Government” (Van Atta 2011). Van Atta
emphasized that many of the recommendations that came out of these meetings and
the DSB were “logical.” Logical however, did not necessarily lead to solid or well
developed decisions. For instance, Van Atta states: “at that time, I don’t think that
SEMATECH or the DSB, specifically said DOD funding. I think they said that it was
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important that the government fund this as this was something that would be of
advantage across the entire industry. Individual companies could participate in and take
advantage of the SEMATECH and the goals it was aiming at. However those goals were
not something that any individual firm would fund by itself” (Van Atta 2011). Even
though there seems to have been a congruence of interests, this did not necessarily
mean that there was a coalescence of decisions concerning SEMATECH. As a result:
“many of the early decisions concerning SEMATECH were vague” (Van Atta 2011).
Specificity and Strategic Planning:

William Bandy expanded on this lack of specificity from both industry and
government and how it affected initial planning at SEMATECH. Both Craig Fields, the
Director of DARPA and William Bandy, who was working with micro‐electronics projects
for the National Security Agency (NSA) had expectations of technologies that might
come out of SEMATECH. Fields prevailed upon the NSA to have Bandy work with him on
the SEMATECH project. Fields, charged with routing and administering the funds for
SEMATECH through DARPA, wanted to see more specific plans about SEMATECH’s
research agenda. Specifically, Fields and Bandy wanted to know how SEMATECH was
going to get from point A to point B and how those plans might mesh with some
research objectives that were being considered by DARPA. Bandy tells a story about
their initial impressions of SEMATECH’s strategic plan. “What they had was junk. I
mean, it was awful. You looked at the thing and said: ’wait a minute’ this is industry?
What are they doing? ‘They don’t know what they are doing.’” Bandy remembers:
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“These guys at SEMATECH were trying to convince both myself, and Craig Fields that
strategic planning was not a good idea as it would limit industry’s ‘agility’” (Bandy 2011).
This was an unexpected disclosure about the SEMATECH project. By this time
(1988), it had become quite clear to all of the participants involved with SEMATECH that
this was going to be a project driven by industry. The enabling legislation (Defense
Authorization Act) made that apparent. Such academic and professional management
luminaries as Henry Mintzberg and Jack Welch have stressed the importance of strategic
planning and how it is essential to the success of firms in mature industries. If strategic
planning is so critical to success, how could it be that poor planning was coming out of a
conglomeration of successful mature industry firms? How could such a conglomeration
of expertise expect to advance SEMATECH without a solid strategic plan? Twenty some
years later, such a state of affairs is not only perplexing but disturbing.
Bandy was asked to explain this unexpected state of affairs and how it might
have come to exist. Bandy related how SEMATECH actually had two governing boards, a
Board of Directors and an Executive Technical Advisory Board (ETAB). These two boards
and SEMATECH employees were not necessarily interacting with each other. Part of the
reason for this was that SEMATECH was a unique organization, with a host of internal
trust issues that had not yet been overcome. Companies were sending their people to
SEMATECH, but not necessarily their best and brightest. He recounts:
[SEMATECH] was a very strange kind of organization to start with because the idea originally was,
“Oh, we’ll develop the next generation semiconductor process here within the Sematech
facilities and we’ll share all this for people to go out and build their own products with.” Well for
some companies, that’s the last thing they wanted to do because they have their own
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competitive advantage with these processes that they were developing and they weren’t about
to share anything with anyone.
So, there was this whole internal tension about “How’s this going to work?” and “Will it work?”
And that’s why they didn’t really have a really good plan at that point (Bandy 2011).

An organization with two boards, confused needs and wants and a desire to
protect secrets could have only resulted in this level of confusion. In the face of this
confusion though, Bandy and Fields were interacting with SEMATECH and working with
them on more detailed plans. Bandy and Fields felt that conditions were improving with
SEMATECH and this demonstration of progress was enough to for them to release
funds. “No one was still [completely satisfied] with SEMATECH’s planning process but it
was moving in the right direction…it was getting there, but it wasn’t quite where it
needed to be” (Bandy 2011).
DARPA’s Contribution to Success:

SEMATECH would struggle with a real concrete direction and strategic plan for
some months after its initial interactions with Bandy and Fields. In reviewing the
interview with Bandy it became apparent that SEMATECH did not really come together
as an organization until SEMATECH found a suitable catalyst. That catalyst proved to be
working with the tool manufacturers.
“Good plans did not really materialize until this whole notion of developing the next generations
of manufacturing equipment materialized. This became a no‐brainer for everyone because back
in those days people were developing their own internal manufacturing equipment inside the
companies. [At that point] you saw people really embrace the whole planning process. They had
these committees and people were working with planning out all this stuff. And, I mean, it
became quite exciting at that point to be there [to be] part of that….it sort of just‐just at some
point blossomed” (Bandy 2011).

This was another unanticipated revelation. One of the events that should have
caused SEMATECH to fail was the switching of the research agenda. This switch should
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have either resulted in a withdrawal of funding from Congress, or an exit of industry
members regretting the loss of funds already invested. SEMATECH’s first round of
funding was for a five year period. Barely two years into the approval of that five year
period the organization switched its research agenda from developing specific
manufacturing techniques to produce circuits at increasingly discreet line widths to a
research agenda that focused on interactions with tool producers to develop the
industry’s tools, tool standards, standards for testing and several other issues. Such
changes in a research agenda are not unheard of in research projects with much longer
funding horizons say 7‐10 years. In fact, such changes are expected. However, given
the five‐year funding period and the aggressive technological goals SEMATECH had set,
changing its agenda with so much time and effort already invested across such a short
time span, should have heralded disaster. Fields and Bandy explained why this
perception was then, and remains, incorrect. Bandy states:
“I might take a little issue with the premise that they actually switched research agendas because
I’m not sure they really were clear on a research agenda to begin with. [The shifting of focus
away from demonstration vehicle to the] manufacturing equipment industry, started making a
lot of sense. This finally then morphed into a plan that everyone could get around and support.
That’s when I think people became much more engaged with the whole notion of what
SEMATECH was doing” (Bandy 2011).

Fields expressed his thoughts about SEMATECH changing the research agenda. “I do not
characterize the evolving research agenda as a failure, either. In fact, if the research
agenda was unchanged during the life of SEMATECH I would have been concerned”22
(Fields 2011). Another former DARPA official asserted that: “the SEMATECH research

22

Interview conducted by author Jan‐Feb 2011. Hereafter, this interview will be referred to as Fields 2011
and will appear parenthetically in the text.
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agenda changed early on when it was realized that focusing on production of a
component to drive manufacturing technology and competence was not the most
efficient method [to reach its goals]” 23 (Confidential interview 2011) The net result of
this change in research focus was that “the entire R&D enterprise and technological
infrastructure for the U.S. semiconductor industry benefited from this change”
(Confidential Interview 2011). DARPA wholeheartedly endorsed this switch in research
agenda, thus helping the SEMATECH effort move along.
Debate‐DARPA’s Contribution to Success:

Not everyone interviewed shared the same assessment of DARPA’s relationship
with SEMATECH and contributions to success. Bill Spencer had a decidedly different
view of how DARPA contributed to the success of SEMATECH. When asked how DARPA
contributed to SEMATECH’s success Spencer claimed: “They had a seat on the Board and
they kept quiet.”24 This statement could easily be taken pejoratively. SEMATECH had at
least two boards. The Board of Directors was, as expected, the public face of SEMATECH
decision making, but other boards such as the Executive Technical Advisory Board
(ETAB) had a good deal of direction setting power at SEMATECH. This multi‐layered
decision making apparatus allowed DARPA to have at least some voice at SEMATECH.
DARPA may have had a very quiet voice on the public face of SEMATECH. Bandy
explained, “I had no vote on the Board of Directors, I could comment on potential
23

Interview conducted by author in Feb –Mar 2011. Hereafter, this interview will be referred to as
Confidential interview 2011 and will appear parenthetically in the text.
24

Bill Spencer interview conducted by author, Feb 2011. Hereafter, this interview will be referred to as
Spencer 2011 and will appear parenthetically in the text.
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decisions but that was about it.” Bandy and subsequent DARPA appointees to
SEMATECH had a much more active and real voice on the ETABs. Spencer spoke about
ETABs and the Board. He explains:
“After we got the program structured, where there was a strong interest, we then began to get
competition to get member companies’ key employees onto a particular project, and particularly
to lead that project. [For SEMATECH] to succeed, it needed to be run from the private side. It
need[ed] to attract the very best people. SEMATECH was fortunate in that the CEOs of the
companies—or if it was a company like IBM or Motorola, the head of semiconductor division—
was the one who was on the Board. And we then had usually the head of manufacturing or the
senior technical officer on our Executive Technical Advisory Board, which really worked out the
details of what the programs were going to be. They were approved by the Board, but they had
chief technical people or manufacturing people who had an input into how they were put
together‐and very seldom–I don’t remember a case when the Board vetoed something that the
Executive Technical Advisory Board had proposed” (Spencer 2011).

The ramifications of this statement are not altogether apparent. Contrary to what
Spencer says about DARPA being quiet, DARPA did enjoy a great deal of interaction with
the ETABS. In this capacity DARPA was able to exercise and contribute to the success of
SEMATECH, as it was able to provide guidance and input into planning at the most
critical level, the operational level. This level of decision making seems more in line with
how DARPA normally prefers to interact with contractors. This planning interaction was
not unusual in any way according to Fields. “There were no special mechanisms for
interaction between DARPA and SEMATECH beyond the usual interaction between
DARPA and all contractors or grantees in DARPA programs. That traditional interaction is
continuous, intimate, intense, collegial and informal. In my view interchange with
mutual respect works much better than institutionalized bureaucracy” (Fields 2011).
Realizing then that DARPA had a real positive and direct influence on SEMATECH,
we are left with a conundrum: how then do we explain DARPA’s inability to secure
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research focus on X‐ray lithography and ASICs, agenda items which were repeatedly
noted by government agencies? It is to that question that we now turn.
Explaining the Lack of Agenda Setting Privileges:

The Institute for Defense Analysis was asked to weigh in on the SEMATECH
project. Dick Van Atta, one of the researchers at that Institute was called upon to work
with the DOD and assist the government with the organization of a response to the
Japanese threat. Van Atta’s experiences in this capacity have not previously been
published and the interview with him reveals some truly important considerations
concerning the SEMATECH project.
Van Atta spoke at length about SEMATECH: like Bandy, he started his
explanations at the very beginning. “There was an awakening by the semiconductor
industry that they had a competitiveness problem. And that was brought home to them
by the fact that the DRAM business was being aggressively taken away by Japanese
companies. [T]he concern was that the way this was happening because of several
activities in Japan that were government‐based, and government allowed. [These
activities] severely and unfairly disadvantaged the US companies” (Van Atta 2011).
This awakening was also seen within the halls of the U.S. Government, as a result
of SIA and SRC involvement. Both industry, a few government agencies such as the
DOC, and the DOD in particular knew that there were things that needed to be done.
Van Atta reminisced: “[within Washington] there was this sense of we know what we
thought were things that needed to be done, or could be done, or would have been
appropriate to do” (Van Atta 2011).
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One important Washington‐based group interested in the semiconductor
competitiveness problem was the law firm of Dewey Ballantine. Attorneys Clark
MacFadden and Tom Kalil were doing a great deal of analysis and assessment for SIA of
the issues. They were according to Van Atta, doing: “a rough data approach to
analysis—here is the problem, here is what we should do about it: more from an
[industry] advocacy point of view rather than a purely objective analysis. But they were
getting data. They were providing briefs on approaches, et cetera, at the same time”
(Van Atta 2011). The knowledge generated by Dewey Ballantine was working its way
around Washington D.C.
A second group with increasingly deeper interests in the semiconductor industry
was the DOD. Several key people, Bob Berger, Larry Sumney, and Sonny Maynard (the
latter two) were working the VHSIC program, were “working DOD’s interest in doing
something about the status of the US semiconductor industry, its manufacturing and its
problems. Sumney and Maynard’s VHSIC program was being run and managed by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) under the Defense Department for Research
and Engineering (DDR&E) organization. Van Atta foreshadowed that parts of the VHSIC
program would be moved out from under the OSD into DARPA and these parts would
constitute their contribution to the SEMATECH effort. These same VHSIC people and
their interaction with SEMATECH would have a lingering effect on DARPA and
SEMATECH particularly in the continuous calls for research in X‐ray lithography and
ASICs.
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In spite of this wide variety of interest and concern, Van Atta explained that
there was almost no data collected in a systematic way, on the nature of America versus
Japan, especially in terms of defense application of integrated circuits. Van Atta had
done a precursor study on defense dependence on foreign semiconductors and a
subsequent briefing to interested parties which became one of the key briefings that
initiated DSB deliberations. Van Atta was with the DSB throughout the development of
the task force. Van Atta pointed out that the DSB included many luminaries from the
DOD and from industry, including the co‐inventors of the micro‐circuit, Robert Noyce
and Jack Kilby, who had been securing information from the SIA and Dewey Ballantine.
Van Atta claims that: “the report from the Defense Science Board would go on
to become the seminal document on the nature of the semiconductor competitiveness
problem from a “national security perspective” (Van Atta 2011). The DSB report
addressed why the government should do something about the semiconductor
industry’s competitiveness problem and included two key recommendations. The first
recommendation addressed the need for more government/DOD R&D on future kinds
of chips and chip technologies, and particularly production technologies, and
lithography and that the DOD should continue and strongly increase the R&D in these
areas. The second recommendation which was “exceedingly different for the time was
that industry needed to find a way to get together to focus on manufacturing, and that
effort should be supported by the US Federal Government” (Van Atta 2011). This was
the recommendation that aligned the U.S. Government’s interests with industry’s
desire to create a manufacturing institute that would become SEMATECH. Although a
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novel and untried method in the United States at the time, the public goods economics
theory and research of the time informed the DOD of the potential benefits of this type
of consortium (Van Atta 2011).
Van Atta noted that the general consensus between industry and government
became that industry was to pay half and government would pay half. Equality of
funding was not however to mean equality in decision‐making. In fact, the decision‐
making that characterized SEMATECH’s beginnings, “general consensus and general
recommendations” (Van Atta 2011) was to be the type of decision‐making that would
pervade SEMATECH until Bill Spencer took over. This type of general consensus
occurring with both industry and U.S. Government interests‐even though some reports
had very specific recommendations‐would lead to some long‐term inefficiencies. Van
Atta warned that in spite of the length and depth of the DSB report:
“what wasn’t clear at the time was what role would the government play beyond just paying
money? Versus, what would be the role of industry? When the DSB report was in development
it wasn’t clear whether this effort would involve building a production facility, or exactly what
would happen. [In hindsight] I don’t think we actually really thought through the whole thing.
[The prevailing thought of the time was] find a way of getting people together, put some money
out there, fund manufacturing implementation R&D, lay it out where we should be going in the
future and then find a way for industry to come together in some kind of neutral forum, working
together with their tool and equipment supply base explaining where we’re going to go” (Van
Atta 2011).

At the time, these seemed to be very specific recommendations. However, history
reveals that these are nothing other than generalizations that everyone seemed to
agree upon.
The DSB report, although the seminal work responsible for the government and
industry moving forward on what would become SEMATECH, received a lukewarm
reception at Reagan’s White House. Van Atta hypothesized about the reasons for this
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and the ramifications it would have for SEMATECH. “The White House was not eager to
pursue the DSB report or its suggestions as it was what you might have then termed
‘industrial policy.’ The Reagan (Republican) Administration was either dis‐inclined to
pursue the effort as a matter of Republican values, or more simply did not want to
pursue it through the Executive Office” (Van Atta 2011). Although the DSB report was
vague in its recommendation about what government agency should work with
SEMATECH, concern about semiconductors was active throughout the halls of
government at the time. These concerns were being addressed by the DOC, DOE and
DOD. Van Atta noted however “that to avoid the broader philosophical arguments of
the time concerning industrial policy, the issue of how to involve the government was
placed specifically and purposely towards this notion of national security” (Van Atta
2011). Framing SEMATECH up as a matter of national security may have served to
bypass debates about industrial policy. “Linking SEMATECH’s interest to national
security should have ensured that its oversight be housed with a government agency a
government office with more direct influence on national security such as the DOD or
the Executive Office” (Van Atta 2011).
Problems with Enabling Legislation:

The Reagan White House response to the DSB report, or lack thereof, moved the
discussions about, and decisions to fund SEMATECH into the Legislative Branch. The
creation of SEMATECH through legislation passed on the Hill rather than through
Executive Order would have far reaching effects on what the government hoped to gain
(Van Atta calls this ‘equities’) from the SEMATECH effort. To understand these effects
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Van Atta reviewed the Semiconductor Cooperative Research Program Legislation. He
reviewed the act of legislation, passed into law which expresses:
the finding of the Congress that it is in the national economic and security interests of the United
States for DOD to provide financial assistance to SEMATECH (a consortium of the U.S.
semiconductor industry) for research and development activities in the field of semiconductor
manufacturing technology. Directs the Secretary to make “grants” to SEMATECH for such
purpose, in accordance with a specified memorandum of understanding entered into between
SEMATECH and the Secretary requiring SEMATECH to work in cooperation with the Secretary and
the Department of Energy, and requiring the Advisory Council on Federal Participation in
SEMATECH to review the research activities of SEMATECH to take all necessary steps to ensure
the expeditious transfer of technology developed and owned by SEMATECH to the private sector
participants in SEMATECH research. Establishes the Advisory Council on Federal Participation in
SEMATECH (the Council) to: (1) conduct an annual review of the activities of SEMATECH and (2)
submit to SEMATECH any recommendations for modifications of plans or the technological goals
in the plan in the view of the Council. Outlines administrative provisions with respect to the
Council. Directs the Comptroller General to review the annual reports of the independent auditor
required by the Secretary in the memorandum of understanding, and to make comments to the
defense committees concerning the accuracy and completeness of such reports, together with
any additional comments as considered appropriate. Provides that any export of semiconductor
manufacturing technology developed by SEMATECH under these provisions shall be subject to
the Export Administration Act, and not to the Arms Export Control Act. Provides for the
confidentiality of certain information concerning SEMATECH, as well as trade secrets developed
by them (Public Law 100‐180).

Van Atta took considerable time to explain the significance of several clauses in this
legislation. The ones that most inform this study speak to the manner of funding (grant)
and the duties and rights of the government such as the annual review.
First, receiving funding under the auspices of a grant was not an accident. The
previous chapter established that an aura of distrust existed between industry and the
government. This mistrust (Van Atta does not claim mistrust, but rather differences in
research agendas and technological interests) became embodied in legislation (Van Atta
2011). The SIA, really principal players in the industry, such as Bob Noyce, and noted
D.C. law‐firm, Dewey Ballantine pushed to get SEMATECH passed through the Hill. Most
lobbying in Washington D.C was, and still is, conducted by professional lobbyists. In the
1980s the semiconductor industry did not rely on these groups; rather the industry went
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in person. Although not an altogether novel concept now, it certainly was at the time.
Some have postulated that the passionate testimony delivered by the luminaries of the
semiconductor industry before Congressional Committees were key reasons for
SEMATECH coming into existence. However, Van Atta’s recounting of these events
sheds additional light on these lobbying efforts.
“The SIA and Dewey Ballantine as a lobbying lawyer‐type firm, really pushed this through the Hill
to get it going. But the thing that they put in, if you look at the enabling legislation, was
essentially marginalizing and minimalizing DOD’s actual role there….. [Although the] DOD would
fund SEMATECH and would have a role in being on the SEMATECH Board it would be an informal
membership on the Board. That membership was almost enjoined from having direct input to
the project planning the activities of the actual organization. It was stated almost clearly,
industry knows how to do this. It is industry’s prerogatives. The government should have no
direct input or involvement in how SEMATECH chooses priorities and does what it does” (Van
Atta 2011).

The net result of this legislation was, from Van Atta’s viewpoint, problematic.
“Legislation that provides funds under a grant is categorically and critically different
than passing legislation that provides funding as part of a contract. A grant does not
have deliverables, the way a contract does. So, you give a grant and say: ‘we grant ‘X’
amount of money for you guys to go off and do something’” (Van Atta 2011). This
manner of funding allowed industry to do what they felt was appropriate, but
substantially hampered the ability of DARPA, NSA, OSD, DDR&E, DOE, DOC and any
organization that had expectations of SEMATECH to advance any of their interests or
desires.
Van Atta spoke about the latter clauses of the Semiconductor Cooperative
Research Program. The creation of the Advisory Council of Federal Participation in
SEMATECH, although seemingly practical and justified at the time, proved to be an
oblique methodology for control and influence over the SEMATECH project. The
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legislation creating SEMATECH did provide some level of audit but such audits had “no
sticking power.” “There was nothing in the legislation that said if DOD’s or the Federal
Government’s, which became DARPA’s, recommendations are not followed, then the
money can be terminated, or some action of some sort could be taken. The
recommendations basically were only to be at the discretion of SEMATECH’s
management” (Van Atta 2011).
When asked how this could have happened, Van Atta referred back to the
beginning. If you look into the Congressional Testimony: “originally with Noyce and
then with Spencer, [you will find] that this [SEMATECH] is about private industry.
Private industry knows the right things and the way to do things, and the government
doesn’t have the wherewithal to do it” (Van Atta 2011). I would surmise that the real
issue was not that the government did not have the wherewithal to do it: rather it was
that the government may not have had any better ideas about what to do than industry.
Van Atta captures the ambiguity pervading the entire effort in this way: “So, DOD, here
is this thing that you’re supposed to do. There are all kinds of interesting issues like,
how do we do it? How do we get started on it? One of the big problems was industry
itself didn’t know how to get together this way. [They did have a good push at the Naval
Academy] And there were trust issues that they were worrying about” (Van Atta 2011).
In any case, ambiguous or not, Van Atta reminds that such an abdication of authority
and the relinquishment of direction to private industry would, have very un‐envisioned
and unintended ramifications for the interests of national security and national
competitiveness.
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The Ramifications of the Abdication of Decision Making Authority:

To fully capture the ramifications of the abdication of decision‐making to
industry, one has to have some sort of idea what the U.S. Government might have
expected from SEMATECH. Van Atta produced an unpublished report (1988) that
focused these issues. This report: “recommends that a national‐level effort be
mounted on a range of advanced lithography approaches (not exclusively X‐ray) and the
related mask technology. Specific suggestions were made regarding the direction of
SEMATECH and a coherent program within DOD for supporting and promoting
microelectronics technology in conjunction with involvement in SEMATECH” (Van Atta,
et al. 1988)
This report is fairly illuminating when juxtaposed against a 2005 SEMATECH
(Polcari 2005) report and provides a contrarian view of the SEMATECH project, had it
been less industry focused and been provided with a methodology for developing a
more evenly balanced mandate for research and operations. Although the report was
published after the Semiconductor Cooperative Research Program Legislation, it was
published before the MOU between DARPA’s Fields and SEMATECH which was signed
on May 12, 1988. Knowing this, it was still possible that the government might have
been able to implement some of its objectives, as they could have been written into the
as of yet penned and signed MOU. Van Atta (1988), made the following
recommendations about SEMATECH. Amongst the most significant were:
Rapid implementation of SEMATECH without sacrificing proper guidance and support is crucial if
SEMATECH is to counter the competitive challenge. The Memorandum of Understanding
between the Secretary of Defense and SEMATECH and the related grant documents will establish
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the level of guidance and the nature of cooperation….attention should now focus on SEMATECH
strategies to improve the competitiveness of the industry” (Van Atta 1988).

Van Atta noted that the competitiveness of the industry had shifted away from
complementary metal oxide semiconductors (CMOS) to ASICs which at that time
provided higher levels of revenue. In addition to providing more revenue [for industry]
the DOD recognized that the chips they were using, and would continue to use, were
mostly ASICS and thus the following was recommended: “The development of the ASIC
revolution….challenges SEMATECH to capture and transfer the knowledge gained in
memory production into lower volume logic and ASIC areas where the U.S. still
maintains a competitive position” (Van Atta 1988).
ASICs and Abdication:

The growing market for ASICs caused a decided shift in the U.S. semiconductor
industry. ASICs, because they are application specific, were then produced in relatively
small volumes. The challenge with ASICs was not so much how to make them, the
challenge was how to make small batches of chips that could be sold at a profit and yet
were affordable to customers. The real cost associated with ASICs was/is the design of
the chip. This was, at the time marginally more expensive than production. At this
time, CAD design of semiconductors was relatively new. Production costs were high
because of the small production runs. Other producers/designers in the semiconductor
industry, such as noted SEMATECH critic T.J. Rodgers of Cypress Semiconductors,
recognized these cost areas and were pioneers in the semiconductor production
methodology that is now ubiquitous around the globe. Van Atta recounts:
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“Our report said there were at least two, if not three, areas that needed to be developed [under
SEMATECH]… One was, we specifically highlighted ASICs and said that the production processes
for competitive capabilities for ASIC‐like technologies was of particular interest to the
Department of Defense. That capability, in our mind, would have great potential in a commercial
environment as well; but it was unlikely that the existing companies would pursue that, because
they by and large were not ASIC companies.” But this notion of a commercial vendor of ASICs
that would be very rapidly moving from one product to another, eventually became the foundry
kind of model, was something that these guys were not thinking about. Cypress was. There is
an interesting evolution of ASICs into these other kinds of foundry‐based—fabless—
semiconductor companies et cetera. I will go so far as to say, we anticipated that model in our
study” (Van Atta 2011).

The ‘fabless’ model which IDA was prescient about, works as follows: small firms (and
now really any firm) design chips but sub‐contract the production out to specialized
production firms who may produce small lots for each individual design firm. This
schema would have seemed counter‐intuitive to the producers of the time as it does not
lend itself to the creation of the economies of scale which characterized the merchant
producers of the time. However, we now know that the contracted production facilities
which produce ASICs can create economies of scale by being able to produce many
small production runs for many firms. This model is known as the design and foundry
method of production.
The IDA and the smaller firms that made up SEMATECH may have endeavored to
pass this prescient knowledge forward to SEMATECH but were unable to do so because:
a) of the way decisions were made at SEMATECH, at least until Spencer changed them;
and b) the governments knowledge concerning this model could not be incorporated
into the SEMATECH agenda because of no real influence on the SEMATECH agenda.
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Lithography and Abdication:

Van Atta’s report also discussed forms of lithography that should be of interest
to the U.S. Government. The report made a pointed plea for further study of emerging
lithography techniques, including, Ion Beam, Extreme Ultra‐Violet Light Lithography
(EUV) and X‐ray lithography amongst others. The report noted that alternative
domestic lithography technologies already existed for 5‐35 nanometer widths. These
lithography techniques if proven and perfected under SEMATECH could have been more
easily adapted to the production of ASICS. This report also emphasized that: “efforts in
the U.S. in advanced lithography have been underfunded and uncoordinated” (Van Atta
1988). Whether this choice of words was intentional or not, this was a powerful
statement. SEMATECH was designed to overcome the barriers of underfunding and lack
of coordination. It seems therefore, that SEMATECH would have been a natural place
for the U.S. Government to expect to make progress in the areas of ASICS and
alternative lithographies. It proved not to be.
The report also noted that American was ahead of, but also behind, Japan in
some of the presented alternative lithographies. The report warned that the Japanese
were pursuing lithographies aggressively. Furthermore, U.S. based lithography
companies were on the verge of collapse. “Failure to address this challenge would be a
substantial disadvantage for U.S. lithography equipment suppliers and semiconductor
manufacturers. SEMATECH is now defining the manner in which it will support specific
lithography technologies in its overall research program” (Van Atta 1988). Knowing this,
the panel of experts who crafted this report made recommendations about how
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lithography should be incorporated into the SEMATECH agenda. Sadly however, it turns
out, that SEMATECH would not be much of a supporter of the U.S. Government’s and or
DARPA’s interest and investment in lithography. As a result of this the U.S. would have
to, and continues, to acquire lithography equipment from abroad because the U.S.
lithography industry evaporated, even as DARPA endeavored to save it.
The most crucial content in Van Atta’s 1988 report is the point that captures the
thoughts about what the DOD needed to do in order to effectively support the
semiconductor industry. The DOD needed to:
1) drive device and manufacturing technology for DOD specific performance
requirements that are not met by the commercial sector;
2) support manufacturing technology innovation and implementation; and
3) support the manufacturing infrastructure in critical areas of key equipment,
components and materials (Van Atta 1988).
SEMATECH appeared to be well positioned to meet both criteria two and three.
However, a venue for meeting criteria one, was at that time, not altogether clear. DUPs
and DUTs were being discussed as a way to meet criteria one. Parts of VHSIC were
purportedly addressing criteria one. SEMATECH again, seemed a logical venue for
assisting the government in meeting criteria one. Unfortunately, that would not
happen. Van Atta hints at why this was to be so. At the time that SEMATECH was being
created there were research efforts going on in the OSD, DDR&E, at NSA, and other
defense related agencies. Many of the people associated with these efforts wanted
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them to continue and it was felt that: “R&D for those types of technologies should not
suffer because of the money going to Sematech” (Van Atta 2011). Van Atta related that
there were some groups within the government (on the Hill primarily) who thought that
SEMATECH solved all of the government’s problems and concerns with the
semiconductor industry. However, “we at the DOD were saying, now, wait a minute.
There are a lot of things in semiconductors these guys won’t do and aren’t doing, and
therefore the government needs to have a broader, robust portfolio, that SEMATECH is
only a part of. We became stymied because on the Hill some people said, we don’t
want to do any more of this; SEMATECH is here to do it” (Van Atta 2011). Knowing this,
it seems safe to say that the government’s interests and “equities” it hoped to secure
from SEMATECH were killed before they ever had a chance to come to the light of day.
SEMATECH’s Current Research:

Some relatively recent documents published by SEMATECH reveal that the IDA’s
recommendations were even more on target than they previously thought. A 2005
presentation by then acting CEO of SEMATECH, Michael Polcari provides evidence that
SEMATECH has shifted its research priorities to focus on some of the technology and
research recommendations outlined in the IDA report. This particular presentation
spoke about research endeavors in semiconductor production using materials other
than CMOS and using lithography and masking techniques that are based on
technologies other than optical lithography. Polcari’s presentation also addressed
SEMATECH’s interactions with other members of industry, and government
organizations. Interestingly enough, the slide which discusses government interaction
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does not mention such interaction occurring at a federal level. Several slides that make
up Polcari’s presentation are presented in Appendix D.
Even more recent than this 2005 presentation is a SEMATECH document on
EUVL (SEMATECH Litho_Overview.pdf 2010) which is included in Appendix E of this
study. A cursory review of this document demonstrates that SEMATECH is currently
focused on technologies that had been identified for development almost twenty years
ago, not only by Van Atta, but by others as well. Bandy mentioned that ion beam and
extreme ultraviolet light lithography were being studied in the NSA at the time.
Listening to Van Atta, one becomes very cognizant of the sadness he must have
had and continues to feel about SEMATECH. Here it is twenty or so years later, and the
industry is just now beginning to hit its stride with the development and deployment of
some of the technologies proposed back in 1988. Given the regularity with which this
industry meets the dictates of Moore’s Law, we can only imagine where this industry
and potentially the state of the nation would be had SEMATECH pursued, or been forced
to pursue, research in areas that were identified in 1988. In spite of this melancholy,
Van Atta sagely noted that “we cannot rerun the SEMATECH project. If we cannot rerun
it, and change certain parameters, then we had best understand why policy and
operations developed in the manner they did, so we can ensure that such opportunities
do not get bypassed again” (Van Atta 2011). To do so, we must understand where and
why industry and the federal government diverged.
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Divergent Conceptions:

Chapter four established that industry and U.S. Government interests diverged
because of trust issues. Van Atta notes that trust issues had some effect on the
relationship between U.S. Government and industry, but there were other tangible
factors that caused a divergence of interests and hopes for SEMATECH. SEMATECH was
“by industry, for industry.” Van Atta observed that industry came to the SEMATECH
project encumbered by its own practices and its own interpretations of its experience
with the U.S. Government. “[The] incumbent industry guys came to SEMATECH with
their understanding of their today problem and they didn’t want anything that would
distract them from getting what they wanted. [For instance] look at the VHSIC program.
Whatever VHSIC was doing, wasn’t it–[for industry.] There was distrust of the
government, distrust conveyed as: ‘those federal guys go off and do this stuff, which we
don’t think meets our needs and helps us very much’” (Van Atta 2011). This type of
attitude only ensured that SEMATECH was not really going to spend a great deal of time
or effort focusing on issues which are of little interest to incumbents in industry.
Van Atta chides: “Now, the fact that VHSIC wound up being the font for the
creation of – what’s called VHDL sign language, which essentially permeates the whole
industry, shows you basically how myopic industry was” (Van Atta 2011). This rather
pejorative statement was tempered with the realistic assessment that industry and the
government were on “different foci in different time tracks” (Van Atta 2011). The
semiconductor industry had, since the advent of Moore’s Law, lived on a two‐year
competitive cycle. The U.S. Government, still operating under the Vannever Bush
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Doctrine, did not‐perhaps in the late 1980’s‐ realize its own cycles of development were
unnecessarily long. Industry had a problem to solve: and Van Atta sagely notes: “it was
their view that they had their ‘own’ industry problems to solve, [and as such] they
wanted to put all the emphasis and resources into it. They didn’t want their effort to
become diluted and distorted by these other priorities, which would involve other
actors and other companies, and other kinds of devices, et cetera” (Van Atta 2011).
Industry came to SEMATECH with a near‐term focus on incumbent technologies (CMOS)
and the technology platforms of optical lithography and DRAMS. Given the huge capital
investments made by the incumbents of the industry this focus is completely
understandable.
The U.S. Government diverged from industry because it was looking beyond
CMOS, DRAMs and optical lithography. The U.S. Government, however, seemed to have
erred in the way it presented its interests. The U.S. Government repeatedly emphasized
its interests in ASICs. The U.S. Government’s interest in ASICs was twofold: one it was
the semiconductor product of choice for the DOD and two it was the ‘wave of the
future’. Bill Spencer stated rather emphatically: “SEMATECH made a distinct decision to
stay out of any product activities. We did not do any product development of any kind,
and ASICs, in my view, would have fallen in that category. So, we didn’t do memory
development, or processor development, or ASICs development, or microwave
development, or anything else. We focused strictly on manufacturing technology and
stayed away from any product activity” (Spencer 2011). Given this statement, it can be
surmised that what industry heard from the government was not so much that ASICs
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were the wave of the future: rather, industry heard, develop ASICs, develop ASICs, and
develop ASICs. Given that SEMATECH was prohibited by law from focusing on product
development, (the Act states‐consortia can only focus on pre‐competitive technologies)
this selective hearing is easily understood. I must posit therefore, that the DOD made
the mistake of assuming that cloaking the semiconductor industry under the mantle of
national security would make moot the particular prohibitions on commercialization and
thus provide a method for the push towards ASIC development.
Whatever industry heard, Van Atta explained that the U.S. Government was
looking way beyond the near‐term not only in relation to competitiveness, but in
relation to technology development and application of technological innovation as well.
Simply put, because the government and industry had differing conceptions of
competitiveness, the technologies that would create it, and the application of
technology: “we crafted competing agendas or alternative agendas. Industry was trying
to push the near‐term CMOS chip‐specific agenda, and we were looking at
competitiveness from a broader portfolio perspective. [We said] (CMOS) is good and
needed but what we also need to think about is four or five key things, one of which is
new types of devices and chips that we want to be competitive in the future, and maybe
we can leapfrog or get a first mover advantage in that” (Van Atta 2011).
Van Atta posited a third area of divergence between U.S. Government and
industry. The third area he discussed was future technologies for producing chips. He
emphasized, we were not thinking about the immediate next generation, we were
thinking like the next generations and generation beyond that in terms of lithography”
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(Van Atta 2011). Van Atta noted that industry did not have a problem per se with that.
Apparently, various entities such as IBM spent a lot of time lobbying for lithography
money. “Funding for technologies that were outside of the immediate next generation
was important to some in the industry, but it was probably not something that was
appropriate or useful for Sematech per se to fund. These speculative technologies
solved no immediate and or near term problems. The even more exotic ones X‐ray etc
came with huge costs and infrastructure needs that just did not seem particularly
relevant at the time” (Van Atta 2011).
Bandy summed up some of the more practical problems with X‐ray lithography
noting that the building in which such a technology was to be installed would have to be
heavily shielded to protect not only semiconductor workers but the general community
in which it was built, so as to protect them from the harmful effects of X‐rays. In
addition, He noted over and over again what an expensive endeavor such a facility
would be. The cost of such a separate facility would have been such that competitors
would most likely be using the same facility to make competing products. With this in
mind he said: “I can see it, why the semiconductor industry would think this is nuts”
(Bandy 2011).
Bandy’s position on the issues of X‐ray lithography and ASICS is somewhat
different than Van Atta’s. He notes, as a program manager for NSA and at SEMATECH,
that X‐ray lithography dominated the agenda of all manner of government sponsored
research efforts. He explained that at the time there were other technologies. He
lamented: “there were other technologies out there…. There was ion beam lithography
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for example… NSA we got behind an effort to try to demonstrate some of that
[different] technology. But it was just pushed down because it wasn’t X‐ray lithography.
It seemed like everything that came forward other than X‐ray lithography was just sort
of pushed to the side. It was very frustrating” (Bandy 2011).
When asked why SEMATECH did not pursue these other technologies, as it
would seem to have been an ideal place to do so, Bandy explained that he did not know
why there was such an unbalanced fascination by DARPA and other government
institutions on X‐ray lithography. He did however offer that SEMATECH most likely
looked at X‐ray lithography and just concluded that “it was going nowhere.” Van Atta
had an explanation as to why the whole X‐ray lithography issue kept continuously
coming up at SEMATECH. He told how some of the programs and research done under
VHSIC and Microwave Millimeter Integrated Circuit program overseen by the OSD and
DDR&E moved into DARPA. These were not “typical DARPA hires.” Van Atta speculated
that these people were the people who continued to drive and support this focus on X‐
ray lithography as they had invested a great deal of time and effort in developing them
under the auspices of these other programs (Van Atta 2011).
Bandy’s conception of SEMATECH’s treatment of the ASICs’ agenda parallels
that of Van Atta and industry’s concern with cost. ASICs at that time were not high
volume chips. ASICs are not general processors, nor commodity type semiconductors
like DRAM and SRAM. Bandy, being an engineer, noted that: “an ASIC is what you
develop when you want to get better performance than can be derived from a general
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processor kind of chip. You put all the function in hardware to increase the performance
and also decrease power and size. You can do this because you’re not supporting a big
processing overhead; you’re just targeting the specific functionality of the chip, the
ASIC” (Bandy 2011).
Bandy explained that you manufacture ASICs in the thousands vs. the many
millions. The manufacturing equipment associated with ASICs had a very limited
application and would likely end up in just a few labs and a few fabs. The ASIC type of
semiconductor and its associated capital assets make it very difficult for a company to
make a substantial return on its manufacturing assets. At least that was the
understanding of the time. If your business model is based on and set up for high
volume manufacturing, producing small lots of wafers with very specialized equipment
does not make economic sense. Bandy noted that industry was not oblivious to what
was going on with ASICs, but given a choice between investing in how to design chips vs.
manufacture chips, “you invest in your design capability, so you can do a high‐level
design, produce the layout and you then go to fab. You put your resources in design
and you go in and you make a few wafer runs of the ASIC and then you are on to doing
the next one” (Bandy 2011). At the time this was a different model. “After the design is
produced firms would need quick turnaround and to do that there would need to be a
firm or facility that is oriented towards a diverse product mix. A facility such as this
would most likely have to run possibly a dozen different ASIC designs through the line”
(Bandy 2011). Bandy further explained each product would require slightly different
processing. “As the owner of such a facility you would have to tweak the process a little
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bit as you do one product, tweak a little for the next and so on. A firm that specializes in
commodity products does not want to do this in a full‐blown production facility already
outfitted for mass production” (Bandy 2011). Since some of the members of SEMATECH
were manufacturers of chips: “I can understand why Sematech would not get so much
enamored with ASIC design and production or get involved with it. It wasn’t in their
wheelhouse, in a sense: once SEMATECH decided to focus on the work it was doing
with tool makers, it “migrated out of specific processes associated with a given
technology” (Bandy 2011). ASICs and X‐ray lithography are specific products and
technologies and were thus not of much interest to SEMATECH.
More on Divergence:

Bandy had some different thoughts about why SEMATECH and the U.S.
Government had divergence issues and the ramifications this might have had on the
relationship between DARPA and SEMATECH. The U.S. Government and industry had
very different conceptions of what their problems were. Not everyone in the U.S.
Government was focusing on, or continues to focus on, the future and technologies of
the future. One of the biggest problems that government agencies such as the NSA, CIA,
DOE, and DOD face is obsolescence. The U.S. Government, especially the military, is a
very large consumer of not only ASICs but a host of special purpose parts, technologies
and legacy systems. There are items used in the DOD that are archaic by current
standards. Part of the reason for this is security issues; part is that the U.S. Government
develops products that need to be far more robust than their industry or general
consumer users would need. Still other reasons why some U.S. Government
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technologies or systems are obsolete is the sheer length of time it takes to develop
them. Bandy asks the obvious question: “What do you do about products, systems or
associate technologies that are 20‐30 years old and fail” (Bandy 2011)? Bandy discussed
a number of studies that have been undertaken to address this question. Some studies
have suggested that the U.S. Government needs to establish fabrication facilities to deal
with this problem. Although expensive, it is realistic: “industry’s not going to address
this obsolescence because of the economics of it. You’re talking about limited number
of parts again, about ASICs, about old stuff and old technologies and how you rollover
the old technology into new technology” (Bandy 2011).
The uninitiated might be inclined to think that reproducing obsolete products
could be quite lucrative: perhaps. Industry has to remove human and other capital
assets out of current production processes and facilities in order to deal with
obsolescence replacement issues. This may not be terribly efficient; it could, however,
be profitable. Profitable, only if you can charge a margin that not only offsets the costs
associated with losses in efficiency but losses to current production as well. For most
industries, this type of business model does not ensure long‐term success, and thus they
tend to shy away from it.
As Bandy is also a businessman, on top of being a top flight‐engineer and project
manager, he then linked obsolescence to divergence between SEMATECH and U.S.
Government. He states: “Obsolescence is a government unique problem, without
assistance from industry, the government is sort of – is kind of orphaned” (Bandy 2011).
In this regard it becomes easy to see why the government might have put so much
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money into SEMATECH. “The government has a real technology problem. They want to
see security for government requirements for technology. The government has all this
old crap sitting around and we need to figure out what to do with that” (Bandy 2011).
SEMATECH seems to have been oblivious to the problem of obsolescence.
Bandy asserts however that DARPA was hugely concerned with it and he spent a great
deal of time on this issue. This cannot be corroborated as the official records are lost.
Industry was concerned and remains concerned with staying within the timeframes
associated with Moore’s Law. As such, they are likely to be disinclined to remanufacture
old technologies, no matter how potentially lucrative such products might be at the
margin. This attitude engendered and continues to engender ill‐will. Bandy reveals the
heart of this when he says, “I just gave you all this money and you’re not going to care
about my problem. I can understand that there is going to be a bit of an issue there”
(Bandy 2011).
Divergence? Not Really:

Van Atta and Bandy both identified divergences between the interests of
industry and the U.S. Government. A former DARPA official however, did not
necessarily see things that way. In fact, this individual noted: “in the specific case of
ASICs, DARPA worked on advancing design tools and CAD capabilities which also
benefited SEMATECH and its members. DARPA arranged annual meetings through
SEMATECH to gain exposure of these capabilities to the mainstream semiconductor
companies” (Confidential Interview 2011). This DARPA official explained that ASICs were
but one of a host of projects that DARPA was working on in relation to the
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semiconductor industry. DARPA was also heavily involved in advanced lithography‐X‐ray
lithography being part of a portfolio of lithography techniques‐that “were beyond the
horizon of interest for the most of the industrial members of the consortium”
(Confidential Interview 2011). DARPA had been working on this portfolio for some time
and as a result had already established major relationships with industry players. Thus,
DARPA did not see a need to for any “additional interaction with SEMATECH in the area
of X‐ray lithography” (Confidential Interview 2011). This official was quick to point out
that DARPA worked in conjunction with SEMATECH in several different technologies
such as resists, masks, silicon‐on‐insulator wafers, advanced packaging technologies,
and flexible semiconductor processing equipment. This was another unanticipated
revelation as many of these technologies mentioned are, according to Polcari’s
presentation recently at the forefront of SEMATECH research efforts.
DARPA and Dissatisfaction:

There is one final issue that needs to be presented and that is whether or not
DARPA in any way expressed its dissatisfaction with the divergence between its research
expectations and those promulgated by SEMATECH. SEMATECH’s initial round of
funding was slated for five years beginning in 1988. That funding was set to expire at the
end of fiscal year 1993. As Congress was preparing its annual budget, SEMATECH was
the topic of budget cuts. Browning related that this budget cut was a way for the U.S.
Government to express its dissatisfaction with SEMATECH. Bandy did not believe that
this was the case. He claimed that: “if DARPA was really dissatisfied with SEMATECH
they most likely would not have made a recommendation to cut twenty percent of the
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government’s contribution. They would have at that point, just recommended not
renewing funding altogether” (Bandy 2011). The unidentified DARPA official said that
like all programs: “there is a fierce competition for funding every fiscal year; and funding
priorities do change over time” (Confidential Interview 2011). Spencer related how he
spent a good deal of time with Congress, working with other executives from SEMATECH
to ensure that the budget was passed each fiscal year. Spencer related that SEMATECH
was targeted, just like every other program is targeted every year, by the uninitiated
and or Congressmen with a desire to make a name or statement. During his tenure,
SEMATECH was funded in full (Spencer 2011).
The consensus that emerges from these three interviewees is that proposed
budget cuts were a normal and expected part of any major program. These proposed
cuts were not a veiled indicator of dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction with SEMATECH
seems to be a function of perspective. SEMATECH was an overwhelming success from
industry’s standpoint. From DARPA’ standpoint, SEMATECH may or may not have been
a success per se. It is clear in talking with Bandy, Fields and the unidentified DARPA
official that DARPA did not have specific goals in mind for either X‐ray lithography or
ASICs. Dissatisfaction therefore is a result of different perceptions about problems that
need solving and different conceptions of competitiveness. It is clear however from Van
Atta’s standpoint, that SEMATECH was an overwhelming failure. The U.S. Government
invested considerable amounts of money and received very little in the way of return on
investment.
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Conclusion:

Two major topics were presented in this chapter. The first topic explored the
mechanisms and interactions between the government and DARPA that contributed to
the success of SEMATECH. Those contributions were the hosting of a key meeting, and
the interaction between DARPA and SEMATECH that facilitated the development of
good strategic planning that would secure SEMATECH’s first round of funding, and
pervade subsequent planning sessions while SEMATECH received funding. DARPA
contributed to SEMATECH on a silent basis at the operational rather than executive
level. This was a far better place for DARPA to contribute as it fit with their normal
mode of interaction with groups, agencies and contractors that they were accustomed
to work with.
It is highly unlikely that had DARPA had a bona‐fide vote at the Board of
Directors level that they would have been able to sway the research agenda in any
meaningful way. The method under which SEMATECH was funded, a grant, gave
industry carte blanche and ensured that the U.S. Government had no real decision‐
making capabilities. This is the second major topic explored in this chapter. Audits were
performed of SEMATECH, all of which were positive, but even had those audits
concluded that if SEMATECH was deficient in any way, the only effective lever for
change that the government would have been able to wield was through funding.
SEMATECH was fully funded throughout its relationship with the government; therefore,
DARPA must have remained satisfied with the work SEMATECH was doing.
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SEMATECH, DARPA and the U.S. Government did have very divergent research
agendas, and conceptions of concerning competitiveness and problem definition.
Obviously, DARPA and SEMATECH were able to come to agreement on one common
problem, the tool manufacturing industry. When this occurred SEMATECH blossomed.
DARPA and SEMATECH seem to have had very different perceptions about ASICs and
lithography and what those technologies met for the United States as a whole.
None of the requirements advanced in the IDA report seem to be overly odious,
nor do they seem an unreasonable way in which to secure near and long‐term U.S.
competitiveness. In retrospect, we now know that some of the recommendations and
areas of interest cited in the IDA report were exceedingly prescient as they indicate that
at least someone in the U.S. Government already had a grasp of where the industry was
going, even if industry itself did not, or was not willing to admit. It seems that in the
intervening years however, that industry has moved not only in the direction IDA had
envisioned, but that industry has also come to embrace at least some of the
recommendations made in this 1988 report.
SEMATECH was the model upon which other Government Industry Partnerships
have been predicated. The next chapter will explore whether or not the SEMATECH
model was and remains a good model for the development of dual use technologies.
Using the more fully balanced history of SEMATECH, as opposed to the histories of
SEMATECH from the existing literature we will explore the short and long‐term
ramifications of the SEMATECH project, in relation to the development of dual‐use
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technologies and craft some conclusions about its efficacy in relation to the public
policy.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
Overview:

This study has endeavored to create an alternative perspective concerning
SEMATECH. Traditional perspectives on SEMATECH herald it as a significant
achievement, not only from an industry perspective, but in some cases as a public policy
success. Wessner notes that SEMATECH has been the model for not only more U.S.
Government sponsored GIPs but foreign GIPS as well (Wessner 2003). Others,
Deininger, Spencer, Grindley, and Irwin‐ to name a few‐ have claimed that SEMATECH
had a significant positive effect on the U.S. semiconductor industry and link SEMATECH
to the resurgence of the industry. This study has endeavored to demonstrate that
claiming SEMATECH a success may be only partially correct.
SEMATECH emerged as a response to unique challenges directed at U.S.
economic and security interests. Only two previous studies, related to the issue of
national security, (Dempsey 1993) and (Byron 1993) have really endeavored to question
the success of SEMATECH. These two studies were conducted for the National Defense
University and the Naval Post‐Graduate School respectively. Both conclude that
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SEMATECH did not succeed in protecting the national security interests of the United
States because SEMATECH did not result in the creation and sustainment of a wholly
domestic value chain for the production of semiconductors. This particular study also
puts into question the success of SEMATECH.
I examine two hypotheses:
1) SEMATECH is a good model for creating, overseeing and managing Dual Use
Programs ensuring that the government sponsoring agency is able to secure
tangible benefits.
This study has revealed that SEMATECH was not all that it might have been for
the U.S. Government. In short, SEMATECH did not deliver any tangible benefits or
“equities” to the U.S. Government as a result of its research endeavors. SEMATECH’s
research thrusts were focused upon those technologies and processes that were of
interest to its industry members. That it did not deliver on all expectations both from
the government and from industry should not be a surprise. Hindsight now reveals that
SEMATECH could not have addressed the government’s national security interests and
the development of technologies specifically targeted at ASICs and advanced forms of
lithography. SEMATECH could not do this because of the manner in which it was
founded and the manner in which it was funded.
2) A government agency (DARPA) can make real positive contributions to
industry led research consortia other than acting as an overseer of public
venture capital:
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This study reveals that DARPA did make significant contributions to the
SEMATECH effort. In spite of a rocky courtship period, DARPA was able to develop a
working relationship with SEMATECH characterized by respect for capabilities and
expertise.
DARPA’s most important contributions to the SEMATECH effort were the pushing
and prodding of SEMATECH towards 1) a more specific strategic plan and planning
processes and 2) a focused research effort. Had these efforts on creating more focus
not occurred it is highly likely that SEMATECH would have devolved towards the MCC
model of operation, and even with government funds would not have succeeded.
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Hypothesis One Discussion:
SEMATECH is a good model for creating, overseeing and managing Dual Use Programs
ensuring that the government sponsoring agency is able to secure tangible benefits.
The Importance of Selecting a Government Agency:

This study found that when SEMATECH was established, industry lobbied several
government agencies including the DOD, DOC and DOE. Industry, through the SIA and
SRC, elected to pursue the consolidation of its developing interest in a manufacturing
institute under the auspices of a recommendation that came out of the Defense Science
Board Report. Prior to the publication of this report, SIA officials representing
SEMATECH were lobbying the DOC, DOE and the DOD as possible sponsors for a national
response to the loss of competitiveness in the production of DRAMs and SRAMs.
Ultimately, SEMATECH became embedded with the DOD. The DOD remains an
interesting partner given the mistrust and somewhat adversarial relationship that had
developed between the semiconductor industry and the DOD as a result of the troubled
VHSIC program. The DOD had gone out of its way to craft a better relationship with
industry as it developed the VHSIC program, but the internal politics of the DOD
hampered the ability of industry to commercialize much of the technology developed
under VHSIC and created a sense of disillusionment and ill‐will.
It would seem then that industry might have found a better agency such as the
DOE or the DOC for advancing the development of a manufacturing cooperative.
However, neither of those agencies may have been suitable for advancing SEMATECH’s
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interests through Congress and the White House as neither of those agencies could put
quite the national security emphasis on semiconductors that the DOD could and did.
Tying semiconductors to national security interests afforded a narrow opportunity for
the Reagan Administration and Congress to deflect the debate over industrial policy and
“picking winners.” The Reagan Administration’s banal response to the SEMATECH issues
pushed the creation of SEMATECH into the halls of Congress and thus created a project
that unintentionally left the government with an organizational agreement and
processes in which the U.S. Government was nothing other than a subsidizer.
The Efficacy of Government Funding as a Criteria for Success:

This study’s findings align with T.J. Rodgers of Cypress Semiconductors who
claimed: “SEMATECH is a well lobbied subsidy to a group of companies” (Pollack 1988).
Claims of government participation and funding being necessary for SEMATECH to
succeed and revitalize the industry were dubious then and remain dubious to this date.
If government participation in SEMATECH was necessary for SEMATECH to succeed,
than government participation should have continued to be needed to this date.
However, SEMATECH has not received the same manner of funds from the government
since 1997. SEMATECH has endured for fourteen years, in fact thrived for fourteen
years, without government funds and subsidization. Knowing this, we are forced to ask
whether government participation in SEMATECH was necessary at all.
This assertion was addressed in part by Horrigan, which this study examined.
Horrigan posited that the success of research consortia is a function of how well the
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consortium meets the conditions outlined in the following formula. (R‐E)+G>T. The
crucial portions of this formula that concern us are E, costs of enforcement and G,
government subsidy. This study has revealed that government involvement, particularly
a government subsidy is not necessary for research consortia to succeed. Spencer
indicated that SEMATECH was appreciative of government funds, stating that “they
helped us do some things faster” (Spencer 2011). The fact that SEMATECH has endured
and exists now, makes a very strong statement about what needs, well rather what
need not be said about this issue. If a government subsidy is not necessarily a criteria
for success, then it would stand to reason that something else might be more important.
Does Horrigan’s assertion that E‐the cost of enforcement‐ is a crucial component of
success help explain why SEMATECH succeeded or failed any better than the assertion
that a government subsidy is necessary for a R&D consortium to succeed?
Evaluation of the Efficacy of Enforcement as a Criterion for Success:

Many of the firms that participated in SEMATECH also participated in MCC.
Whereas SEMATECH succeeded, MCC did not. This study found that the reason for
SEMATECH’s success was in part a function of a clearly defined and supported research
agenda. SEMATECH did not have a cafeteria research program, or a cafeteria funding
schema. The research focus of SEMATECH not only attracted members from the
semiconductor manufacturing sector, but from the crucially important tool sector as
well. As these separate industry participants interacted, they became increasingly able
to focus their R&D efforts and to overcome their attitude of victim and victimizer. This
created a leadership culture that could focus on R&D rather than on retention and
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funding of individual pet projects. “A more honed focus on R&D directed at generic
technology and equipment industry infrastructure created significant results in the
advancement of manufacturing techniques and asset deployment” (Grindley 1994).
These were perceived as tangible results for the bulk SEMATECH’s industry members.
Only three of SEMATECH’s founding members‐ LSI, Micron Technology and
Harris Semiconductor‐ left the consortium in 1993. Both SEMATECH and DARPA were
apparently nonplussed by this exodus. According to the agreement between SEMATECH
and the U.S. Government, fifty percent of funds were to come from the U.S.
Government, the other fifty percent from member firms. LSI, Micron Technology and
Harris were smaller firms. Theoretically however, the funds SEMATECH lost from the
exodus of these firms should have resulted in an equal loss of funding from the U.S.
Government. I can find no evidence in either the government documents available or in
the existing histories of SEMATECH that the loss of these funds posed any problems
whatsoever. In fact, the U.S. Government contribution to SEMATECH remained at the
levels SEMATECH requested from year to year, for the entire life of the project, 1987‐
1997.
SEMATECH complicated enforcement issues when it made a conscious decision
to magnify the free‐rider problem by making SEMATECH developed technologies
available to non‐members in much shorter time frames than originally established.
Considering then that SEMATECH lost members, and introduced programs that dis‐
incented the remaining members to stay it would appear that the crafting of good
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enforcement mechanisms is also not necessarily a criterion for success. Members
stayed “period” because of the progress that was being made in both technology and
process development.
In addition to Horrigan (1996), Chapter Two of this study presented other
authors and theorists who had set out criteria that they believe account for the success
of SEMATECH. Among those authors were Geisler (1993), Porter (1990) and Fong
(2000). The lessons learned as a result of this study can be applied to these analysts as
well.
Cooperative Research and Impact on Organizations:

Geisler (1993) suggest that more work needs to be done to assess the impact
that cooperative programs have on organizations. This study can contribute to this.
SEMATECH had a positive impact on most of its industry members. Technologies were
developed, transferred and realized in the production of real commercial products.
According to the SIA, the U.S. semiconductor industry regained much of its competitive
advantage in global markets. (sia‐online.org retrieved Sept. 2011) However, SEMATECH
did not impact the government in a positive manner. Other government agencies, NSA
as an example, wishing to perform R&D that was focused on semiconductors did not
have access to SEMATECH. Even if they did, it would have been wasted effort as the
government had no real influence on SEMATECH’s agenda. What opportunity the
government had for inserting its needs, wants, and or desires, was represented, for
example, by Van Atta’s (1988) report.
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Had Van Atta’s (1988) recommendations been acted upon, the U.S. Government
would possibly have had real decision‐making authority. Van Atta’s report and the
opportunity it represented existed before the MOU between Fields and SEMATECH was
signed. Fields (perhaps never having seen Van Atta’s report…it was unpublished)
endeavored to craft at least some level of commitment to the U.S. Government’s
research agenda (20 percent of annual budget to long‐term research), but sadly the
agreements he made were too little, and too late. The mold had already been cast. As
SEMATECH’s efforts became increasingly focused on working with tool suppliers, on
advancing research in pre‐competitive technologies, and increasingly on more internally
published research desires (Spencer’s SEMATECH II) the government became
increasingly less capable of inserting its own research wants (ASICs and alternative
lithography) into the agenda. As it became apparent that other lithography
technologies were being given insufficient attention at SEMATECH the U.S. Government
was forced to find other programs and other funding methods for government agencies
who wanted to do research on lithography and other semiconductor products. This is
not a very efficient use of the U.S. Government’s financial resources.
Another work by Geisler (1997) notes that “each sector, industry, and the
government, has its own criteria for measuring success where technology cooperation is
concerned. Inter‐sector cooperation is a complex phenomenon that does not lend itself
to direct measurements.” This is a dubious statement at best. The U.S. Government is
more than capable of measuring success. DARPA and the government had some wants
in terms of research that would have assisted in the development of ASICs and other
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forms of lithography. SEMATECH did not deliver on these. Some of the reasons for this
are the focus on pre‐competitive technologies. To SEMATECH’s mind, ASICs were a
specific product. At that time they probably were. Many ASIC products are now
ubiquitous and are really becoming more of a commodity per se: the signal processor in
your cell phone is an example of this. In the 1980s and early 1990s cell phones were
somewhat new technologies. As they have grown in market presence, so has the
demand for the ASICs which make them work. This raises a question: when does an
ASIC become a commodity, and when it becomes a commodity, as were DRAM and
SRAM, does it then become a driver of manufacturing technology? This question was
posed to a long‐time semiconductor engineer.25 He responded: “an ASIC becomes a
commodity when it becomes an off‐the‐shelf product. Many cell phone chips now fit
that description. As for question two: yes, off‐the –shelf products remain technology
drivers” (Confidential Interview, 2011). Given this, Van Atta et al were correct in
identifying the importance of ASIC development to the semiconductor industry.
That SEMATECH did not focus its attention on ASICs and industry’s switch to
ASICs speaks of a huge failure in this particular model of cooperation. The
semiconductor industry of the time focused on short‐term incremental improvements
to products and production process that had already run its course. Brown (2010) notes
that even as some members of SEMATECH were participating in the consortium that
they were already positioning themselves to move to different products. Intel was a
25

Interview conducted in Colorado Springs, Mar 2011. The engineer interviewed prefers to remain
anonymous as said individual has worked with many of the firms studied herein.
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perfect example of this. Intel left the SRAM and DRAM business to focus its attentions
on the logic market – a market it now dominates on a global scale. The U.S.
Government had been made aware of what the future held, but was unable to push and
prod industry in that direction. Industry eventually found it, but again, at what cost?
We can probably never measure this, other than through gross speculation.
This study demonstrates that SEMATECH did not have a very positive impact on
the government. SEMATECH did not deliver technologies to the government per se.
The processes and some of the research into optical lithography may have benefited
some of the government’s own foundries. However, SEMATECH did not deliver dual use
technologies that were applied to ASICs nor did it deliver much in the way of
advancement in other forms of lithography. It could not.
The adoption of the SEMATECH model may have set the stage for the devolution
of the U.S. Government’s ability to affect the technology trajectories and technology
focus of business. Harlen (2008) claims the U.S. Government has lost its ability to
impose direction on technology development. The reasons for this decline go back as
far as the 1970s but are really most evident when studying spin‐ons and the dual‐use‐
technology programs of the 1980s and 1990s. Harlen catalogues the change in research
from the pipeline perspective and the spin‐offs associated with that model of
technology development to the change in spin‐on technologies associated with
industries ability to supersede and surpass the technological needs of the government
and its mission based projects. As the government became less of a driver of
technological innovation, funding for technological development declined. Harlen
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references National Science Board statistics and claims that the federal government’s
share of R&D funds began declining in “1979 and by 2000 had fallen to less than 50 per
cent of R&D.” (Harlen 2008, 6) The net result of this decline in funding is: “the erosion
of the government’s relative importance in technology markets creating a decline in the
ability of the government to impose requirements on firms receiving money from it and
which has led it to adopt a more hands‐off, market‐oriented approach to the
development of technologies” (Harlen 2008, 3). The impacts of this have become
magnified throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Emerging firms trying to develop new
technologies and find markets in which to sell these technologies are finding it
increasingly difficult to access venture capital to do so. Securing a government contract
no longer guarantees growth in revenue and concomitant improvements to technology.
The government has endeavored to address this private‐market failure through
different programs including the CIA’s In‐Q‐Tel program. The government however
cannot sustainably all venture capital for unproven technologies (Harlen 2008).
Although we cannot attribute this particular funding mechanism failure to
SEMATECH, we can point to the SEMATECH project as the start to this trend.
SEMATECH was one of the first government industry partnerships to focus on
technology development from a market perspective. The Clinton Administration made
SEMATECH a model upon which GIP should be developed. This may have contributed to
the current state of affairs.
The net result of the switch from spin‐offs, to spin‐ons, and industry led
development is once again, a critical under investment in technologies that are several
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generations ahead of the technology trajectory. As more nations, in Asia in particular,
rise to greater economic prominence, the U.S. cannot rely on the development of new
technologies that focus solely on the commercial interests of industry. The U.S.
Government was in a position to drive technology development towards the
technologies of the future in the semiconductor industry. However, this study found
that having abdicated its authority, an opportunity to leapfrog technology was missed.
This study also found that SEMATECH does not provide evidence that the
government is capable of crafting a strategic plan for technology development (Fong
2000): quite the contrary. SEMATECH reveals an inability on the government to bring
its interests and the interests of industry into greater synergy. The central failure of the
SEMATECH effort was not necessarily its inability to address the national security issues
it was to have addressed; rather, the failure was in the method by which SEMATECH
came to exist and the manner of funding. There appears to be little evidence that many
of the government agencies who develop semiconductors, for whatever purposes, got
together to provide a united front concerning what could be done to advance the
interests of all government agencies. Bandy noted that DARPA had a long‐fascination
with X‐Ray lithography, which was in sharp contrast to NSA’s interest in ion beam
lithography. SEMATECH crafted a rather broad goal; the restoration of the U.S. to
competitiveness. This broad goal seems to have convinced many members of Congress
then that SEMATECH was a group that would be all, and do all. A focus on pre‐
competitive technology development lent SEMATECH an air indispensability and
perhaps invincibility as well. As long as SEMATECH was making progress on its agenda,
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Congress appeared to believe that SEMATECH was a worthy investment and continued
to fund it.
Clearly however, SEMATECH was not strategically beneficial to all people; nor
could it be. Having surrendered any strong means of exercising influence over
SEMATECH, the interests of the U.S. Government took a back seat to the short‐term
goals of industry. Industry’s conception of competitiveness is very different than the
U.S. Government’s. In this industry in particular, competitiveness is based on how
closely those in the industry are able to keep pace with Moore’s Law. The
semiconductor industry is a capital intensive industry that needs to produce chips as
quickly as possible, get them into the market and realize a return on investment and
assets, before that generation of technology is superceded by another. The U.S.
Government’s conception of competitiveness is, in one part, based on the creation of
new technologies that create a first‐mover advantage. The U.S. Government’s research
interests were then in technologies that were in ASICs, a near‐term wave of the future,
and in another case, lithography, technology that would be long‐term and several
generations ahead of the optical lithography of the time.
One can easily understand why SEMATECH would choose to ignore ASICs, as
they were a specific type of semiconductor, a finished product, and thus outside of
SEMATECH’s legal mandate. Many of the firms that started SEMATECH no longer make
DRAMs and SRAMs and some of them abandoned this technology even while they were
participating in SEMATECH. Brown notes that Intel had made a strategic decision to
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begin to abandon DRAMs in favor of micro‐processors as early as 1986. Why then did
Intel participate in SEMATECH? Brown only hints at this, but it seems Intel was looking
for ways to produce its micro‐processors, faster and better (Brown 2010). The initial
focus of SEMATECH may have been on doing research to produce memory chips at
increasingly discrete line widths, but as the research agenda evolved and began to focus
on tool making and machinery, Intel’s interests remained engaged. The tools used in
making DRAMs and SRAMs are largely the same tools used in the manufacture of micro‐
processors. Support of SEMATECH, therefore had no real downside for INTEL, IBM,
Texas Instruments, or Motorola, or for that manner, any of the other large members of
SEMATECH.
Porter’s “diamond of competition” is a useful tool for interpreting whether or
not the SEMATECH effort was successful. In the Competitive Advantage of Nations,
Porter spoke about the tasks that a government should engage in so that it can to assist
with creating competitive advantage. Porter spoke about the necessity of the
government to foster vertical cooperation and to push and prod industry. The
government was successful in the area of creating vertical integration. This was
accomplished under changes in the law, most notably, the passage of The Co‐operative
Research Act. The government was not successful per se in enhancing, to the fullest
extent, more cooperation in related in supporting industries. Van Atta talked about
other companies and industries that make up the semiconductor value chain. For
example, chemicals are extensively used in the production of semiconductors and yet
this industry was not part of SEMATECH’s efforts.
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The U.S. Government’s most notable shortcoming was in the pushing and
prodding. The method of funding was the first and perhaps most critical reason why the
government was unable to push and prod SEMATECH. The second was the U.S.
Government really had no concrete ideas what it wanted from SEMATECH. Although
Van Atta’s report was fairly specific it was not acted on. In addition, in its rush to assist,
Congress and the DOD did not consult broadly enough with other agencies such as the
NSA or the DOE. As a result there were uncoordinated efforts across the federal
government. To rectify this failure, other semiconductor initiatives were created to
ensure that the technologies that these organizations, including the DOD, needed to see
developed were met. Even had the government found a way to insert itself into the
SEMATECH decision making apparatus at the Board level, it would have been unlikely
that there would have been any funds forthcoming to meet whatever research they
might have been able to secure. Money was now spread out across several different
programs.
Hypothesis Two Discussion:

A government agency (DARPA) can make real positive contributions to
industry led research consortia other than acting as an overseer of public
venture capital.
Although DARPA may not have been able to advance the U.S. Government’s
interests at large; this study has found that DARPA contributed to the success of
SEMATECH in two ways. The first was somewhat uncharacteristic of DARPA and
happened when Fields and Bandy first interacted with SEMATECH. The second way
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DARPA interacted with SEMATECH was in consultative manner, and is DARPA’s normal
scope of interaction with groups that they work with. This consultative interaction
engendered a close and very collegial level of relationships. (Bandy, Fields, DARPA
official, Interviews 2011) However, DARPA’s most notable contribution to the success of
SEMATECH was not necessarily associated with this collegial interaction. Early in the
development of the relationship between DARPA and SEMATECH, Fields and Bandy
insisted on a more detailed plan from SEMATECH. SEMATECH was on the verge of
diluting its research efforts by pursuing demonstration vehicles using two distinct
technology platforms, SRAM and DRAM. In addition, no really concrete strategic plan
seems to have been put together at that time. The executive leaders of SEMATECH
were crafting open plans so that creativity would not be stifled. The edict issued by
Fields that funds would not be forthcoming if more cogent plans did not emerge
seemed necessary and proved fruitful.
The net result of these early edicts was the establishment of a very solid working
relationship, based on respect, between SEMATECH and DARPA. The early interaction
disposed of one of two demonstration vehicles: SEMATECH dropped IBM’s DRAM in
favor of AT&T’s SRAM as the technology for which machinery would be developed and
evaluated. This decision positioned SEMATECH to be able to respond to the U.S.
Government’s desire to see research directed towards ASICs. SRAM technology is more
easily transferred to other types of semiconductor products. Although Fields
threatened SEMATECH with a loss of funds if they did not develop a solid strategic plan,
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he was never forced to act on the threat. The MOU was signed and Fields, Bandy and
the leadership of SEMATECH had crafted a working relationship.
This working relationship dispelled some unfounded perceptions of DARPA by
industry. Those perceptions were that DARPA would take over SEMATECH, DARPA
would force SEMATECH to focus on military technologies, and DARPA would piece out
funds (Browning 2000). In addition, DARPA’s evolving and fruitful relationship put an
end to debates within the Beltway concerning which government agency would be the
best agency to oversee SEMATECH. The legislation which authorized SEMATECH
required a review of this issue. It was a big surprise when oversight of SEMATECH was
transferred from the Undersecretary of Defense to DARPA. DARPA is a division of the
DOD, so we must assume that leadership in Washington did not see much of a problem
within an intra‐agency switch. However, we can only imagine how much bigger the
surprise would have been had SEMATECH been moved out of DOD to another
government organization that had expressed interest in working with SEMATECH. Such
a switch would have been time consuming and most likely disastrous. How much would
the DOE or the DOC have known about SEMATECH’s previous lobbying efforts,
coordination efforts, and efforts to craft the understanding between itself and
government’s interests.
Craig Fields’ early edicts to SEMATECH may have been perceived as bossy, and
overly direct. This study reveals that SEMATECH and DARPA emerged from their early
interactions with a better understanding of each other, and it seems a better
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understanding of how the DOD was going to support the SEMATECH effort. Even
though the terms crafted between SEMATECH and Fields were never realized, the
relationship that was formed was proof positive for 8 or more years of an ability to work
with each other.
It cannot be overstated how important it was for SEMATECH to have its R&D
efforts focused. During its de‐facto operational beginnings, SEMATECH was close to
diluting its focus. Then acting COO, Charlie Sporck, decided that SEMATECH would
utilize both the SRAM and DRAM technology platforms for manufacturing vehicle
demonstration purposes. These technologies were donated by AT&T and IBM
respectively. This dual platform decision was an internal‐ practical‐ political decision. It
was however a dangerous decision as it moved SEMATECH in a direction akin to MCC.
MCC worked on several technology platforms at once, and as a result of this, MCC’s
research efforts and funding were diluted because individual member organizations
sponsored those programs which showed the most promise for their immediate
interests. Had SEMATECH continued to pursue two different technology platforms, it
seems highly likely that they would have marched down a parallel path. SEMATECH was
a new organization but MCC had been around for a few years. SEMATECH members
AMD, DEC, Harris, Motorola, NCR and National Semiconductor were all members of
MCC. It is natural for persons and organizations that are faced with ambiguity to
follow behavior which is familiar. These members may well have fallen back on known
behavior had they not interacted with DARPA. SEMATECH averted a very real threat by
working with DARPA to craft a focused strategic plan, and a focused research platform.
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Dodging this bullet was perhaps the most significant reason why SEMATECH was able to
accomplish the things that it did.
More subtle interactions and catalysts between DARPA and SEMATECH‐that
eventually ensure the success of SEMATECH‐evolved out of the switch in research
emphasis. The change from the demonstration manufacturing vehicle research to the
development of new manufacturing standards and proofing of tool making technologies
was the real story of SEMATECH’s success. This co‐opetition (Caryannis 2004) between
members of SEMATECH and SEMI, solidified operations and the mission at SEMATECH
and contributed to what I believe are the following criteria for success.
SEMATECH’s switch in research emphasis firmly focused SEMATECH’s research
efforts for several years. This co‐opetitive research agenda when combined with
SEMATECH’s more focused research agenda (which emerged as a result of DARPA’s
insistence for a more focused strategic plan) ended the possibility of SEMATECH
pursuing dual research platforms, SRAM production and DRAM production.
SEMATECH’s work with tool supplier’s revealed that much of the industry
suffered from the same problems. This discovery shattered the belief that everyone had
different proprietary technologies and problems which required individualized solutions
from tool manufacturers. This stark realization opened up the cooperative possibilities
between market competitors and more or less helped to reduce the concerns
surrounding proprietary technologies and trust issues that plagued the industry. The
work upstream created a co‐opetitive environment (Caryannis 2004) that allowed a
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good portion of the industry, not just semiconductor sales firms26 to improve
technological know‐how and fostered a more collegial relationship, rather than the
victim/victimizer relationship that had been the norm. This in turn, facilitated a greater
interaction between all parties, especially at the Executive Technical Advisory Board
level where the bulk of technical decisions and technical advances were located. As
DARPA was effective at level of technical advisory boards; DARPA’s contributions then at
that level may have made some small contributions to national security concerns. The
U.S. Government does own and operate some of its own FABs. Since these FABs
suffered from the same problems as industry, it stands to reason that the government
might have been able to improve some of its own relationships with the tool
manufactures and in some aspects of its production processes. This does not however
mean that the U.S. Government was able to apply these lessons learned directly to
either ASICs or other forms of lithography.
Given what is presented above had DARPA not intervened in SEMATECH at the
points that it did it would have been highly unlikely that SEMATECH would have
delivered any tangible benefits to industry. SEMATECH would have gone down the MCC
path and pursued one too many technology thrusts. Thus the government under the
auspices of DARPA made a larger contribution to the success of SEMATECH.

26

This should not be surprising as internal DOD semiconductor providers suffer from same problems as
members of SEMATECH and national foundries do as well.
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Summary Comments:

This study has revealed that the SEMATECH model has some fundamental flaws.
Structuring a GIP under the auspices of a grant is a poor idea. Grant funding encourages
industry members of a GIP to pursue their interests. In the case of SEMATECH, industry
interest proved to be, as Van Atta demonstrated: “myopic.” SEMATECH did make
contributions to the restoration of the U.S. semiconductor industry and international
competitiveness. However, the focus on incremental development meant that such
competitiveness is likely to lead to only a temporary comparative advantage.
If competitiveness is considered to be the creation of technologies that leap frog
at least one generation and provide something other than a short comparative
advantage, then SEMATECH falls short as a model. The U.S. Government correctly
identified impending changes to the semiconductor industry’s product mix and
lithography technologies. Had SEMATECH addressed the government’s wants and
desires it seem likely that the industry would have made a faster transition to ASICs and
the Design/Foundry model that characterize industry at the time of this writing. In
addition, had SEMATECH had a longer‐term focus, it would have propelled the U.S.
towards other technologies that would help overcome the impending barriers to
semiconductor line widths that are posed by simple physics. SEMATECH’s own
documents show that it started working on other forms of lithography (EUV, DUV) in the
early and mid‐2000s. Given the rapid rate of technological progress that characterizes
the semiconductor industry we can only speculate as to how much father the industry
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would be today had it listened more attentively and acted upon what its government
partner had to say and suggest.
The SEMATECH model is an effective model if the government’s goal is a short‐
term solution to a technology problem. If however, the government is interested in
long‐term technology, then funding under the auspices of a grant, and allowing industry
to control the research agenda, will likely not deliver. If the government wishes to
create technology that is dual use, and that creates a first mover advantage, then the
government needs to consider creating its own research consortia out of its own
agencies as well. Two coordinated consortia, one from industry, and one from
government might help the U.S. to create a program that balances short, medium and
long‐term technology development and forces, per Brown, (2010) industry crisis on
other countries competing in the same industry.
SEMATECH was by industry, for industry, and although Congress may have
understood this, the people who represent the interests of government, the program
managers, researchers, auditors, etc. did not. Congress may have been rushed into,
and persuaded to create a new paradigm (spin‐on) of federally sponsored research.
Congress’ haste did not necessarily mean that hundreds of program managers, auditors,
auditing agencies etc had been rushed into the new paradigm of change as well. A
strategic change of this magnitude takes time and focused effort to filter down into all
levels of an organization. As such, those auditing SEMATECH might have been auditing
its performance using the wrong glasses. Fourteen years after SEMATECH weaned itself
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of government funds, the organizational memory of accountability that looks for the
embodiment of technologies in real products, still seems active. In many respects this is
good, as it means that at least someone is endeavoring to ensure that taxpayers receive
some level of tangible benefits or “equities” in return for the resources invested. In
some respects this is troubling, as it indicates that government agencies do not change
at the same rate as business and thus balanced interests and or shared measures of
success might continue to be elusive.
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APPENDIX A
Bob Burmeister, he and I were talking about, well, what can we do about getting this thing going? And
I will give Burmeister the credit for saying, “Why don’t we hold it at a government facility, and invite
them to come? And that would give them the cover to come, because it’s not individual companies, et
cetera. And it provides a safe haven relative to the public press, et cetera.” Because these guys were
coming together for the first time.
So we, meaning IDA, through various contacts, got facilities at the Naval Postgraduate School in ’87, or
whenever it is. I’d have to go check the calendar. And actually, through SIA, got them to invite all of
the companies that were signing up to participate in Sematech.
And I can’t remember exactly whether that was before or after, or what the actual legislation, (I believe
Van Atta is referring to the Bay-Dole Act) et cetera. But it was very early. And we literally held the
first meeting of Sematech at the Naval Postgraduate School. And the interesting thing was, each
company that came—IBM, Intel, TI, et cetera—as far as I could tell, their CEOs had never met each
other because they were competitors, and they hated each other. Or, they – here were competitors, and
they didn’t really spend much time together for legal anti-trust reasons didn’t want to spend much time
with each other.
But – and they all came to this auditorium at the Naval Postgraduate School. And they all sat quite
distant from each other. Each CEO, CTO, and their corporate lawyer were completely separate from
each other, sitting around this auditorium, with lots of space between them.
And then the interesting thing is, after the introductions, after the discussion, the DOD guys got up.
And I can’t remember who – whether it was Sumney or Maynard or whoever from DOD, but DOD
guys said, you know, we’re glad you’re here. Here’s what we’re trying to do.
And then we basically had them start to talk. And what they basically said is, well, I have this problem
in terms of dealing with my suppliers and with my manufacturing. And then another guy would say,
well, I have that problem too. Or, do you have that problem too? Well – and they went back and forth.
And then by the second hour, all of the CEOs and CTOs were sitting down together as a group, shoulder
to shoulder, interacting and discussing, and all the lawyers walking around the back with nothing to do,
and they finally all just got up and left. Because they realized that, one, they could be there, and two,
they had mutual interest, and three, they really started getting down and talking about, well, what do –
what are we focusing on, or how do we do it?
And so, that first meeting became the icebreaker that would get them all really start to interact. And
from there I could go find out what happened next, but it was kind of like the kickoff of the whole thing.
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APPENDIX B
Fong’s Five Typologies (Fong 2000, 159‐ 160).
1) By‐Product Model
In this by‐product model, the conduct of defense research is exclusively guided by
mission agency military requirements. Commercial spin‐offs are not avoided and may
become quite significant. But any such by‐products are unintended from a policy
planning perspective, and are considered beyond the consideration of DoD.
2) Intentional Spin‐Off Model
In this approach, commercial spillovers are expressly contemplated during program
planning….In this intentional spin‐off model, defense research remains overwhelmingly
guided by military needs. And the actual “harvesting” of anticipated commercial
benefits is considered beyond the Pentagon’s jurisdiction, and is left to the efforts of the
private sector.
3) Explicit Dual‐Use Model
In this model, defense technology projects have the express purpose of benefiting
commercial as well as military needs. Projects focus on a level of technical work that is
generic to both the military and civilian sectors. Although technologies developed in the
first two models may indeed have a dual‐use utility, this third approach pursues such
technologies explicitly and programmatically. This explicit intent, as well as balancing
between military and commercial objectives, defines this category more narrowly for
this analysis than more general uses of the “dual use” term.
4) Industrial Base Model
In this approach, the commercial orientation of defense programs, at least
operationally, exceeds the defense orientation. One purpose of industrial base
programs remains military benefits, namely, access to leading‐edge technologies and
capabilities. But in this model, such benefits are gained only after commercial
technology and civilian industrial advances are supported by DOD. The commercial and
civilian focuses of such programs are justified on the grounds that it is necessary to
establish or bolster the civilian technology and industrial base so that spin‐ons can
accrue to the defense technology base.
5) Economic Competitiveness Model
In this approach, any vestige of national security or other mission agency rationale is
jettisoned, and unabashed support is given to commercial technology. Such purely
civilian oriented technology policy is usually associated with R&D programs of U.S.
economic rivals in Asia and Europe.
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APPENDIX C
Interview Questions
1) Sematech might have failed in at least three instances, its initial difficulty in appointing a
CEO, the switching of the research agenda, and later in its life when SEMATECH
developed machinery became available to non‐members, magnifying the free rider
problem. What specific mechanisms or processes did DARPA engage in to help
SEMATECH overcome these difficult situations?
2) What else did DARPA do that ensured the success of the SEMATECH project?
3) SEMATECH invested quite a bit of time and effort to create mechanisms and processes
to ensure cooperation concerning agenda, authority and accountability amongst the
industrial members of the project. What specific mechanisms and processes were
created by either DARPA or SEMATECH to ensure cooperation with DARPA? Were these
mechanisms successful? If so, how? If these mechanisms were not successful, why
weren’t they?
4) There is second source evidence indicating that DARPA and some of the industrial
members of SEMATECH had a great deal of interest in advancing research and
development of ASICS and X‐ray lithography. These particular efforts do not seem to
have made it to the SEMATECH research agenda. Why is this?
5) At one point the government proposed reducing its annual contribution to SEMATECH
by 20 million dollars. Funding was eventually approved at the full budgetary amount.
Was this a way for DARPA to express its dissatisfaction with the SEMATECH project?
6) During the development and operation of the SEMATECH project, there was a shift in
national research policy towards more of a spin on model. The Clinton Administration
endorsed the SEMATECH project as a model for government industry partnerships. Is
the SEMATECH model a good model? What are its strengths? What are its
weaknesses? How should those weaknesses be addressed?
7) Are there lessons from the SEMATECH project that would apply to other government
organizations concerning their decisions to join, remain in, or terminate a GIP or
research consortium?
8) Is there anyone else I should talk to?
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APPENDIX D
The documents provided in this appendix demonstrate that SEMATECH is now engaged
in research that focuses on different semiconductor substrates, “thin Silicon‐On‐
Insulator” (SOI) and on alternative forms of lithography such as Extreme Ultraviolet Light
(EUV). X‐Ray technology was on the forefront of DARPA’s research interests, however
EUV is one of several alternative lithography technologies that DARPA and other
government agencies had interest in during the years that SEMATECH received direct
funds from DARPA.
This information can be accessed at:
http://www.pascaltechnologies.com/files%5CTech.Docs%5CThe%20Semiconductor%20I
ndustrys%20Path%20to%20Survival%20and%20Growth%20Polcari_2005.PDF
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APPENDIX E

The material presented in this appendix is meant to demonstrate the significant
progress in the research of alternative forms of lithography made by SEMATECH,
especially Extreme Ultraviolet Light Lithography.
This information may be accessed at:
http://www.sematech.org/research/litho/documents/Litho_Overview.pdf
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